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Terror is nought but prompt, severe, inflexible justice; it is
therefore an emanation of virtue; it is less a particular principle
than a consequence of the general principle of democracy
applied to the most pressing needs of the fatherland.
-Maximilien Marie Isidore de Robespierre'
I. INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this Article is to present twenty-one theses involving the
negative influences, in the view of the author, that the French Revolution has
had on Latin American legal systems since the time of their independence.
These propositions do not exhaust the respective topics, since each of them
could be the object of a standalone tractatus (treatise). Instead, these
propositions aim at motivating further academic discussion on the positions
presented.
The methodology chosen consists of the proposition of twenty-one theses,
each presenting a negative diagnostic of the effects triggered by the French
Revolution's legal legacy in the life, organization, and essentials of Latin
American legal systems. These theses revolve around five areas of impact:
the ethical and philosophical substratum of the political system, the
fundamentals of the democratic regime, the organization of the branches of
government, the paradigms of fairness, justice, and axiology, and the shaping
of family life, public morals, and the legal profession.
The Enlightenment and the French Revolution of 1789 were crucial
historical and political phenomena that have significantly impacted European
life2 from the nineteenth century onwards.3 France was the epicenter of this
philosophical, economical, and political cataclysm. The Enlightenment and
the French Revolution served as powerful movements that embodied
philosophical ideas that shaped societies and legal systems around the world.
Even the American Revolution has been counted among the French
1 See generally Maximilien Robespierre, Speech to the National Convention: The Political
Philosophy of Terror (Feb. 5, 1794), available at http://www.worldfuturefund.org/wffnaster/
Reading/CommunismI/ROBESPIERRE%27S%20SPEECH.htm.
2 See H.G. KOENIGSBERGER & ASA BRIGGS, A HISTORY OF EUROPE: EARLY MODERN
EUROPE 1500-1789, at 315-31 (1987) (reviewing the immediate historical events leading
toward the French Revolution).
3 JAMES G. APPLE & ROBERT P. DEYLING, A PRIMER ON THE CIVIL-LAW SYSTEM 13 (1995),
available at http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/CivilLaw.pdf/$file/CivilLaw.pdf ("This
intellectual movement included the French Revolution and contained the near origins of the
modem European codes.").
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Revolution's progenies.4 This influence had a particularly strong impact on
the design, organization, implementation, and ongoing status of Latin
American legal systems5 since the wars of independence.6 Many people
generally recognize that the French Revolution changed the world, and that
we are still living under its massive philosophical, intellectual, and legal
influence, especially in Latin America.7 French revolutionary ideas are still
profusely quoted in judicial decisions throughout the region.8
In effect, when the new Latin American republics gained their
independence, they needed models on which to base their new societies.9
The fathers of the new Latin American nations were well aware that they
were building on the remains of three hundred years of Iberian influence,
which was paramount in every sphere of colonial life. The Latin American
liberators strongly rejected the Iberian legacy, even though most of them had
obtained their education and training in the continent. 10 They were quick to
4 The resemblance of many provisions of the French Revolutionary Constitution of 1791 to
the U.S. Constitution is noteworthy. Compare 1791 CONST. tit. II, ch. V, para. 9 (Fr.)
(providing that "[n]o citizen may be tried in criminal matters except upon an indictment
received by the jurors"), with U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 (stating that "[t]he trial of all crimes...
shall be by jury"). Many other provisions of both constitutions show a striking resemblance,
including the provisions on impeachment. Compare 1791 CONST. tit. III, ch. III, § I para. 10
(Fr.) (delegating the legislative body with "[p]rosecution, before the National High Court, of
the responsibility of ministers and of the principle agents of the power"), with U.S. CONST. art.
I, § 3 ("The Senate shall have the sole Power to try all Impeachments."). Also notice Title III
of the Constitution of 1791, where, "[o]f Public Powers" first regulates the "National
Legislative Assembly." Article I of the U.S. Constitution follows suit by referring to "[t]he
Legislative Branch."
Robert S. Barker, Judicial Review in Costa Rica: Evolution and Recent Developments, 7
Sw. J.L. & TRADE AM. 267, 269 (2000) ("The independence movements in Spanish America
were strongly influenced by the French Revolution.").
6 IVAN JAKSIit, ANDRIS BELLO: SCHOLARSHIP AND NATION-BUILDING IN NINETEENTH-
CENTURY LATIN AMERICA 156 (2001) (recalling that the Chilean Liberator, Bernardo
O'Higgins, proposed the wholesale adoption of the Code Napoldon in 1822 to the Chilean
Congress, accompanying his proposal with the following exhortation: "Let us forever erase
the institutions built under colonialism and eradicate ignorance!").
APPLE & DEYLING, supra note 3, at 18 (referring to the Civil Code of Brazil as the
"greatest monument to legal thought and codification in Latin America" and also pointing out
that "[t]he greatest influence on this code's substantive provisions was the Code Civil of
France").
8 See Sentencia [S.] No. 504, de las 5:00 p.m., 19 Oct. 2009, BOLETIN JUDICIAL [B.J.]
[Supreme Court of Justice] pp. 1-23, Cons. VIII (Nicar.), available at http://www.glin.gov/vi
ew.action?glinlD=224071 (allowing the President of the Republic and other public officials to
run for reelection).
9 Dale Beck Furnish, Judicial Review in Mexico, 7 Sw. J.L. & TRADE AM. 235, 237 (2000)
("Mexico's legal system traces its lineage from the Romano-European traditions of the Civil
Law, through the French Civil Code of 1804.").
10 See generally ALLAN R. BREWER-CARiAS, REFLEXIONES SOBRE LA REVOLUC6N
NORTEAMERICANA (1776), LA REVOLUCION FRANCESA (1789) Y LA REVOLUCION
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reject the Spanish influence, and gladly embraced French revolutionary
ideas1' that ended up shaping the new Latin American legal systems. 12 The
French Revolution had a great impact not only on private law (civil law), but
also on public law, as it became the intellectual mother of the Latin
American independence movement.
More than two hundred years have helped to assess the impact of the
French Revolution in the Latin American legal field. The common claim
that it constituted a grassroots movement directed by, and for the benefit of,
the people has greatly receded. A quick glimpse of Delacroix's Libert
Guidant le Peuple (Liberty Leading the People)-even though painted forty
years after the Revolution-clearly reveals the truth behind the July
cataclysm: ferocious bourgeois faces trampling upon the fresh cadavers of
scantly dressed, destitute people. 13 The true owners and harvesters of the
revolutionary horrors were the leaders of the aristocracy and the nobility. No
independent and learned observer in his compos mentis (sound mind) may
deny the outright connection between the Revolution, the Reign of Terror,
14
and the Napoleonic imperial experiment. 15  The real forces behind the
Revolution appealed to the liberal idea of representative democracy to cloak
their efforts with a blanket of legitimacy. However, what really happened is
that the enlightened and despotic government of the bourgeoisie replaced
monarchical government.
1 6
HISPANOAMERICANA (1810-1830) Y SUS APORTES AL CONSTITUCIONALISMO MODERNO 155-
202 (2008) (analyzing the institutional crisis that led to the French Revolution prior to 1789,
and its impact on Latin American early constitutionalism).
1 M.C. Mirow, The Code Napolern: Buried But Ruling in Latin America, 33 DENV. J.
INT'L L. & POL'Y 179, 183 (2005) (stating that "[a]part from the intrinsic appeal of the Code
and its widespread acceptance within world legal circles, its Frenchness made it particularly
attractive to Latin Americans in this crucial period of Latin American codification").
12 Id. at 181 (stating that "[t]he fundamental influence of the Code Napoleon on Latin
America's legal development is unquestionable and clearly evident from contemporary
sources").
13 EUGENE DELACROIX, JULY 28: LIBERTY LEADING THE PEOPLE (1833), available at http://
www.louvre.fr/llv/oeuvres/detail-notice.jsp?CONTENT/ 3C%3Ecnt-id=l 134198673237674
&CURRENTLLVNOTICE%3C%3Ecntid= 10134198673237674&FOLDER%3C%3Efolder
_id=9852723696500815&bmLocale=en; see also CHARLES BAUDELAIRE, EUGENE DELACROIX:
HIS LIFE AND WORK 30 (1979) (mentioning that Delacroix called himself "a realist" in the
presentation of his own art; "Je veux reprrsenter les choses telles qu'elles sont") ("I want to
portray things such as they are." (author's translation)).
14 CHARLES HILL, GRAND STRATEGIES: LITERATURE, STATECRAFT, AND WORLD ORDER 24
(2010) ("The French Revolution ideologically legitimized terror."). For a further analysis of
the terror, see generally HUGH GOUGH, THE TERROR IN THE FRENCH REVOLUTION (1998).
15 See generally Napolgon Bonaparte 1769-1795, FRENCH-AT-A-TOuCH.COM, http://www.fr
ench-at-a-touch.com/FrenchHistory/napoleon i 1769-1795.htm (last visited Mar. 20, 2011)
(providing a chronology of French History).
16 Id.
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This Article argues that the legal ideas advanced by the Enlightenment
and the French Revolution, which influenced the new Latin American
nations during the nineteenth century, were not random, unsystematic, or
haphazard. To the contrary, the premise is that those ideas were materialized
by, and in turn coherently advanced by, a fully coordinated philosophic
thinking that was (and is) consistent and compact. The beheading of King
Louis XV1 7 by the National Assembly in 1793 set the tone for the
guillotining of about forty thousand under the Reign of Terror. As a
consequence of the influence of the French Revolution, many more perished
during the subsequent Latin American political experiments. 19 All things
considered, the Revolution was true to itself-blood is what it got:
To arms, citizens!
Form your battalions!
Let us march, Let us march!
May an impure blood
Water our furrows!
20
This Article asserts that many of the chaotic consequences that plague
Latin American legal systems in the eyes of common law observers were
avoided in England, since England "steadfastly steered its traditional
course."21 That is, England did not have an event equivalent to the French
Revolution.
The key legal notions brought about by the Revolution include: the
absolute separation and antagonism between religion and the State,23
17 Andr6 Tunc, The Grand Outlines of the Code Napoleon, 29 TUL. L. REV. 431, 431 (1955)
(noting that "if there was great confidence in the justice of the King, the confidence was often
less in the royal officers and even in the royal judges").
18 See generally ROSE McCARTHY, DICTATORSHIP: A PRIMARY SOURCE ANALYSIS 18 (2005)
("Eighteen thousand people were executed at the guillotine, and more than 20,000 were killed
by other means."); see also ANNE MARIE DUPORT, TERREUR ET REVOLUTION: NiMES EN L'AN II
1793-1794, at 245-84 (1987) (referring to Chapter I1 (A): "[l]es victims des lois
r~volutionnaires") ("the victims of revolutionary laws" (author's translation)); id. at 285-87
(containing bibliography on the subject).
19 See generally BENJAMIN KEEN & KEITH HAYNES, A HISTORY OF LATIN AMERICA 178-592
(8th ed., Cengage Learning 2008) (analyzing the bloody consequences that the multiples
coups and dictatorships have caused in Latin American countries from the nineteenth century).2OCLAUSE JOSEPH ROUGET DE LISLE, LA MARSEILLAISE (1792), available at http://www.ford
ham.edu/halsall/mod/marseill.html.
21 R.C. VAN CAENEGEM, AN HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION TO PRIVATE LAW 134 (D.E.L.
Johnston trans., 1992) (1988).
22 See id. at 137 (recalling that Latin was the official language of law in England until
1731).
23 1791 CONST. pmbl. (Fr.) ("The law no longer recognizes religious vows or any other
2010]
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sovereignty of the State,24 the privileged and virtually unchecked legislative
powers of the government,25 the unrestricted supremacy of statutory law,
26
the restrictive role assigned to legal sources (custom, general principles of
law, and equity) other than statutory (positive) law,27 the unification of civil
laws in one legal body (the Civil Code) universally applicable to the whole
28 29
nation,28 a diminished judiciary, the abolition of the intermediate corporate
bodies of society represented by the guilds, 31 the imposition of universally-
mandated government instruction,31 the abolition of the fundamental
institution of Western family law,32 and the consecration of a legal system
guaranteeing privileges for the few to the detriment of the many.33
In light of these legal notions, this Article proposes that the twisted notion
of natural law championed by the French Revolution-coupled with its ideas
of authoritarian democracy, paternalist state, legislative monopoly and
supremacy, 34 and the lack of an effective check and balances system-have
all contributed to the systematic degradation and delayed demise of Latin
American democratic systems. In turn, this Article sustains that these
phenomena facilitated a poor human rights record throughout the region in
the last two centuries.
obligation contrary to ... the Constitution."); id. tit. I, § 3, para. 9 (providing for the right to
elect religious ministers, contrary to the Catholic Church's millenary clerical appointment
process).
24 Id. tit. III, para. 1 ("Sovereignty is one, indivisible, inalienable, and imprescriptible. It
appertains to the nation; no section of the people nor any individual may assume the exercise
thereof.").
25 Id. pmbl. (remarking that all citizens are equal, and that there is no "superiority other
than that of public functionaries").
26 Id. tit. IlI, ch. 1I, § 1, para. 3 ("There is no authority in France superior to that of the
law.").
27 See id. para. 6 ("If the King places himself at the head of an army and directs the forces
thereof against the nation, or if he does not, by a formal statement, oppose any such
undertaking carried on in his name, he shall be deemed to have abdicated the throne.").
28 Id. tit. I, § 3, para. 13 ("[A] code of civil law common to the entire kingdom shall be
drafted.").
29 Id. tit. III, ch. V, para. 3 (manifesting that "the courts may not interfere with the exercise
of the legislative power, suspend the execution of laws, encroach upon administrative
functions").
30 Id. pmbl. ("[N]eitherjurandes nor corporations of professions, arts, and crafts any longer
exist.").
31 Id. tit. I (mandating public instruction for all citizens).
32 Id. tit. II, para. 7 ("The law considers marriage only as a civil contract.").
33 Id. tit. III, ch. I, § 2, para. 2 (establishing requirements related to age, birthplace, and
social position for the exercise of civil rights).
34 Tom Farer, Consolidating Democracy in Latin America: Law, Legal Institutions and
Constitutional Structure, 10 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POI'v 1295, 1315 (1995) (observing the
French origin of "legislative supremacy").
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In the area of government organization, for example, this Article states
that the revolutionary concepts of strong separation of religion and State,
absolute sovereignty of the State, and unfettered nationalism all contributed
to the shaping of endemically weak and conflicted constitutional systems in
Latin America from the very beginning. In addition, this Article asserts that
the recent Latin American reforms in the area of judicial review-some of
them borrowed from France-have not removed the original stain of
incongruence and insufficiency present in the initial borrowing from French
revolutionary law.
The Civil Code of 1804 is said to "enshrine the principles of the French
Revolution. ''35 This Article explains that the political and legal notions that
were written into the Code are essentially authoritarian. Consequently, these
legal ideas produced a legal instrument-lofty in its pretensions of
universality, flawed in its combination of diverse philosophical approaches,
and filled with unsubstantiated commitments. These features created a
code 36 plagued with inconsistencies, and, contrary to its pretensions, wholly
unholistic. These flaws have greatly contributed to a situation of legal
confusion and, in many ways, an undeclared motivation to walk away from
law and justice in broad sections of Latin American societies.
This Article sustains that the French Civil Code's merits-as they are-
are found in sections borrowed from Roman law37 and the European ius
commune (common law), as it was, through 1789. 38  Furthermore, this
35 James Gordley, Myths of the French Civil Code, 42 Am. J. COMP. L. 459, 459 (1994).
36 David Gruning, Codifying Civil Law: Principle and Practice, 51 LOY. L. REV. 57, 57
(2005) (commenting that, for some, the Civil Code "represents the culmination of the
Enlightenment's view of the law and of legislation").
37 Rafil Lozano Merino, Address at the Proceedings of the Ninth Annual Conference on
Legal Aspects of Doing Business in Latin America: New Approaches: Looking to the Twenty-
First Century, in Successfully Financing Operations and Projects, 11 FLA. J. INT'L L. 72, 77
(1996) ("The Napoleonic Code is often recognized as the paramount synthesis of the
Romanist tradition, originating from the oldest tradition and then molded by the above
mentioned schools and the liberal principles that marked a new era in the history of thought.").
38 For a review of the influence of Roman Law in Europe and the emergence of the ius
commune, which the French Revolution aimed to abolish, see generally MANLIo BELLOMO,
THE COMMON LEGAL PAST OF EUROPE 1000-1800 (1995); H.G. KEONIGSBERGER, MEDIEVAL
EUROPE 400-1500 (1987); ENNIO CORTESE, LE GRANDI LINEE DELLA STORIA GIURIDICA
MEDIEVALE (2000); LAURA SOLIDORO MARUOTTI, LA TRADIZIONE ROMANISTICA NEL DIRITTO
EUROPEO (2001); BARRY NICHOLAS, AN INTRODUCTION TO ROMAN LAW (1962); H.F.
JOLOWICZ & BARRY NICHOLAS, HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF ROMAN LAW (3d
ed. 1972); CHARLES M. RADDING, THE ORIGINS OF MEDIEVAL JURISPRUDENCE: PAVIA AND
BOLOGNA 850-1150 (1988); KENNETH PENNINGTON, THE PRINCE AND THE LAW, 1200-1600:
SOVEREIGNTY AND RIGHTS IN THE WESTERN LEGAL TRADITION (1993); JAMES MULDOON,
POPES, LAWYERS, AND INFIDELS: THE CHURCH AND THE NoN-CHRISTIAN WORLD 1250-1550
(1979); R.H. HELMOLZ, THE IUS COMMUNE IN ENGLAND: FOUR STUDIES (2001); VAN
CAENEGEM, supra note 21.
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Article proposes that additions after 1789 have not or will not withstand the
passage of time-in spite of widespread statements to the contrary-as two
hundred years of history demonstrate.
Finally, this Article argues that traditional Latin American civil and
criminal procedures, insofar as they borrowed from French revolutionary
law, were inspired by the same flawed ideas as the Civil Code. Accordingly,
these notions have contributed to promoting the widespread perception that
Latin American civil and criminal procedures are utterly dysfunctional.
II. A TWISTED NOTION OF NATURAL LAW39
The concept of natural law4° was first proposed in the Western world by
St. Thomas of Aquinas during the thirteenth century. 4' The intellectual
foundations of the West may only be understood by making a reference to
the works of Aquinas, the great Catholic philosopher and theologian. He
was the first to explain the triad constituting the foundation of all legal
systems in the form of divine law, natural law, and positive (or human) law.42
Doctor Angelicus 43 taught that divine law is the permanent set of rules
emanating from God Himself through Revelation, mainly in the Sacred
Scriptures. 44  Divine law is, therefore, eternal, wise, incorruptible, and
possessing all the attributes of Eternal God.45
39 William May, Contemporary Perspectives on Thomistic Natural Law, in ST. THOMAS
AQUINAS & THE NATURAL LAW TRADITION: CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVES 113, 124 (John
Goyette et al. eds., 2004) (referring to the distortion of natural law "in some times and
cultures").
40 See VAN CAENEGEM, supra note 21, at 115-21 (discussing the historical origins of the
idea of "natural law").
41 Gordley, supra note 35, at 463-64.
42 See PETER J. STANLIS, EDMUND BURKE AND THE NATURAL LAW, at xvii (2003)
(explaining the Thomistic context of natural law as follows: "God as the external principle of
good acts in two ways: he instructs us by His law and assists us by His grace. Law as one of
the ways that God is a principle of action is the immediate context of Aquinas's treatment of
natural law.") (citation omitted).
43 WILLIAM EDWARD ADDIS & THOMAS ARNOLD, A CATHOLIC DICTIONARY 269 (1884)
(stating that "Doctor Angelicus" is the "name given to St. Thomas of Aquin [sic]").
41 CHRISTOPHER DAWSON, RELIGION AND THE RISE OF WESTERN CULTURE 205 (1950)
(mentioning the fundamental role of divine law since the times of European medieval political
philosophy).
45 See David Novak, Maimonides and Aquinas on Natural Law, in ST. THOMAS AQUINAS &
THE NATURAL LAW TRADITION, supra note 39, at 43, 61 ("Therefore, there is some divine law
that is perpetual because it is identical with either natural law or the supernatural reality of
Christian revelation.").
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As Aquinas explained, natural law is the reflection of divine law in the
human conscience.46 When properly discerned, natural law encompasses the
features of divine law, to wit, its universal application, and trumps any other
factors influencing the temporal realm. Two main consequences ensue from
this premise: first, natural law embodies what is just, good, and desirable in
every human society, and second, natural law may not vary according to
time, location, or majoritarianism (the temporary expressions of the
majority).4
7
The third level of the Aquinean legal pyramid is human law, the law of
the polis (political community).48 It may be written on the books (positive
law) or practiced by the community (customary law). Aquinas taught that
human law is a derivative legal product. 49 Therefore, to achieve legitimacy,
it must be subordinated to natural law. To be valid and to serve as a
foundation of the sovereignty claimed by those exercising auctoritas
(authority), natural law must conform to divine law.
This pyramidal structure entails a hierarchy, where one level is subject to
the other. Human law is subject to natural law, which shows what is good
and just in society. Natural law is subject to divine law, which is the law of
Revelation-the law that mandates not to murder, hurt, or lie to one's
neighbor.50
This structure of legitimacy and organization has permeated the
arrangement of legal systems in the Western world since the thirteenth
century, based on outstanding intellectual efforts by the expositors of natural
law. However, in the years prior to the Revolution, many ideologues
advanced a coordinated philosophical discourse, used by the forthcoming
political movement. In that vein, revolutionary ideologues presented a
colossal, schematic, and systematic distortion-a suppressio veri
(suppression of truth)-of the core certainties presented by the school of
46 See STANLIS, supra note 42 ("Divine law refers specifically to God's law as explicitly
revealed to man.").
47 Steven A. Long, Natural Law or Autonomous Practical Reason: Problems for the New
Natural Law Theory, in ST. THOMAS AQUINAS & THE NATURAL LAW TRADITION, supra note
39, at 165, 179 (referring to the "immutable divine" will-eternal law-that is the source of
natural law).
48 See STANLIS, supra note 42 (recalling that according to Aquinas the law is defined
generally as "an ordinance of reason directed to the common good by those who have care of
the community and promulgated").
49 See id. (sustaining that "human law refers to what we understand as law in the ordinary
sense and including custom") (emphasis added).
50 See generally Natural Law and Sir William Blacktone, 4,LL ABOUT PHILOSOPHY, http://
www.allaboutphilosophy.org/natural-law-and-sir-william-blackstone-faq.htm (last visited Mar.
20, 2011) (discussing natural law).
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natural law, as Aquinas first presented. A quick review of these distortions is
outlined below.
A. Elimination of Divine Law from the Hierarchical Pyramid Presented by
Thomas ofAquinas
The French revolutionary ideologues kept the concept of natural law, but
obliterated the belief of its foundation on divine, eternal law .5  They said
that natural law was no longer based on divine law, but instead on human
law-on human reason.52 Thus, the dogma of the social compact (political
society) was born.5 3  The modem notion of democratic majoritarianism
succeeded the ideology of the social compact, which founded its ontological
support on the secular notion of natural law. Ultimately, the polis was no
longer subject to any spiritual or divine power, but to itself, to the accord of
the majority.54
The French Revolution moved away from the concept of natural law's
validity in every location and time. In doing so, it embraced the idea of a
natural law that depends on the mores of transitory and circumstantial
majorities. Thus, natural law was divested of its claim to universality and
uniformity. It became an idea nurtured in, and embraced by, relativism.
This Article proposes that the combination of the secularized notion of
natural law and the inordinate forces existing at the time of the Latin
American independence triggered a malum praecessi (an evil result)-the
legal, constitutional, and moral consequences of which are still present in the
region.
51 BRIGITTE BASDEVANT-GAUDEMET & JEAN GAUDEMET, INTRODUCTION HISTORIQUE AU
DROIT XIIIE-XXE SItCLES 323 (2000) (referring to the new revolutionary concept of natural
law as "inddpendantes de Dieu") ("independent from God" (author's translation)).
52 Id. at 322 ("Dans le domaine juridique, cela implique dlaboration d'un droit nouveau,
librement congu par l'homme, dont le fondement soit la raison, qui soit au service du people et
compris par lui.") ("In the legal field, this means developing a new law, freely designed by
man, whose foundation is reason, that is at the service of the people, and is understood by
him." (author's translation)).
53 See RICHARD JOHN NEUHAUS, THE NAKED PUBLIC SQUARE: RELIGION AND DEMOCRACY IN
AMERICA 38 (2d ed. 1984) (discussing the spiritual and religious underpinnings of the
Revolutionary spirited agenda and commenting, "The 'scientific' approach of the secular
Enlightenment is similar to the 'primitive' world views of ancient times. There is finally no
real history, no real contingency, no real change; the world is either composed of static entities
or what looks like change implies a cyclical recurrence of the same old thing. Judeo-Christian
tradition, however, is premised upon the concept of real history, real change, and happening in
an incomplete universe that is still awaiting its promised fulfillment.").
54 Long, supra note 47, at 179 (referring to the "immutable divine" will-eternal law-as
the source of natural law).
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The effect of a concept of natural law determined exclusively by the
social compact implies that no further search into the metaphysical
foundations of the law is necessary. According to the revolutionary
democratic principle, it is the majorities who decide their own destiny, and
the majorities also decide the content of natural law.55 In sum, the ultimate
revolutionary idea concerning natural law is that once a society rids itself of
the shackles of divine law, only positive law subsists as the source of all
democratic legitimacy.
But even French revolutionary ideologues understood that leaving the
majorities unrestrained would bring about dire consequences to their new
society. Hence, they proposed the notion of public policy as a set of ethical
principles that would act as a deterrent to positive law, counteracting the
whims of the majorities.56 However, they could not avoid the fact that by
debasing the Aquinean pyramid, they had to necessarily default to
majoritarianism as a political rule. This view had to ultimately accept that-
since there is no longer an ultimate divine notion of what is right and
wrong-it is up to majorities and, ultimately, the government, to determine
restrictions on the exercise of power.
Another effect of the laicization of natural law is that any claims or
attempts to detach the foundations of natural law from the will of the
majority, whether permanent or temporary, are considered violations of the
separation of religion and State. God's law, consequently, has no place in
civil society. Man is sufficient to himself, and he should have emerged from
the Enlightenment as the ultimate ruler of his own world.
B. Natural Law Is No Longer Unchangeable, Universal, or Permanent
Since the mores of the moment change, the new ideal of natural law is
also open to change. According to this view, nothing wrong or inadequate
should be perceived in this new arrangement of things.57 Human reason acts
55 EDMUND BuRKE, REFLECTIONS ON THE REVOLUTION IN FRANCE 290 (The Temple Press
Letchworth 1910) (affirming that "[t]he political dogma, which, upon the new French system
is to unite the factions of different nations, is this, 'That the majority, told by the head, of the
taxable people in every country, is the perpetual, natural, unceasing, indefeasible sovereign;
that this majority is perfectly master of the form, as well as the administration, of the
state .... that this is the only natural government; that all others are tyranny and
usurpation' ").
56 INTRODUCTION TO COMPARATIVE LAW 95 (Konrad Zweigert & Hans-Jirgen Katz eds., 2d
ed. 1987) (mentioning that "[f]reedom of contract is therefore the principle which dominates
the law of obligations in the Code civil, restricted as little as possible by mandatory rules of
law, called in France 'lois d'ordre public' [public policy laws]").
57 See STANLIS, supra note 42, at 122 ("Neither 'abstract right' nor metaphysical 'truth' nor
'general will' nor 'utility,' nor anything else could replace or justify transgressions against the
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as the insuperably corrective element of undesirable constructions or
applications of the new concept of natural law. If humans are reasonable
beings, as the enlightened belief purports, there is nothing to fear from a
rational exposition and molding of natural law.58
The revolutionary substitution of the will of the people for the millenary
concept of divine law as the foundation of democratic legitimacy rested on
the idea that majoritarian expressions of the people would act as a supreme
check over irrational ideas and elements. However, this expectation has been
tested against reality during the last two centuries. In fact, the last century
alone saw millions and millions march to their deaths, forced by the will of
"legal" regimes based on the majoritarian concept.59 As it stands today, the
French revolutionary distortion of natural law is ontologically empty,
morally bankrupt, and politically debased.
C. Elitist, Moralistic, and Moralizing Ethos Tainted the Concept of Natural
Law
The proposition that a transitory majority can provide universal legal and
moral legitimacy to the legal order at a given time was assured to rest on
well-founded ground. However, truth and experience show that, without
resorting to a foundational force, the soft, volatile, and compromising
concepts of public policy 60 and good morals advanced by the revolutionary
codifiers as powers to overrule statutory law, will always be defined by the
majority.61 A curious and empty moralist overtone replaced the prior
religious foundations of natural law. The idea of moral restoration of society
after the Revolution was coupled with the political elitism bred by the
movement. In other words, the few enlightened men of the Revolution
thought of themselves as the moral bastions of the political schemes that
ethical norms of the Natural Law.").58 See Tune, supra note 17, at 441 (noting the deification of reason by the French
Revolution).
59 See, e.g., ALAN BULLOCK, HITLER AND STALIN: PARALLEL LIVES (1993); see also
RICHARD OVERY, THE DICTATORS: HITLER'S GERMANY, AND STALIN'S RUSSIA 192 (2004) ("In
both regimes the security apparatus slowly accumulated legal instruments that allowed it to
bypass the existing justice system .... The Soviet system operated on an agreed legal
foundation.").
60 See James L. Dennis, Interpretation and Application of the Civil Code and the
Evaluation of Judicial Precedent, 54 LA. L. REV. 1, 12 (1993) (referring to the daunting task
of civil law judges when it comes to defining loose concepts, such as, "public policy").
61 HEINRICH A. ROMMEN, THE NATURAL LAW 141 (1979) ("In actual practice, the general
will, because representative government is almost necessarily party government, is always
best a majority decision against which the minority will ever claim the protection of the
law.").
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developed. Recent history shows that many political experiments that
clothed themselves in morality were a pretext for the repression and
elimination of political dissidents.6 1
D. The People Do Not Reserve Any Powers: All Are Transferred to the
Majority As Represented by the Legislature
The crooked notion of secular natural law preached by the Revolution
entailed the legal principle that there is no longer a limit to the areas of life
where the majority can govern. The foundation of this proposal lays in the
concept that all the power and sovereignty are transferred from the majority
of citizens to the legislature. 63 However, this total-transfer of sovereignty
within the revolutionary Constitution of 179164 runs counter to the
contemporary notion of democracy, and has fueled many important debates,
for example, in the United States since its inception.65
Every political revolution needs an ideology. 66 The bourgeois Revolution
was not an exception and, accordingly, chose nationalism as the cornerstone
of its philosophy.67 Sovereignty, therefore, became the legal expression of
nationalism68-both internally with respect to its subjects, and externally
62 Conan Fischer, Europe Between Democracy and Dictatorship: 1900-1945, in IV
BLACKWELL HISTORY OF EUROPE 284 (2010) ("Hitler's protestations of peace needed to be
taken seriously, but only alongside 'a moral renewal and the rapid and rigorous perfecting of
[France's] military forces.' ").
63 See John H. Merryman, On the Convergence (and Divergence) of the Civil Law and the
Common Law, 17 STAN. J. INT'L L. 357, 359 (1981) ("Many view the rise of the nation-state
and the emphasis on state sovereignty as an exaggeration, as one of those periods of history in
which the pendulum has swung too far .... ).
64 1791 CONST. tit. III, para. 2 (Fr.) (affirming that sovereign powers may be exercised by
the nation, "from which alone all powers emanate.., only by delegation").
65 See generally Martin A. Rogoff, A Comparison of Constitutionalism in France and the
United States, 49 ME. L. REV. 21, 58 (1997) (discussing Carr6 de Malberg's rejection of the
"Rousseauian equation of la souverainetd nationale [national sovereignty] with direct
democracy," as an example contrasting the differences between the American and French
notions of representative democracy).
66 ANTONIO ROSMINI, 39 FILOSOFIA DEL DIRITTO 1401 (1967) ("I1 movimento del 1789 fu
movimento d'irritazione ... le idee dovevano dunque essere e furono orribilmente confuse.")
("The movement of 1789 was the movement of irritation ... the ideas had to be and were so
horribly confused." (author's translation)).
67 See Louis Henkin, Revolutions and Constitutions, 49 LA. L. REv. 1023, 1030 (1989) ("In
a radical sweep, the [French] Revolution replaced sovereignty in the king with sovereignty in
the Nation.").
68 See Julie Chi-hye Suk, Equal by Comparison: Unsettling Assumptions of
Antidiscrimination Law, 55 AM. J. COMP. L. 295, 300 (2007) ("The French Revolution also
enshrined a republican conception of sovereignty which has endured in the constitution
presently in force. The Declaration stated, 'The principle of all sovereignty resides essentially
in the nation. No body nor individual may exercise any authority which does not proceed
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with reference to other states.69 It is precisely here where the explanation of
the expansion of colonial powers in the epoch after the Revolution finds its
foundations.7°
III. A TOTAL AND RIGID SEPARATION OF RELIGION AND STATE
Nowhere was the Revolution more blatant than in its attempts at
obliterating the Catholic religion. 7' To achieve this goal, the revolutionary
ideologues advanced the red herring concept of "separation" between
religion and State.72 This "wall" of separation brought about some specific
consequences, some of which are presented below.
A. Religion Has No Role in the Public Square
Montesquieu, the high priest of the Revolutionary philosophical advance,
stated it clearly: "Thus, venerable as those ideas are which immediately
spring from religion, they ought not always to serve as a first principle to the
civil laws; because these have another, the general welfare of society. 73
From "not always, 74 to "not ever" there is a simple, short walk. The
denial of religion's role in the public square subsequently led to its seclusion
in the private realm. As an expression of the majority, the belief that
government action prevails over religion denies religion's role once a
government renders religion's exercise a "concession" or an act of
government tolerance. In that sense, religion-the utmost expression of
human reason and faith in search of the infinite and consequential moral
codes that emerge therefrom 75 -is deprived of its core element of religare
directly from the nation.' ").
69 See generally JOHN HENRY MERRYMAN & ROGELIO PREZ-PERDOMO, THE CIVIL LAW
TRADITION: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LEGAL SYSTEMS OF EUROPE AND LATIN AMERICA 20 (3d
ed. 2007) (referring to the concept of "internal sovereignty" advanced by the French Jean
Bodin and the English Thomas Hobbes, and to that of external sovereignty proposed by Hugh
Grotius, which "looked more to the relation among states").
70 Id.
71 See infra note 191.
72 See Jennifer M. Westerfield, Behind the Veil: An American Legal Perspective on the
European Headscarf Debate, 54 AM. J. COMP. L. 637, 646-47 (2006) ("The history of
secularism begins with the rise of the French idea of laicit6, which in turn finds its roots in the
anticlericalism that developed during the French Revolution .... '[I]t is a political notion
involving the separation of civil and religious society, the State exercising no religious power
and the churches exercising no political power.' "(citations omitted)).
73 1 CHARLES DE SECONDAT, THE SPIRIT OF LAWS 65 (1748).
74 Id.
75 See, e.g., Jeffrey Omar Usman, Defining Religion: The Struggle to Define Religion
Under the First Amendment and the Contributions and Insights of Other Disciplines of Study
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(binding the community together).76 Instead, the revolutionary attitude
toward religion was to relegate it to a subordinate role. Finally, the French
Revolution was lofty to affirm that Caesar had prevailed over God.77
The public role of religion in the West was for millennia, accepted as a
necessary force for good in society.78 Tension between religion and State
existed, and much has been written about it. However, the discussion has
focused more on the jurisdictions of each field; texts have examined the
spiritual versus the temporal, 79 rather than the participation of religion in the
shaping of temporal societies. History depicts religion building Western
European legal culture.8° In denying the role of religion, the French
Revolution attempted to demolish the European legal culture.
Including Theology, Psychology, Sociology, the Arts, and Anthropology, 83 N.D. L. REV. 123,
201 (2007) (describing "humanity's attempt to create a constrained and conditioned finite
understanding of the infinite").
76 C. John Sommerville, Defining Religion and the Present Supreme Court, 6 U. FLA. J.L. &
PUB. POL'Y 167, 172 (1994) (" '[R]eligion' comes from the Latin religare, which means to
hold back or bind fast.").
77 ROMMEN, supra note 61, at 89 (alluding to "Locke substitutes for the traditional idea of
natural law... as a moral reflex of the metaphysical order of the universe revealed to human
reason in the creation of God's will, the conception of natural law as a rather nominalistic
symbol for a catalogue or bundle of individual rights that stem from individual self-interest").
78 See, e.g., Paul B. Rasor, Biblical Roots of Modern Consumer Credit Law, 10 J.L. &
RELIGION 157, 192 (1993) ("As religion became intertwined through narrative with moral
norms and social concerns, it became more than cult and ritual.... Both religion and law
became blended into covenant, which formed the guiding moral and ethical principles of the
society. These principles have become so deeply ingrained that they have permanently
affected the way we think about law.").
79 See, e.g., Steven D. Smith, Is A Coherent Theory of Religious Freedom Possible?, 15
CONST. COMMENT. 73, 74 (1998) ("The enduring problem is to determine how these matters
stand in relation to each other. Does the spiritual take priority over the temporal, or vice
versa? Is the spiritual more real, or more authoritative, than the temporal ... 7"); see also Ira
C. Lupu, The Distinctive Place of Religious Entities in Our Constitutional Order, 47 VILL. L.
REv. 37, 84 (2002) ("Seen in political terms, 'religion' represents that which the new order
disclaims: jurisdiction over ultimate truths, a comprehensive claim to undivided loyalty, and a
command to worship. Separationism, then, depends on articulation of this political concept of
sacredness and on some attempt to identify what particular aspects of the behavior of religious
institutions are bound up with the sacred.").
80 DAWSON, supra note 44, at 14 (stressing that during the later centuries of the Middle
Ages, "everywhere we see the co-operation of men and movements of diverse national origins
which tended towards the creation of a common but highly variegated pattern of culture
throughout Western Christendom"); see also HILAIRE BELLOC, THE CRISIS OF CIVILIZATION 1
(1937) (offering that "the culture and civilization of Christendom-what was called for
centuries in general terms 'Europe,' was made by the Catholic Church gathering up the social
traditions of the Grceco-Roman Empire, inspiring them and giving the whole of that great
body a new life").
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B. Social Justice Is a Secular Concept to Which Religious Views Are Alien
The secularization of law brought together other "collateral" damage as
well. For example, the idea of "social justice" became an entirely secular
concept devoid of religion. 81 The Revolution affirmed the duty of the State
(as representative of the majorities) to determine what is aequo et bono
(equitable and good) in society. Because the will and priorities of a State
change depending on place and circumstance, the relativization of goodness,
beauty, and justice implies a flat denial of any universal truths-that is, those
applicable to all men, at all times, and in all places and circumstances.1
2
As a result, truth becomes a relative concept that is dependent on the
hearts or minds of members of a society at a given time. In this view, the
majority of a society defines the nature, content, and consequences of social
justice. Members of a collective are not impeded from professing a
definition of social justice grounded on religious belief, as long as their
perspectives do not conflict with the majority. In a nutshell, the French
Revolution's message concerning the role of religion in public life is: if you
have religious ideas, you may hold them, but do not bring them into society.
Ultimately, religion created the culture that the revolutionaries attempted to
undermine and destroy.
During the twentieth century alone, majorities, whether real or artificial,
have in many cases either actively promoted or tolerated the worst genocides
humanity has ever witnessed. An author masterfully stated: "majority rule is
no sure guarantee of freedom., 83 In other words, the majority does need a
system of checks and balances. The authentic concept of natural, universal
law provides this system, which was denied by the French Revolution.
81 ROMMEN, supra note 61, at 107 (mentioning that "[t]he individualist natural law of
rationalism .. owed [its] significance to its ethical and politico-economic aims, which were
raised to the sublime dignity of natural justice").
82 See POPE BENEDICT XVI, ENCYCLICAL LETTER CARITAS IN VERITATE § 59 (2009), available
at http://www.vatican.va/holy father/benedict xvi/encyclicals/documents/hf ben-x vi enc_2009
0629_caritas-in-veritate en.html ("In all cultures there are examples of ethical convergence,
some isolated, some interrelated, as an expression of the one human nature, willed by the
Creator; the tradition of ethical wisdom knows this as the natural law. This universal moral law
provides a sound basis for all cultural, religious and political dialogue, and it ensures that the
multi-faceted pluralism of cultural diversity does not detach itself from the common quest for
truth, goodness and God." (citations omitted)).
83 NEUHAUS, supra note 53, at 30 (also stating that "in the century of Hitler, Stalin, and
Mao, however, it is hard to understand how anyone could think the threat of totalitarianism to
be bogus").
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IV. POSITIVISM AS A MORALLY-NEUTRAL LEGISLATIVE SYSTEM
In the revolutionary juridical paradigm, the law becomes the highest and
supreme norm84-the voice of the status quo. Positive law only recognizes
limitations imposed by a secular notion of natural law as its external
boundaries. As the new revolutionary paradigm denied the immutability of
natural law, as it had been explained by the traditional scholastic doctrine
more than a millennia before, the logical consequence was that natural law
came to be conceived as a changing element according to time and location.
The logical effect of this misconception is that in the absence of a
subordination of positive law to natural law, the former was understood as
owing no allegiance to any higher value other than itself.85 In other words, if
alleged democratic majorities determine the substance of both positive law
and natural law, they also divide or unite the pathways between them. In this
context, it could be said that the unrestricted confidence that the French
revolutionaries placed in the supremacy of positive, written law, for the first
time in history, put into actual practice the notions of legal positivism.
86
The Revolution's adoption of positivism resulted in a series of legal
consequences, some of which are analyzed below.
A. No Role for Stare Decisis
Revolutionary sectarianism meant that some attempted to eliminate
jurisprudence as a source of law altogether.87  Fortunately, the
revolutionaries did not take this step. Since, in the revolutionary creed,
natural law no longer derived its foundations from divine law, only positive
law could establish what is good and fair in society. 88 The foremost
84 BASDEVANT-GAUDEMET & GAUDEMET, supra note 51, at 393 ("La loi demeure la norme
supdrieure.") ("The law remains the highest norm." (author's translation)); id. at 425 ("Depuis
la Rdvolution, la loi est toujours considrde comme la source suprieure en droit interne.")
("Since the Revolution, the law is still considered the highest source of law in domestic law."
(author's translation)).
85 VAN CAENEGEM, supra note 21, at 118 (stating that the School of Natural Law bred by
the French Revolution "conceived natural law as a body of basic principles from which
positive law ought to be directly derived: it was an applied natural law [and it] refused to
derive its principles from external systems such as divine law or the corpus iuris").
86 BASDEVANT-GAUDEMET & GAUDEMET, supra note 51, at 330 (mentioning the "triomphe
du 1dgalisme") ("triumph of legalism" (author's translation)).
97 Id. at 425 ("On sait que Robespierre aurait voulu dliminer la jurisprudence ....") ("It is
said that Robespierre wanted to eliminate jurisprudence .... (author's translation)).
88 ROMMEN, supra note 61, at 118 (referring to the ideas expounded by F.J. Stahl,
philosopher of the historical school (1802-1861), for whom "the highest principles touching
the binding force of the positive law-that one must obey the public authorities; whether there
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consequence results in no stare decisis89-that is, no "allegiance" to previous
positive law or existing case law. This attitude prompted the demise of stare
decisis in civil law.90
Since, in every case, the adjudicatory procedure must start from scratch
without referencing past decisions, stare decisis became obsolete in Latin
America, France, and elsewhere.91 Laws dictated what was good, without
referencing any prior judicial decision. Stare decisis, on the other hand,
involves a certain amount of certainty and predictability-that like cases
should be treated alike, and that "justice should not only be done but should
appear to have been done. 92 Nevertheless, the French Revolution rejected
both the substantive merit and the appearance of justice conceived under
stare decisis.
Adjudication became an activity performed ex tabula rasa (absent of
preconceived ideas). This approach came from the profound contempt
French revolutionaries held toward canon law (the law of the Church) and
customary law (thought to be the law of the barbarians).93
A recent comparative study by a Swiss scholar effectively illustrates the
lasting effect of the revolutionary abolition of stare decisis.94 This study
demonstrated the considerable difficulty civil law systems have experienced
in developing theories and techniques for handling case law. 95 Civil law
jurisdictions have faced hardships when trying to change the revolutionary
paradigm, which denied prior judicial decisions any precedential value.
Prior decisions were deemed to lack any utility or authority to shape the
mainstay of current laws.96 Statutory law became the voice of the status quo,
is a limit to this obedience, and what the limit is; whether active resistance is permissible-lie
bey9ond positive law. Yet this pertains not to natural law, but to ethics.").
9 Dennis, supra note 60, at 3 ("The Civil Code is the primary source of law, and precedent
serves merely as an example of a judge's interpretation and application of legislated law.").
90 VAN CAENEGEM, supra note 21, at 130 ("Robespierre would actually have been happy to
see the term 'case law' disappear from the French language, since 'in a state having a
constitution and legislation, the case law of courts is nothing other than statute.' ").
91 BERNARD SCHWARTZ, THE CODE NAPOLEON AND THE COMMON-LAW WORLD: THE
SESQUICENTENNIAL LECTURES DELIVERED AT THE LAW CENTER OF NEW YORK UNIVERSITY,
DECEMBER 13-15, 1954, at 397 (1998) (quoting Professor Lambert of the University of Lyons
as saying, "In France, the judicial precedent does not, ipso facto, bind either the tribunals
which established it not the lower courts.").
92 JOHN HENRY MERRYMAN ET AL., THE CIVIL LAW TRADITION: EUROPE, LATIN AMERICA,
AND EAST ASIA 208 (1994).
93 VAN CAENEGEM, supra note 21, at 125 ("The nationalization of law was at the expense
both of the cosmopolitan ius commune and of particular local customs.").
94 THOMAS PROBST, DIE ANDERUNG DER RECHTSPRECHUNG (1993), cited in MERRYMAN ET
AL., supra note 92, at 209.
95 Id.
96 SCHWARTZ, supra note 91, at 66 (recalling that "the practical effect of stare decisis is that
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and it grew to despise any past precedents. This way positive law achieved
supremacy at any given time in societal life.
After World War II, France instituted a Constitutional Council, whose
decisions were designed to be final and hold precedential value.97 European
and Latin American countries also created their own constitutional courts in
the last decades, 98 and empowered the constitutional chambers or their
highest courts (usually the Supreme Court) with the power to issue
precedential decisions affecting statutory law deemed to be contrary to the
constitution.99  However, these innovations-referred to as the "French
Deviation"' 00 -are but a digression from an original deviation.
B. The Truncated Role of Custom
A profound contempt for canon law and customary law010 was at the root
of the legal principles that shaped the Revolution. 10 2 Accordingly, as the
of vesting courts with the power to determine in a general manner, and to implement by
regulations, as the Code Napoleon states, the contents of statutory provisions").
See MICHEL DE GUILLENCHMIDT, DROIT CONSTITUTIONNEL ET INSTITUTIONS POLITIQUES
382-85 (2005) (highlighting the lack of constitutional control mechanisms before the
Constitution of 1958, the proposals that existed dating back to 1795 to create a "constitutional
jury" to that effect, and the creation of the constitutional court was a "considerable novelty" in
the French constitutional system); see also ALEC STONE, THE BIRTH OF JUDICIAL POLITICS IN
FRANCE: THE CONSTITUTIONAL COUNCIL IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE (1992); id. at 8
("[E]ach Council decision necessarily constitutes the final, substantive stage of the
policymaking process."); id. at 116 ("[T]he Council is indeed a kind of highjuridiction.").
98 Carl Baudenbacher, Some Remarks on the Method of Civil Law, 34 TEX. INT'L L.J. 333,
355 (1999) ("After World War II, most Continental European countries established
constitutional courts with characteristics of common law courts.").
99 See Mauricio Garcia-Villegas, Law as Hope: Constitutions, Courts, and Social Change
in Latin America, 16 FLA. J. INT'L L. 133, 137-39 (attributing principles of maximalist judicial
activism and militant constitutionalism to the "aspirational" Colombian constitution); id. at
150 (describing the factors of instability and inflexibility that led to the 1990 Constitutional
Assembly); David Landau, The Two Discourses in Colombian Constitutional Jurisprudence:
A New Approach to Modeling Judicial Behavior in Latin America, 37 GEO. WASH. INT'L L.
REV. 687, 726 (2005) (describing the philosophy of the Colombian constitutional court as
including "creative judicial work"); Miguel Schor, An Essay on the Emergence of
Constitutional Courts: The Cases of Mexico and Colombia, 16 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD.
173, 187-88 (2009) (describing how the 1991 Colombian Constitution permits a constitutional
court to review constitutional complaints filed by individuals). But see Manuel Gonzdlez
Oropeza, Recent Problems and Developments on the Rule of Law in Mexico, 40 TEX. INT'L
L.J. 577, 583 (2005) (noting that the Mexican judiciary has no plenary powers and can only
suspend a law's effectiveness between parties but not abrogate it).
,0o Felipe Sdez Garcia, The Nature of Judicial Reform in Latin America and Some Strategic
Considerations, 13 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 1267, 1283 (1998).
101 Charles Sumner Lobingier, Napoleon and His Code, 32 HARV. L. REV. 114, 116 (1918)
(pointing out that the Convention of 1791 looked upon customary law as a "barbarian and
degenerate" system).
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State became the unique source of law, enjoying a sacred, law-making
monopoly, custom could no longer be a source of law.'03 Thus, custom was
submerged as a subordinate, secondary source of law based on the
predicament that one, uniform law-applicable to everyone in the polis-
must govern the people. The new understanding of customary law, in due
course, abolished the free expressions of the people.' 0 4  Prior to the
Revolution, there was a lively interaction between the European ius
commune and customary law.10 5  The latter was rather disorganized and
highly local-a chaotic state that the revolutionaries swore to abolish.1
0 6
The phenomenon-a lack of uniformity-was not going to pass the
revolutionary test. Legal homogeny became a goal in and of itself. If some
sort of evenness previously existed under the European ius commune,10 7 the
Revolution deemed it soft on, and tolerant of, local customs. The
Revolution's attitude toward local customary law established prior to 1789 is
reflected by Voltaire's observation, "[W]ith the improvements in
communications, it became absurd to pass from the domain of one law to
that of another every time it was necessary to change horses.' 0 8 Thus, legal
uniformity became one of the primary objectives of the revolutionary
experiment-to be established fully and irrevocably by the power of the
State. However, customary law, which derived from the free expression of
102 VAN CAENEGEM, supra note 21, at 117 (referring to the French Revolution idea that "old
customs and books of authority must be replaced by law freely conceived by modem man, and
whose sole directing principle was reason").
103 BASDEVANT-GAUDEMET & GAUDEMET, supra note 51, at 430 ("Le Code Civil a
express~ment abrog6 l'ancien droit coutumier, dans toutes les mati&res d~sormais r~gies par la
loi. Le droit coutumier a d~finitivement perdu la place qu'il occupait auparavant.") ("The
Civil Code has expressly repealed the old customary law, in all of the matters theretofore
governed by the law. Customary law has definitively lost the place it had up to that time."
(author's translation)).
104 See ADOLPHE GRANIER DE CASSAGNAC, HISTOIRE DES CAUSES DE LA REVOLUTION
FRAN;AISE 189 (Auguste Pagny ed., 1850) (reviewing the protections provided by the old
customary law to families and their patrimonial properties).
105 David J. Ibbetson, COMMON LAW AND IUS COMMUNE 6 (2001) ("[T]he ius commune
constituted what has been described by one recent writer as 'a secure point of reference'; it
was the background to the operation of local statutes and customs.").
106 See THOMAS GLYN WATKIN, AN HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION TO MODERN CIVIL LAW 100-
02 (1999) ("[C]ivil law had won one victory; French law had surrendered to the advantages of
having its laws enshrined in written texts, and this would let in that other feature of civilian
learning, the opportunity for reasoned, juristic development of legal doctrine.").
107 BASDEVANT-GAUDEMET & GAUDEMET, supra note 51, at 408 ("[L]e droit romain es un
droit mondial, applicable A toutes les nations.") ("And Roman law is a worldwide law,
aulicable to all nations." (author's translation)).
8 Alain Levasseur, Code Napoleon or Code Portalis?, 43 TUL. L. REV. 762, 763 (1968).
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the people, has been "routinely dismissed as of slight practical importance"
since the revolutionary days.'09
Then, customary law retained a supplementary, subordinate role as a
source of law that could never abrogate the written law."0  The only
exception to the downgraded role of customary law in civil law countries
applied to the field of commercial law."' The reason for this exception can
be attributed to commercial law as lex mercatoria (the law of the
merchants)-the law of the business class, the bourgeoisie, and those who
provided the heart, soul, hands, and guillotine to the Revolution. The uses,
habits, and practices constituting lex mercatoria were kept as a crucial
element for the furthering of their businesses."12 For custom to maintain a
role in revolutionary-inspired commercial law, a good exception had to be
found. The use of disenfranchised people, nonetheless, did not result in a
better place in the revolutionary pyramid of legal sources. Customary law
was circumscribed to a demoted, supplementary role on the scale of legal
authorities.
Even in situations where commercial custom is afforded a role in civil
law jurisdictions, it is subject to meaningful restraints. Custom is recognized
exclusively secundum legem (according to law)' 13-when it accords to
109 MERRYMAN ET AL., supra note 92, at 203.
"10 Id. at 203-04.
11 Id. at 204 (stating that "[c]ustom, in the form of trade usage, plays a greater role in
commercial... law than it does in civil law generally"); see also CODIGO DE COMERCIO
(COMMERCIAL CODE) [COD. COM.] art. 4 (Chile) (providing that "commercial custom [can]
substitute for the silence of the law, when the facts forming the custom are uniform, public,
generally executed in the Republic or in a specific locality, and reiterated for a long period of
time" (author's translation)).
112 Felix Dasser, Lex Mercatoria - Critical Comments on a Tricky Topic, JUSLETrER, Jan.
2003, at 5, available at http://www.homburger.ch/fileadmin/publications/LMCRIT.pdf ("This
regime [France's] which was held to embrace the revolutionary Lex Mercatoria doctrine .... ").
13 C6oDIGO CIVIL (CIVIL CODE) [COD. Civ.] art. 2 (Chile) ("Custom is not law except in the
cases where the law refers to it."), copied verbatim in Articles 2 of the Civil Codes of
Ecuador, El Salvador, and Honduras; see also CODIGO CIVIL [COD. CIV.] [CIVIL CODE] art. 17
(Arg.) ("Uses and customs may not create rights, except when the laws refer to them, or in
situations that are not covered by the law." (author's translation)). CODIGO CIVIL [COD. CIV.]
[CIVIL CODE] art. 8 (Colom.) ("In no case may custom have a force contrary to law.
Desuetude or lack of practice, even if immemorial and general, may not be sustained as a
reason not to comply with the law." (author's translation)); CODIGO CIVIL [COD. CIV.] [CIVIL
CODE] art. 3 (Costa Rica) ("Uses and custom may only apply in the lack of applicable law,
provided that their existence has been proven and they are not contrary to the morals or the
public order, or to a prohibitive law." (author's translation)); CODIGO CIVIL FEDERAL [CC]
[FEDERAL CIVIL CODE] art. 10 (Mex.) ("No desuetude, custom or practice contrary to a law
may be argued as an excuse for noncompliance with a law." (author's translation)); CODIGO
CIVIL [CIVIL CODE] art. 7 (Para.) ("The use, custom or practice may not create rights, except
when the laws refer to them." (author's translation)); CODIGO CIVIL DE LA R.O. DEL URUGUAY
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positive, statutory law.'" 4  In sum, with scant exceptions, after 1789
customary law bid farewell to the pyramid of legal sources in the civil law
world.
C. General Principles of Law
The general principles of law in post-revolutionary France awaited a
similar fate as customary law. Society dictated that the general principles of
law had no place in the legal system unless and until positive law expressly
accepted it. 1
5
Civil law scholars tediously explain the role of general principles of law
in civil law systems, oftentimes without much success. At their core, the
general principles of law have no persuasive power unless referred to by
primary sources of law. However, reality shows that "[E]ntire bodies of law
in civil law systems have been built up by judicial decisions in a manner
closely resembling the growth of anglo-American common law."'"16 Thus,
people assume that general principles of law create the foundation for case
law.
One example contrary to this trend is the principes gendraux du droit
administrative (general principles of administrative law) developed by the
French Council of State." 7 These principles provide an exception to the lack
of persuasiveness of the general principles of law, because the Council
created new legal institutions without resorting to any primary source of law,
namely, statutory law." 8  Another instance is the creation of certain
administrative tort law liability theories, such as the doctrine of the abuse of
rights and the doctrine of administrative impr~vision (unforeseeability)." 9
[CIVIL CODE] art. 9 ("Laws may only be repealed by other laws; neither desuetude, custom or
practice contrary to the laws may be argued as an excuse for noncompliance with the laws."
(author's translation)); CODIGO CIVIL [CIVIL CODE] art. 7 (Venez.) ("Laws may not be
repealed but by other laws; neither desuetude, custom or practice contrary to the laws, no
matter how old or universal, may be argued as an excuse for noncompliance with the laws."
(author's translation)).
114 The Constitution of 1791 abolished the old custom of the right of aubaine; that is, the
right of the Crown to acquire ownership over the property of foreigners to the exclusion of
testate or intestate heirs. CONST. tit. VI (Fr.) ("Foreigners, established in France or not, may
inherit from their French or foreign kinsmen.").
115 MERRYMAN ET AL., supra note 92, at 204.
"6 Id. at 208.
117 Rogoff, supra note 65, at 76 ("Moreover, in interpreting and judging the legality of
executive legislation and specific administrative actions, the Conseil d'Etat applies principes
genraux du droit (general principles of law).").
1S Id. ("These principles are deduced as a matter of statutory interpretation.").
119 MERRYMAN ETAL., supra note 92, at 209.
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On the other hand, Germany, a dubiously pure civil law country, still accepts
"'certain general principles which the legislators have not rendered in the
form of positive rules.' ,,120
Notwithstanding these examples, the general principles of law from
recent case law in France, at least, illustrate the same concept of natural law
exhibited prior to the French Revolution. 121 As a result, the case law only
partially resurrects the heritage of the pre-Revolution legal tradition.
122
Instances of these principles include the theories offraus omnia corrumpit
(fraud corrupts everything), nemo contra factuam proprium venire potest
(doctrine of unclean hands), and enrichessement san cause (unjust
enrichment). 123  The revolutionaries looked at the traditional general
principles of law with suspicion, as another manifestation of the legal order
they sought to abolish. As a result of the slow return of these theories via the
general principles of law prior to the Revolution, revolutionary civil law
fully subordinated these principles to statutory law. 124 For example, although
the Spanish Civil Code of 1889 includes the general principles of law as a
legal source in Spain, the general principles are clearly subordinate to
statutory law and customary law. 125 Generally, Latin American civil codes
follow the same approach as the French and the Spanish, securing the general
principles as a subsidiary source of law.'
2 6
120 Id. at 206.
121 See STANLIS, supra note 42, at 80 ("To Burke the Natural Law was so basic to the ancient
social order of Europe that its subversion was enough proof that the [French] revolution was
the most extensive project ever launched against all religion, law, property, and real civil order
and liberty.").
122 BERNARD SCHWARTZ, FRENCH ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND THE COMMON-LAW WORLD
270 (2006) ("It is only because the classical notion of sovereignty, accepted without question
by the men of the Revolution, has been coming to be repudiated by French legal theory that
the principle of State liability has been able to extend itself over the entire field of public
law.").
123 See generally JOHN BELL ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF FRENCH LAW 433-40 (2d ed., 2008)
(analyzing the civil equitable remedy of unjust enrichment); id at 417-33 (reviewing other
jurisprudential equitable remedies in French Law, namely, the gestion d'affaires (unrequested
management of another person's affairs); and the repetition de l'Indu (recovery of 'undue
payments')).
124 See generally JEAN-MARC MAILLOT, LA THEORIE ADMINISTRATIVISTE DES PRINCIPES
GItNtRAUX Du DROIT 69 (2003) (highlighting the "valeur infraldgislative" [infra-legislative
hierarchy] of the general principles of law).
125 CODIGO CIVIL [COD. CIV.1 [CIVIL CODE] art. 1 (Spain), available at http://www.ucm.es/in
fo/civil/jgstorch/leyes/ccivil.htm ("Los principios generales del derecho se aplicartn en
defecto de ley o costumbre, sin perjuicio de su cardcter informador del ordenamiento
juridico.") ("The general principles of law shall be applied in defect of the law or custom,
without prejudice of their role in informing the legal system." (author's translation)).
126 See, e.g., CODIGO CIVIL [COD. CIV.] [CIVIL CODE] art. 16 (Arg.) (establishing that is
conflict may not be decided by resorting to the letter or the spirit of the law, the principles of
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D. Role of Equity
It has been stated, throughout the centuries, almost ad nauseam, that
whereas equity is a source of law in common law systems,1 27 it is denied that
same authority in civil law jurisdictions. 12g As explained elsewhere in this
Article, positivism denies the existence of primary sources of law other than
written statutes. 129  Philosophically, at least, the judicial function needs
equity as the remedial tool par excellence. The new revolutionary regimen
was to inflict an unprecedented capitis diminutio (decrease of head) coup to
the judicial function in the West. 130  To achieve this objective,
revolutionaries denied judges equitable powers in post-revolutionary
times.' 31 Equitable powers were deemed incompatible with the new role of
judges and their duties.1 32
analogous statutes may be used; and that if the doubt persists, the general principles of law
must be used); CODIGO CIVIL [COD. CIV.] [CIVIL CODE] art. 1 (Costa Rica) (stating that,
together with custom and uses, the general principles of law are unwritten sources of private
law, used to interpret, delimitate, and integrate the written sources of law); CODIGO CIVIL
FEDERAL [CC] [FEDERAL CIVIL CODE] art. 19 (Mex.) (establishing that civil controversies must
be decided in accordance with the letter or the legal interpretation of the law, and in the lack
thereof, in accordance with the general principles of law); C6DIGO CIVIL [CIVIL CODE] art. 6
(Para.) (providing language analogous to Article 17 of the Nicaraguan Civil Code); CODIGO
CIVIL [CIVIL CODE] art. 8 (Peru) (providing that judges may not excuse themselves from
dispensing justice based on a legal lagoon, or a defective law. In these cases, the judges must
apply the general principles of law; preferably, those inspiring the Peruvian legal order);
CODIGO CIVIL DE LA R.O. DEL URUGUAY [CIVIL CODE] art. 16 (providing language analogous
to Article 17 of the Nicaraguan Civil Code, and Article 6 of the Paraguayan Civil Code,
respectively); C6DIGO CIVIL [CIVIL CODE] art. 4 (Venez.) (mandating that, when there is no
specific law applicable to a case, legal provisions regulating similar cases or analogous
matters are to be taken into consideration and, in case of doubt, the general principles of law
shall apply). The Chilean Code of Civil Procedure, Article 170, provides that final decisions
must show the laws on which the case is decided, and if no laws exist, the equity principles
used by the judge to decide the case.
127 For a review of the basic differences between the core institutions of civil and common
law, see F.H. LAWSON, A COMMON LAWYER LOOKS AT THE CIVIL LAW (1953); see also Gino
Gorla, Samuel Livermore (1786-1833): An American Forerunner to the Modern "Civil Law-
Common Law Dialogue," in COMPARATIVE AND PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW: ESSAYS IN
HONOR OF JOHN HENRY MERRYMAN ON His SEVENTIETH BIRTHDAY 121-37 (David S. Clark
ed., 1990).
128 See John Henry Merryman, On the Convergence (and Divergence) of the Civil Law and
the Common Law, 17 STAN. J. INT'L L. 357, 381 (1981) (addressing the "quite different
prevailing views of the role of judges in the Civil Law and Common Law," with a specific
reference to equity).
129 See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
130 SCHWARTZ, supra note 122, at 14 ("The judicial function is a more limited one.").
131 A Decree of March 5, 1803, Sec. 5 provided that "[t]he judges are forbidden to
pronounce, by way of general and legislative determination, on the causes submitted to them."
132 Levasseur, supra note 108, at 771 (criticizing the strictures of the approach to the role of
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The legislature provided legal solutions to situations which the judicial
use of equity previously resolved. 3 3 With legislative, statutory solutions to
all the legal problems arising in the polis, judicial creativity, or eccentricity,
had no role to fulfill.
1 34
However, to the Revolution's chagrin, statutory law could not provide for
all situations or major issues that needed to be resolved. 135 The only egress
from this dilemma was to allow judges to use equity, but with a decisive
modifier: exclusively when no statutory solution for a given case existed.
136
This solution posed questions, such as, what alternatives did the
revolutionary legal minds have for this situation? Was it possible to ask the
legislature to legislate vis-d-vis every new situation that required a legal
solution? Would that approach transform the essence of the legislative
function into one proper of the judicial branch? Ultimately, this alternative
was not viable based on the Montesquieuan principle of separation of
powers, 3 7 as honored by the Revolution. Another solution had to be found.
Thus, the revolutionaries determined that the judiciary could, in rare
cases, create law using equitable powers and offer a legal solution where
none had been provided. However, judicial equitable powers were
substantially restricted and limited to the "non-provided for cases," and were
established in default of written law.
138
This revolutionary concept of equity was codified in Andr6s Bello's Civil
Code,139 which is the source of most Latin American civil codes. Equity
equity in the French legal system, and arguing that what is desirable is that "if there is no
particular enactment [in a given case], custom or equity must be consulted").
133 EVA STEINER, FRENCH LAW: A COMPARATIVE APPROACH 71 (2010) ("Equity in France
has never been considered a proper source of law.").
134 Id. at 66 (outlining the "French approach to statutory interpretation," which greatly limits
the interpretive role ofjudges).
135 SCHWARTZ, supra note 122, at 157 (comparing the different perspectives of the French
American systems in situations where the legislature had been silent).
136 See, e.g., CODIGO BE PROCEDIMIENTO CIVIL [COD. PROC. Civ.] art. 170 (Chile).
137 CHARLES DE SECONDAT, supra note 73, at VI ("Montesquieu held that governmental
powers should be separated and balanced to guarantee individual rights and freedom.").
138 Maria Luisa Murillo, The Evolution of Codification in the Civil Law Legal Systems:
Towards Decodification and Recodification, 11 FLA. ST. J. TRANSNAT'L L. & POL'Y 1, 15
(2001) ("[C]ontemporary civil law shows an awareness of the limits of law, avoiding
excessive casuistry and introducing general clauses of good faith and equity in the civil
codes."); see also id. at 17 (referring to the numerous reforms to the Argentinean Civil Code,
restricting its individualistic approach, which show a shift "towards social values introducing
provisions about the theory of abuse of law, the rebus sic sanctibus clause and the principle of
good faith and equity").
139 See CODIGO CIVIL [COD. CIV.] art. 24 (Chile) (providing that, where the Civil Code rules
on legal interpretation are not applicable, obscure or contradictory passages in the laws must
be interpreted in a manner that more resembles the general spirit of legislation and natural
equity (author's interpretation)).
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adopted a weakened position in Latin American civil law jurisdictions, as the
adoption of revolutionary ideas deprived countries of the wealth that Anglo-
American law had to offer in the form of equitable remedies. 140 In sum, an
intricate communication between the notion of the judicial role in a society
and the recognition of judicial powers rooted in equity exists. As the
Revolution curtailed the former, Latin America endured a fall from grace for
the millenary concept of equity, 141 where judicial inefficiency and low self-
esteem still go hand-in-hand.
V. PROMOTION OF THE DEMOCRATIC SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT AS THE
SUPREME FORM OF GOVERNMENT
The Revolution advanced the democratic system, based on the majority
rule, as the highest system of human government. This political scheme was,
clothed with an aura of sacredness such that any attempts at proposing
alternative organizational forms for political societies, at least in the West,
has amounted to anathema after the Revolution.
The democratic proposition is founded on the notion that the will of the
majority defines what is true, just, and good in society. 14 2  Therefore,
democracies should be the best system of government because they embody
the principle of popular representation and a universal vote.
However, a closer look at the democratic principle advanced by the
Revolution clearly reveals hidden flaws. Specifically, and counter-
intuitively, a direct link between the democratic ideal and the notion of
authoritarian democracy in Latin America exists.143  Once the will of the
140 See PHANOR JAMES EDER, A COMPARATIVE SURVEY OF ANGLO-AMERICAN AND LATIN-
AMERICAN LAW 66-85 (1950) (commenting on the equitable remedies generally available in
common law, such as the principle that equity presumes that is done which ought to be done,
equitable conversion, laches or unclean hands, estoppel, specific performance, and the broad
availability of injunctions); see also Sergio Bermudes, Administration of Civil Justice in
Brazil, in CIVIL JUSTICE IN CRISIS: COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 352
(Adrian A.S. Zuckerman ed., 1999) ("Provisional relief by injunction is not available as a
matter of course from the courts in most forms of proceeding.").
... See Rolf Knotel, Derecho Romano y Codificaci6n del Derecho Civil, Lecture at the
International Congress "Diritto Romano, Diritto Cinese e la Codificazione del Diritto Civile,"
Beijing 3 (Oct. 3-6, 1994) (affirming the traditional core role that aequitas [equity] fulfilled in
traditional Roman Law).
142 STANLIS, supra note 42, at 239 (referring to the "fundamental dogma of the French
Revolution-that the general will of the people at large was the sole legitimate criterion for
making changes in society and the only allowable basis for sovereignty in government").
143 M.C. Mirow, Borrowing Private Law in Latin America: Andrs Bello 's Use of the Code
Napoleon in Drafting the Chilean Civil Code, 61 LA. L. REV. 291, 306 (2001) (commenting
on the authoritarian democratic regimen installed in Chile under the influence of French
Revolution-inspired Andrs Bello 's Civil Code).
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majority has been established, since it is assumed that it expresses the will of
the people at a given time and is based on a secular notion of natural law, it
cannot be contested without depriving critics of legitimacy.'4 From this
premise, minorities can be easily excluded, whether for political reasons or
otherwise, enjoying no right or voice in the political system in accordance
with the original revolutionary ideal of democracy.
These French revolutionary constitutional ideas have had a substantial
impact on Latin America since the turn of the nineteenth century. 45 In fact,
Venezuela's 1811 Constitution, for example, "represented one of the first
significant documents inspired by French ideology."'
46
Later constitutional developments in the Latin American region show a
movement toward the inclusion of minorities, whatever their nature or scope,
and away from the revolutionary ideals. 47 Nevertheless, these amendments
are tainted by the revolutionary ethos. In other words, to achieve the dual
purpose of recognizing minorities while maintaining the democratic goal, the
status quo shaped by French revolutionary ideas in Latin America had to
change. A revolution against the Revolution raised the banner of minority
rights long excluded under the aegis of the cataclysmic movement of 1789.
The revolutionary constitutional ideas on democratic legitimacy also
established the paternalistic state, 148 which is understood as an omniscient
entity that recognizes no limits to its power, simply because it is an
expression of the majority. Unsurprisingly, Montesquieu sustained that
"democracy has two excesses to avoid: one is the spirit of inequality, which
leads to aristocracy or monarchy, and the other is the spirit of extreme
equality, which leads to despotic power.' ' 149 Indeed, after the end of colonial
rule, democratic experiments led to precisely the type of dictatorial power
identified by Charles de Secondat. He never explained the exact meaning of
144 STANLIS, supra note 42, at 66 ("[F]or [Edmund] Burke 1789 was a 'revolution in dogma';
it was 'a total departure ... from every one of the ideas and usages, religious, legal, moral, or
social, of this civilized world.' ").
145 Mirow, supra note 11, at 181 ("[M]any new constitutions made direct references to legal
reform, specifically codification.").
146 Roberto Gargarella, The Constitution of Inequality. Constitutionalism in the Americas,
1776-1860, 3 INT'L J. CONST. L. 1, 2 (2005).
147 See generally The Explosive Apex of Evo 's Power; Bolivia's Presidential Election,
ECONOMIST, Dec. 12, 2009; Frank Bajak, Power of Indian Majority to Shape Bolivia Election,
Bos. GLOBE, Dec. 5, 2009, at 4; Bret Gustafson, Manipulating Cartographies:
Plurinationalism, Autonomy, and Indigenous Resurgence in Bolivia, 32 ANTHROPOLOGICAL Q.
985 (2009).
148 Farer, supra note 34, at 1301 (commenting on the "paternalistic rule" affecting Latin
American political systems).
149 CHARLES DE SECONDAT, supra note 73, at 110.
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his term "spirit of extreme equality."15 Thus, as Latin American societies
emerged from colonial times based on the concept of class and status, the
powerful found the Enlightenment to be the "perfect" political doctrine to
keep the masses at a close range. Enlightened Montesquieu, whose legal
philosophies literally shaped the West, gave the leaders of the nascent
republics exactly what they were looking for.
What lies at the very center of the Montesquieuan concept of the legal
order is a deep distrust toward the people. These misgivings were amply
shared by the other luminary of the French Revolution, Jean-Jacques
Rousseau. 15' Since the mid-nineteenth century, probably not a day has
passed without a Latin American constitutional decision citing the legal
theories of the French revolutionary ideologues. 52 Rousseau is one of the
main flag-bearers amongst them.
A scholar neatly summarized Rousseau's constitutional "legacy" in Latin
America as:
a statist view of society where the will of the people replaced
the will of the monarch; from absolute subjects to absolute
citizens without space for private initiative; lack of
accommodation for political differences; transition political
intolerance expressed in the exile of opponents, and paving the
road for insurgence as the only alternative to political
participation for those not in power; and an endemic inability
to dialogue with political opponents. 1
53
Another consequence of the revolutionary democratic model, grounded
on the idea of an infallible will of the majority, has been a wide sacrifice of
individual rights in the name of collectivity. 154 The French revolutionaries
deeply held the constitutional notion that democratic representatives of the
people hold a free mandate, and that the right to suffrage can be restricted on
150 Id.
151 JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT 73 (G.D.H. Cole trans., 2005)
("[W]ere there a people of gods, their government would be democratic. So perfect a
government is not for men.").
152 See supra note 8 and accompanying text (sustaining the validity of Jean Jacques
Rosseau's definition of national sovereignty as one of the arguments for upholding its decision
to repeal a constitutional provision banning the sitting President of the Republic and other
representative officers of government to run for reelection).
1 3 David Jordan, Latin American Constitutionalism, in THE U.S. CONSTITUTION AND THE
CONSTITUTIONS OF LATIN AMERICA 37 (Kenneth W. Thompson ed., 1991).
154 See generally INDIVIDUAL AND COLLECTIVE RESPONSIBILITY 25, 134 (Peter A. French ed.,
1998) (analyzing the social compact notions which have permeated some of the massacres
committed in the name of the "collectivity" during the twentieth century).
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some basis. 55 The rationale used by French ideologues seems to have been
that, as the nation, to whom all political power belongs by virtue of absolute
sovereignty,15 6 is a rather abstract entity, and that the legitimate
representatives of the nation assume all absolute power in accordance with
their mandate.
57
Another aberration was included in the brood of the French Revolution's
constitutional legacy to Latin America: the institution of the referendum and
initiative conceived as "transfers" of lawmaking power from the government
to the people.1 58 This transfer "back" may only be explained by a previous
"divestment" of the people's sovereignty and its deposit into the coffers of
the legislature. 59 What other monstrous theory-undemocratic in nature-
could have triggered so many damaging consequences to the Latin American
democratic experiment other than the "elitist" and "enlightened"
Revolutionary concept of democratic supremacy?
France has been oftentimes cited as a good example of a functioning
constitutional system, and its system of government praised as a model for
Latin American nations. 160 At this point one may only wonder if the
institutional flatterers blinked at the fact that France has had at least eleven
constitutions since 1791, and it took more than good wishes to liberate la
France from the claws of Nazi Germany and its pawn, the Vichy Regime,
during World War II.
Contemporary modifications to the revolutionary model of constitutional
democracy include the postulates that all citizens are politically equal and
exercise their rights through universal suffrage; that political representatives
carry out the will of the people; that citizens enjoy a long cadre of second
and third generation rights at the constitutional level; that it is the duty of the
government to promote social welfare; and that civil society demands an
155 ALBERT S. GOLBERT & YENNY NUN, LATIN AMERICAN LAWS AND INSTITUTIONS 43
(1982).156 BASDEVANT-GAUDEMET & GAUDEMET, supra note 51, at 328 ("Dans les doctrines
rdvolutionnaires, l'importance donn~e au concept the souverainet6 demeure aussi
fondamentale.") ("In the revolutionary doctrines, the importance given to the concept of
sovereignty remains equally fundamental." (author's translation)).
157 GOLBERT & NN, supra note 155, at 42.
158 MERRYMAN & PtREZ-PERDOMO, supra note 69, at 25 ("Another complicating factor is the
inclusion of the initiative and the referendum in the constitutions of some civil law countries;
this necessarily involves the transfer of some lawmaking power from the legislature to the
people, and further weakens the position of the legislature as the sole source of law.").
160 See Furnish, supra note 9, at 237 (commenting on Mexico's legal system as tracing "its
lineage from the Romano-European traditions of the Civil Law, through the French Civil
Code of 1804").
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ever-increasing role in the civitas.16 1 Yet these developments have been
nothing but the late corrections of a flawed original design.
VI. CONCEPT OF ABSOLUTE STATE SOVEREIGNTY AND EXALTATION OF
NATIONALISM
The modem concept of the nation-state was not born in Europe until after
the Reformation. 162  This movement rejected the Catholic Church as the
universal moral authority, and established the State as the "supreme spiritual
and moral, as well as political authority and reality ... [affirming also that]
outside this One Sovereign there is nothing.', 163 The denial of a central moral
authority in Christendom yielded to the affirmation of the local and national
spheres. This divergence from Europe's spiritual background arose
alongside with the affirmation that temporal authority belongs to the modem
nation-state. Eventually, this highly politicized view of the national
sovereignty merged with the Rousseaunian statist view of society. 164 This
Rousseaunian construct of the statist view of society holds that the sovereign
(the government, the State) has no counter powers. In other words, the
negation of a universal moral authority implies the affirmation of partial
authorities, each with its own source of legitimacy and strength. 1
65
This view has generated enormous casualties worldwide during the
twentieth century alone. Many, if not all, of the devastating wars fought in
Europe during the last two hundred years had a nationalistic overtone at their
root. From the onset, the modem nation-state recognized no outer limits or
restrictions upon its activities, regardless of whether these originated from
international law, or customary law, or international legal principles. No
external decision, commitment, or influence could be legitimately exerted
over the nation without its consent.
By affirming their absolute sovereignty, states have justified massive
violations of human rights or even genocides. In fact, governments
161 GOLBERT & NuN, supra note 155, at 43.
162 BELLOC, supra note 80, at 109 (affirming that the "[r]eformation has been called in a
biting epigram 'a rising of the rich against the poor' "); see also HILAIRE BELLOC, ESSAYS OF A
CATHOLIC 65 (1931) (referring to the enrichment of the English squires during the
Reformation).
163 NEUHAUS, supra note 53, at 85, quoting John C. Murray, The Church and Totalitarian
Democracy, 14 THEOLOGICAL STUDIES 531 (1952).
164 See id. at 92 ("Rousseau's mythology of a 'general will' of which the state is the
expression.").
I See generally PATRICK COLLINSON, THE REFORMATION: A HISTORY 210 (2003) ("The
legacy of the Reformation was two different Protestantisms ... the theologically and
institutionally distinct Lutheran and Calvinist traditions.").
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oftentimes have argued their "sovereign" right to determine what happens
within their frontiers, and have denied the right of any other state or
international organization to influence their behavior. The extreme concept
of national sovereignty, born at the time of the Revolution, gave way,
eventually, to extreme nationalism in Europe. The State emerged as a unique
source of law, recognized no restrictions based either on natural law, or in
international law, without its consent.
Latin American nations followed suit and, also during the last two
centuries, have waged wars amongst themselves, based in great measure,
upon the revolutionary concept of absolute State sovereignty.
VII. DOCTRINE OF STRONG SEPARATION OF POWERS
One of the main protests of the French revolutionaries, against the ancien
regime, was the consolidation of all powers of government into the
sovereign; that is, the king. Therefore, while a total separation of
,governmental powers was advocated from the beginning, the three powers
did not emerge as having the same strength. In fact, the French Revolution
never advocated for what is known in the American constitutional
experiment as a "check-and-balances" system.166 This is an American idea.
No such a thing as Marbury v. Madison 67 existed in revolutionary France.
As it is well known, the Latin American wars of independence gave way
to legal and political systems often based on, an absolute, personalist168
executive branch. As the new regimes sought to consolidate their power,
they found in the French revolutionary constitutional ideas, the philosophical
and legal substratum for their goals. Latin Americans needed a
constitutional system of checks and balances that the French Revolution had
not provided.1 69 In due course, executives invoked the principle of strong
separation of powers and rejected any encroachments from the other two
branches.
166 Luz Estella Nagle, The Cinderella of Government: Judicial Reform in Latin America, 30
CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 345, 358 (2000) (stating that the constitutions of the new Latin American
countries established a rigorous Montesquieuan principle of separation of powers).
167 See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803) (providing a foundation for
judicial review).
168 Gargarella, supra note 146, at 12 (describing Bolivar's reaction to a speech delivered in
Angostura, at the opening of the second national congress of Venezuela, where Bolivar stated,
"[L]et us put aside the triumvirate, which holds the executive power and center it in a
president. We must grant him sufficient authority to enable him to continue the struggle
against the obstacles inherent in our recent situation, our present state of war, and every
variety of foe, foreign and domestic, whom we must battle for some time to come.").
169 Nagle, supra note 166, at 352 (highlighting the lack of an effective "check-and-balances"
system among the branches of government in the newly independent Latin American nations).
2010]
GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
On the heels of the French Revolution, for example, the Venezuelan
Constitution of 1811 explicitly prohibited one branch of government
encroaching into another.170 The principle of separation of powers promptly
evolved (or rather degenerated) into an absolute division or "walling"
amongst the branches of government. In this context, strongmen have
cracked down on the opposition by means of "legislative" decrees,
unilaterally written by them, imposing restrictions on individual freedoms,
and targeting political opponents. Also, oppressive executives have screened
off the legislative and judicial branches from interfering with these
regulations. The claim to legitimacy has been founded on the strong
separation of powers doctrine, furthered by the lack of a system of "checks-
and-balances."
The Greek tragedy of the French revolutionary absolute separation of
powers doctrine, that was applied to Latin America upon its independence
from colonial power, is best illustrated by the particularities related to the
generation, implementation, and enforcement of legislation. There have
been enormous fights among the branches of government. This inner
struggle for power in Latin America has been staged in parliamentary
dictatorships, and also with the Supreme Court removing the heads of the
Executive branch.
171
In sum, the principle of strong separation of powers has not allowed
active cooperation between peer offices of government. The newly-formed
Latin American nations saw their branches of government in a constant
struggle to gain supremacy over one another; a situation that continues today.
Interestingly, the French concept of coup d' tat, born during the early years
of the Revolution, does not have an accurate translation into other
languages. 172
170 Constituci6n Federal [Federal Constitution] of December 21, 1811, art. 189, available
at http://www.cervantesvirtual.com/servlet/SirveObras/02461621981246052976613/index.htm
("Articulo 189. Los tres departamentos esenciales del Gobierno, a saber: el Legislativo; el
Ejecutivo y el Judicial, es preciso que se conserven tan separados, e independientes el uno del
otro.") ("The three essential departments of the Government are: the Legislative; the
Executive, and the Judicial, [sic] it is necessary that they be preserved very separate and
independent the one from the other." (author's translation)).
17 1 For an analysis of the constitutionality of the removal of the President of Honduras by the
Supreme Court of Justice and Congress, see Honduras: Constitutional Issues and Authorities,
LIBR. CONG., http://www.loc.gov/law/help/honduras/index.php (last visited Mar. 20, 2011).
172 MARVIN PERRY ET AL., WESTERN CIVILIZATION: IDEAS, POLITICS & SOCIETY 483-84
(2009) (discussing Napoleon's coup d'ktat against the Directory on November 9, 1799).
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VIII. ABSOLUTE SUPREMACY AND MONOPOLY OF THE STATE CONCERNING
LEGISLATION
The revolutionary doctrine (i.e., a set of principles, ideology, and values)
of holding a total wall of separation amongst the branches of government
came to merge itself with the novel notion justifying the legitimacy of state
action grounded on secular natural law. Both the principles of absolute
separation of powers and legislative supremacy generated the theory that
what is legal, for being an emanation from the sovereign, is legitimate and
just. As the law derives from the legislature, the predominant organ of
government, every action of the sovereign, that is, of the legislative branch,
is clothed in a cloak of legitimacy. As one scholar puts it, "[a] cardinal tenet
of the French was that all law-making power was to be vested in a
representative assembly." 173 The law came to be presumed fair, just, and
legitimate. 174 All the powers of government are to back-up that notion with
the strength of reason and, if necessary, of the sword. The inhabitants of the
State, the Revolution proclaimed, became citizens qua members of the State;
that is, their identity and membership in the community was determined and
dependent upon their participation in the State.
175
These ideas rapidly propagated around Europe in the early nineteenth
century 176 giving way in Latin America to the strong influence of the
European absolute state and "not the constitutional parliamentary model that
England gave to America."'177 From Europe, these theories spread into the
Latin American region, where the theory of separation of powers never
became a reality.
178
As previously noted, the doctrine of absolute State power, founded on the
concept of sovereignty, knows no limits as to the areas and extensions where
173 MERRYMAN ET AL., supra note 92, at 193.
174 See MERRYMAN & PtREZ-PERDOMO, supra note 69, at 21 ("The legislative act was
subject to no authority, temporal or spiritual... sovereignty had two faces, an outer face that
excluded any law of external origin and an inner face that excluded any law of local or
customary origin.").
175 NEUHAUS, supra note 53, at 128 (mentioning that when the State "owns" the right to
determine who is a citizen and who is not, the "habit of beheading people for not being
citizens" begins).
176 Bernardo Perifibn, A Romanistic Approach to Unified European Private Law, 4 ROMAN
LEGAL TRADITION 104, 107 (2002), available at http://www.romanlegaltradition.org/contents/
2002/RLT-PERINAN1.PDF (commenting that "[a]fter the French Revolution, on the other
hand, Law was identified with 'the Law,' setting aside doctrinal and jurisprudential tradition
in the interest of greater legal certainty. These ideas which took form in the Constitutions and
codifications of the nineteenth century permeate most European societies.").177 Jordan, supra note 153, at 34.
178 Id.
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the government may legislate. By giving the political majority its substratum
in the legislature, the legislative branch is empowered to go into the citizens'
bedrooms, kitchens, living rooms, and bank accounts, and to regulate
intermediate social, religious and other organizations without any restriction.
Nothing in society escapes the reach of the State, and the whole of the
community becomes subject to its supreme power under this doctrine. 79 The
government holds a total monopoly over communal life as well.
The traditional legislative supremacy doctrine has been eroded and
somehow, even repudiated in its cradle, France, during the last fifty years
after World War 11.'80 One scholar identifies two of the main elements in
this phenomenon, particularly in the aftermath of the 1958 Constitution.'
1
First is the case of the executive's autonomous legislating power by means of
Article 37, according to which matters other than those reserved for the
legislative domain are of an executive character. And second, the slow
abandonment of revolutionary constitutional orthodoxy is the delegation of
legislative power into the executive to issue administrative regulations.
82
However, mainstream French constitutional authors think the strict principle
of separation of powers has not been derogated by these recent
developments. Despite the fact that the evolution has not altered the
traditional pattern of State supremacy, they argue that, in reality, the primacy
of the executive branch has been broadly reaffirmed with these
innovations. I1 3 At any rate, the original design of the revolutionaries is still
malum consilium quod mutari non potest ("it's a bad plan that cannot be
179 Levasseur, supra note 108, at 773 ("Whatever is not contrary to legislation is licit.").
180 See generally Edward J. Pauw & Ari Chaim Shapiro, Defamation, the Free Press, and
Latin America: A Roadmap for the Inter-American Court of Human Rights and Emerging
Democracies, 30 U. MIAMI L. REV. 203-41 (1998) (mentioning certain innovations in the
French parliamentary-presidential system-or semi-presidentialism--including, among
others: a dual executive; a president elected by popular vote; the appointment of the head of
government by the president without parliamentary approval; the possibility of removal of the
government by parliament; the power of the president and prime minister to dissolve the
legislature and call new elections; the lack of presidential veto power over parliamentary
action; and the delegation of legislative functions to the president, who then may legislate by
decree).
18 ROGELIO PItREZ-PERDOMO & LAWRENCE FRIEDMAN, LATIN LEGAL CULTURES 1N THE AGE
OF GLOBALIZATION 3 (2003) ("France... brought General de Gaulle to power in 1958,
inaugurating a period of personalist democracy.").
182 MERRYMAN ET AL., supra note 92, at 194 (discussing that, even though France created the
Constitutional Council, with power to review the constitutionality of parliamentary legislation,
and the Council of State, the constitutionality of executive legislation, "these changes
conferred upon the executive a privileged position in the parliamentary law-making process").
183 MERRYMAN & PtREZ-PERDOMO, supra note 69, at 193-94 (discussing the changes
brought about by the French Constitution of 1958 which meant a strengthening of the powers
of the Executive Branch in that country after World War II).
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changed"). 184 And from the time of independence, Latin American nations
have followed suit in the sense that legislation has become "the work of the
Ministry of Justice and other departments.
' '181
As power begets power, and the sovereign does not often willingly take
criticism, truth becomes the first victim of absolute power. If truth in society
is still a value, then the press has a role to fulfill in the polis. Accordingly,
the sovereign has imposed restrictions on the freedom of the press and other
related freedoms in the name of democratic legitimacy.
In a nutshell, history, at least in Latin America, has shown that a straight
path exists from the French revolutionary doctrine of absolute separation of
powers to widespread limitations on individual freedoms in nominem (in the
name of) of State supremacy and sovereignty.
IX. LACK OF CONSTITUTIONAL EMERGENCY POWERS' 86
The independence of Latin American countries was very violent, due to
the fact, in part, that the Spaniards were militarily strong. Unlike the
inexperienced revolutionary Creole armies, the Spaniards had known victory
after victory, after defeating the Turks in Lepanto and gaining control over
the Mediterranean in the Middle Ages. 18  They were strong and very
seasonable warriors. It was not just a few shots that were fired as it
happened in Concord, Massachusetts, in 1776.88 The Latin American wars
of independence, instead, were fought in huge strongholds and
fortifications,' 89 and much blood spilled during those years.
After the Spaniards were expelled from Latin America, there remained
different factions amongst the independentists. On the one hand, those
184 Author's translation.
185 MERRYMAN ET AL., supra note 92, at 194.
186 "States of Constitutional Emergency" refers broadly to the suspension of constitutional
guarantees and freedoms. It is worth mentioning that the French Constitution of 1791 does not
include a chapter or particular provisions on constitutional emergency powers; see supra
note 4 and accompanying text.
187 See ANGUS KONSTAM, LEPANTO 1571: THE GREATEST NAVAL BATTLE OF THE
RENAISSANCE 38 (2005) (describing the central military role of the Spanish Empire in the
Holy League).
188 See generally EDWARD L. AYERS ET AL., AMERICAN PASSAGES: A HISTORY OF THE UNITED
STATES 106-09 (2009) (reviewing the details of the the battles of Lexington and Concord,
within the context of the War of Independence of the American colonies during the period
1775-1776).
189 Miguel Schor, Constitutionalism Through the Looking Glass of Latin America, 41 TEX.
INT'L L.J. 1, 14-15 (2006) ("Independence in Latin America was followed by unrelieved civil
war for almost half a century throughout most of the continent whereas the United States
enjoyed a series of peaceful presidential transitions throughout its history and did not face a
civil war until the middle of the nineteenth century.").
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nursed in the Revolution despised everything that was Roman1 90 or
Catholic. 191 For them, a new world was supposed to emerge, with reference
to nothing from the past. They created a new order, and in that sense,
everything that was Roman, or based on the Roman heritage, had to go.
192
The other faction consisted of those who rejected the political dominance of
the Continent, but desired to preserve the ancient cultural and religiously-
inspired institutions under which they had lived and prospered for
generations. 93
Upon independence, the winning factions in the former Spanish colonies,
rejected the influence of Spain, the former colonizing Empire. In doing so,
they had to resort to some other model to shape their nascent constitutional
and legal systems. They looked at the United States, but that model was too
new, untested, and still unsettled, as it was immersed in a struggle between
federalists and republicans. French ideas came over from Europe, as the
liberators of Latin America had strong connections to the Continent. Bolivar
and most leaders of the Independence, for example, were educated in
Europe, mostly in France.' 94  Bolivar, himself, attended the crowning of
190 See Shael Herman, The Uses and Abuses of Roman Law Texts, 29 AM. J. COMP. L. 671,
672 (1981) ("Both the French doctrinal writers and code drafters rejected many aspects of
Roman law, and they either transformed or tailored key concepts they allegedly 'borrowed' to
fit the social and political order of post-Revolutionary France.").
191 On the French Revolution's stand toward the Catholic Church, see generally JACQUES
FRAN(;OIs LEFRANC, LE VOILE LEvt POUR LES CURIEUX, OU, LE SECRET DE LA REVOLUTION DE
FRANCE 77-94 (1816) (see, e.g., Chapter VII Les Frank Maqons veulent abolir la Hidrarchie
Ecclsiastique, dans l'Eglise Catholique [The Frank-Masons want to abolish the Ecclesiastical
Hierarchy in the Catholic Church] (author's translation)); JOHN MCMANNERS, THE FRENCH
REVOLUTION AND THE CHURCH (1982) (reviewing the multiple attempts in all spheres of life
undertaken by the French revolutionaries to annihilate the Catholic Church, concerning,
among other, her doctrine, structure, property, public standing in society, concepts of the
sacred, liturgy, festivities, etc.); CLAUDE GEFFRIt & JEAN-PIERRE JOSSUA, 1789: THE FRENCH
REVOLUTION AND THE CHURCH 36 (1989) (stating, for example, that "1795 and 1796 were
years propitious to the construction of a republican Christianity, purged by the de-
christianising persecution"); see also STANLIS, supra note 42, at 175 ("Burke attacked the
French revolutionists who na'vely supposed the violent destruction of evil kings and priests
would result in universal peace."); Rosmini, supra note 66, at 1402 (recalling that Napoleon
Bonaparte stated that modem philosophers "undertook every effort to persuade France that the
Catholic religion was the implacable enemy of every democratic system").
192 It is important to remember at this point that the National-Socialist Party Program
included the demand that "Roman law, which serves a materialistic world view be replaced by
a common German Law." Perifidn, supra note 176, at 111.
193 JAKSI(, supra note 6, at 178 (stating that, referring to the ruling classes of Chile, Andrds
Bello is reputed to have said in 1836 that "people are less zealous about the conservation of
their political liberties that about the conservation of their civil rights [and the perceived view
that the] ability to participate in public affairs is infinitely less important than the ability to
secure life and property").
194 Mirow, supra note 11, at 183 ("French culture ruled Latin American culture and the dlite
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Napoleon, and owned the largest Napoleonic library outside of France.1 95
The Chilean Liberator, Bemardo O'Higgins, attempted to rubber stamp the
French Civil Code in Chile. Sim6n Bolivar, whose tutor was Andrrs Bello,
and the author of the most influential Civil Code in Latin America, 196 deeply
admired the Code Napoleon.' 9'
In sum, the French Revolution had a great impact on shaping the legal
systems, not only at the time of the Latin American independence movement,
but this influence is still felt throughout the region. After all, it was France
that had provided Latin America with the model for private law in the form
of the Civil Code, of which Napoleon said would endure forever.,
98
As they had with the Civil Code, Latin Americans borrowed greatly from
the French revolutionary constitutional mold. Consequently, when the new
Latin American nations gained their independence, they looked at France for
models in the realm of private law, but also sought to imitate France's
constitutional law paradigm. The rationale was that, since France had the
prestige to formulate the Civil Code, she was also thought to have the stature
to give Latin America its constitutional model.
However, when the time came to follow guidelines relating to
constitutional emergency powers, they found that France did not provide a
model.' 99 In effect, this omission was deliberate. The Revolution denied the
branches of government emergency or discretionary powers altogether.
Montesquieu had expressly rejected that discretionary powers be granted to
the branches of government, because it would have involved the destruction,
of Latin America were a Francophone &lite... ruling classes of Latin America intellectually
aligned themselves with the French intelligentsia and saw French progress somehow more in
tune with Latin American cultural and societal aspirations.").
195 M.C. Mirow, The Power of Codification in Latin America: Sim6n Bolivar and the Code
Napolon, 8 TUL. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 83, 97 (2000) ("[T]he books in Bolivar's library that
formerly belonged to Napoleon were given special mention in Bolivar's testament.__.).
196 Murillo, supra note 138, at 9 ("[T]he Chilean civil code drafted by Andrrs Bello was
adopted virtually in its entirety in Ecuador (Civil Code of 1860) and Colombia (Civil Code of
1873), while Argentina, Paraguay, Uruguay, Honduras, Venezuela, El Salvador and Nicaragua
adopted specific provisions in their own civil codes.").
9- Bolivar has been quoted as saying: "The Liberator President is highly aware of the
wisdom with which the Code Napoleon was drafted." Letter from Jos6 D. Espinosa, General
Secretary to Bolivar, to Jos6 Manuel Restrepo, Minister of the Interior (May 13, 1829), cited
in Mirow, supra note 11, at 179.
198 Lobingier, supra note 101, at 133 ("Ma vraie glorie n'est pas d'avoir gagnd 40 batailles.
Ce que rien n'effacera, ce que vivra eternellement, c'est mon Code Civil.") ("My true glory is
not in having won forty battles; Waterloo will blot out the memory of those victories. But
nothing can blot out my Civil Code. That will live eternally." (author's translation)).
199 See supra note 186; see also MERRYMAN & PtREZ-PERDOMO, supra note 69, at 206
(noting that the Norwegian legal doctrine admits that the idea of "emergency constitutional
law," serves to legitimize irregular constitutional acts such as the secession from Sweden).
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or at least the posing, of commensurable threats to the doctrine of strict
separation of powers.2 °°
The fact that the French constitutional revolutionary model stemming
from the very Constitution of 1791 lacked of a well-defined institutional
structure dealing with constitutional emergencies went clearly against the
Western legal tradition, where Roman law presented a model concerning
constitutional emergencies.201 The importance of making a reference to the
Roman model lies in that it was the only procedure for tackling constitutional
emergencies in the West, up to the period of the French Revolution. 20 2 In
effect, Romans had the "constitutional dictatorship" model.20 3 According to
this constitutional system, in cases of emergency, a dictator was appointed.20 4
The appointment procedure involved intricate stages, starting with the
declaration of a period of emergency by the Senate, and the designation of
two consuls. 0 5 The consuls, in turn, appointed the dictator, who could not
be a senator or a consul, for a specific period of time.20 6 The dictator usually
would be a magistrate, detached from the political process, who could
suspend constitutional guarantees as part of his emergency powers only for
six months.20 7 He could not take permanent measures, or imprison any of the
members of the other powers of the State. 8 Once the emergency period was
over, the constitutional order was reestablished.2 9
Therefore, the French revolutionary constitutional theory passed into
Latin America without a model for the exercise of emergency powers. In
other words, the French model rejected such powers, and that vacuum was
thought to embody a key constitutional principle of that model.
Consequently, the revolutionary constitutional theory rotated around the
200 Gabriel L. Negretto & Jos6 Antonio Aguilar Rivera, Liberalism and Emergency Powers
in Latin America: Reflections on Carl Schmitt and the Theory of Constitutional Dictatorship,
21 CARDozo L. REv. 1797, 1817 (2000); see also PRESIDENTIALISM AND DEMOCRACY IN LATIN
AMERICA (Scott Mainwaring & Matthew Shugart eds., 1997) (examining the debate
surrounding of whether the presidential form of government has been a major contributor to
the impediments for real democracy to take root in Latin America).
201 Id. at 1815 (referring to the Roman type of dictatorship).
202 Id. at 1804 (mentioning that "the 1811 Venezuelan constitution, the 1815 Argentinean
charter, the 1818 Colombian constitution, and the 1824 Mexican charter did not include broad
emergency powers").
203 Id. at 1798.
204 Id. at 1799.
205 MCCARTHY, supra note 18, at 8 ("One of Rome's two consuls could appoint a dictator
during a time of emergency.").
206 Id. (commenting that the dictator served "as supreme ruler during such times"--alluding
to times of "war or internal struggles").
207 Id. ("Rome's dictators would serve for six months.").
208 Id.
209 -
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principle of strict separation of powers, and the resulting denial of
emergency powers.
This explains that, when political turmoil took place early during the
independence movement, there was no model to follow. Executives
appropriated the power to subdue the legislative and judicial branches, 210 and
in turn, acquiesced to executive claims to declare and maintain extensive
periods of constitutional emergencies. 21' The legislature showed virtually no
opposition to such measures. The judiciary, likewise, ruled that
constitutional emergency powers were a non-justiciable political question
and, hence, to decide otherwise would have meant a serious violation of the
principle of strong separation of powers.213
In sum, the logical consequences of the assumption of French
revolutionary constitutional ideas in Latin America has allowed the
unwarranted stance of the executive, the systematic subjugation of the
legislature and the judiciary to the president, and massive human rights
abuses during constitutional emergencies. In fact, Latin America has been
ruled by emergency decrees and other types of transitory, emergency
legislation for long periods, during the span of almost two centuries.214 In
Colombia alone, during the twentieth century, a constitutional emergency
lasted for about thirty years.215 All of this has happened thanks to the French
Revolution's legal legacy in the region.
One hundred sixty-nine years after the Revolution, France created a
system of constitutional emergencies with the Constitution of 1958.216 This
is but another aspect of the so-called "French Deviation":2 17 a detour from
210 Nagle, supra note 166, at 352 (referring to the status of servant that the judiciary
achieved early since independence vis-A-vis juntas; that is, governments run by strongmen,
usually after a military intervention).
211 Id. (proposing that "the political patronage and tummoil plaguing Latin America after
independence [caused that] instead of the judiciary being the objective branch and balancing
and neutralizing the power of the political branches, it became their servant").
212 Id.
213 Id. at 351, 358.
214 Id. at 352.
215 Negretto & Rivera, supra note 200, at 1807 ("Colombia was ruled under emergency
provisions for almost three-fourths of the time between 1958 and 1988.").
216 See generally DE GUILLENCHMIDT, supra note 97, at 334-38 (expounding the operation
and ramifications of Article 16 of the Constitution of 1958, and highlighting the lack of
constitutional control prior to that date); THIERRY S. RENOUX, CODE CONSTITUTIONNEL 370-
72, 436-37; see also ANNE-MARIE LE POURHIET, DROIT CONSTITUTIONNEL 342-46 (2007)
(analyzing the ramifications of Article 16 of the Constitution of 1958, which deals with
constitutional emergencies).
217 Garcia, supra note 100, at 1283 (quoting John Henry Merryman, The French Deviation,
44 AM. J. COMP. L. 109, 111 (1996)).
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the principles of the Revolution, which changes nothing of the original
revolutionary ideology of lack of constitutional emergency powers.
X. DIMINISHED ROLE OF THE JUDICIARY
Montesquieu, the true author of the misery that was to befall over the
French judiciary and all of its post-1789 progeny, described the role of the
judiciary in the new model in the following terms: "In republics, the very
nature of the constitution requires the judges to follow the letter of the law;
otherwise the law might be explained to the prejudice of every citizen, in
cases where their honor, property, or life is concerned." 218 The judiciary was
thought to be subservient to the monarchy by the time of the Revolution.
Since it was not possible for the Revolution to eliminate this "multitude of
tyrants' '219 altogether, the Code Civil of 1804, itself an upshot of the
Revolution,22° included particularly stringent provisions delimitating the role
of judges.221 Namely, Article 5 established that judges are forbidden from
issuing general dispositions in the cases adjudicated by them. 22 2  The
technical device of legislative referral (ref&r l)gislati) 223 was conceived for
cases repeatedly decided by the judiciary where no legislative solution
existed. 4  Not even in those cases was precedential value recognized in
judicial decisions. 5 In the Montesquieuan ideology, judges were to become
218 CHARLES DE SECONDAT, supra note 73, at 75.
219 MERRYMAN & PtREZ-PERDOMO, supra note 69, at 126.
220 Lecture 15: "Europe and a Superior Being: Napoleon," HIST. GUIDE, http://www.histor
yguide.org/intellect/lecturel5a.html (last revised Feb. 8, 2006) ("There is no denying the fact
that the French Revolution created Napoleon.").
221 MERRYMAN & PEREZ-PERDOMO, supra note 69, at 133 (stressing the aversion of
Continental lawyers toward single-judge courts, "Juge unique,juge inique") ("A single judge,
a unique yoke" (author's translation)).
222 CODE CIVIL [C. civ.] art. 5 (Fr.) ("I1 est drfendu aux juges de prononcer par voie de
disposition gdn~rale et rrglementaire sur les causes qui leur sont soumises.") ("It is forbidden
to judges to decide the cases subject to their jurisdiction by means of general and reglamentary
dispositions." (author's translation)).
223 1791 CONST. tit. III ch. 5, para. 21 (Fr.), available at http://sourcebook.fsc.edu/history
/constitutionofl791.html ("When, after two cassations, the judgment of the third court is
protested in the same manner as the first two, the question may not be discussed further in the
Court of Cassation without having been submitted to the legislative body, which shall pass a
decree declaratory of the law, to which the Court of Cassation shall be required to conform.").
The legislative referral was eliminated by law on June 27, 1800, but later reestablished by a
law on September 16, 1807, and finally suppressed in 1837. BASDEVANT-GAUDEMET &
GAUDEMET, supra note 51, at 427.
224 VAN CAENEGEM, supra note 21, at 131 ("Where three tribunals persisted in judging to the
same effect, the Tribunal de Cassation had to submit the question to the legislative assembly
to obtain a legislative statute, which was then imposed on the judiciary at large.").225 CODE CIVIL [C. CIV.] art. 3 (Fr.) (providing that "judicial decisions are not binding but
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the "mouthpiece of the law., 226 The extremely mechanical role ascribed to
judges conspired to produce weak and, in many occasions, corrupt
adjudication.227
The history and reality of Latin America demonstrate that judges have
traditionally been "extremely deferential" to the other two branches of
governmen t228 and thus subject to political manipulation. 229 One scholar has
accurately called the judiciary's self-perception as "a nearly 200 year-old
inferiority complex,, 230 coupled with a "self-imposed subservience to the
,,231Iexecutive branch, and to the legislative branch to a lesser degree. In sum,
after the Revolution the judiciary emerged as a handicapped branch of
government, and this legacy was passed onto Latin America,232 where the
judiciary has accurately been called the "Cinderella of the public system. 233
Yet another consequence of the demolition of the judiciary at the hands of
the Revolution has been that the role of interpreting the law was transferred
from judges to legal scholars. Legal experts gained an unprecedented
influence on adjudicatory procedures in the region.234 Thus, learned writing
came to "indirectly control [sic], to a great extent, the judges' understanding
of the case law., 235 The logic behind this scheme is that, since judges are not
allowed to create law or rely on their own decisions or those of higher courts,
learned treatises fill in the gaps by collecting and analyzing the most
important cases, which in turn are relied upon by judges.236 This influence is
except with respect to the cases in which they are pronounced" (author's translation)).
226 Montesquieu called judges: "inanimate beings who cannot moderate either its [sic] force
or rigour." VAN CAENEGEM, supra note 21, at 123 n. 16 (quoting CHARLES DE SECONDAT, THE
SPIRIT OF THE LAWS (1748)).
227 Baudenbacher, supra note 98, at 351 (pointing out that "judges in civil law countries tend
to be career civil servants"). Id. at 358 ("Piero Calamandrei wrote in 1955 that an Italian
judge has told him: 'We decided unanimously, because juridical logic required it, but when
weparted we were all full of sadness.' ").
22 Michael Pahl, Judicial One-Hit?: The Decriminalization of Personal Drug Use by
Colombia's Constitutional Court, 6 IND. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 1, 51 (1995).
229 See William C. Prillaman, Chile's Coherent Approach to Judicial Review, in THE
JUDICIARY AND DEMOCRATIC DECAY IN LATIN AMERICA: DECLINING CONFIDENCE IN THE RULE
OF LAW 137 (2000); Matthew M. Taylor, Beyond Judicial Reform: Courts as Political Actors
in Latin America, 41 LATIN AM. RES. REV. 279, 269-80 (2006).
230 Nagle, supra note 166, at 357-58.
231 Id. at 358.
232 Garcia, supra note 100, at 1284 ("Judicial function is 'something narrow, mechanical and
uncreative,' and judges are 'unprestigious clerks at the bottom of the legal profession.' ").
233 PtREZ-PERDOMO & FRIEDMAN, supra note 181 (mentioning many other evils affecting
the judiciary in the region, among them, low quality recruitment and adjudication standards,
corruption, bribery, and denial ofjustice).
234 Id. at 6-9.
235 MERRYMAN ET AL., supra note 92, at 209.
236 Id. at 710.
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predominantly important "when the law is unsettled, or there is no
established law on a point. 237
Again, unaccountable outsiders have added another layer of illegitimacy
to an already incapacitated adjudicatory process, and this, thanks to the
French Revolution of 1789.
XI. WEAK AND TROUBLED SYSTEM OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
The legal control of the activities of the other branches of government by
the judiciary was hardly a preoccupation of the revolutionaries. An already
diminished judiciary23 8 had to face reality soon after the revolutionary codes
were enacted. That reality shows that the executive and the legislative
branches often violate the constitution, the law, or trample upon the rights of
citizens. Consequently, control over the two other branches was necessary to
counteract their undue influence over judges, and also to ensure the correct
interpretation and application of the law, as issued by the legislature. The
alternatives were to either bestow additional powers on existing courts, or to
create new tribunals.
Again, in the vein of the "French Deviation," the Cour de Cassation,
239
created by the Constitution of 1791, had been given new powers over time.
The Cour was conceived as dependent of, and subordinated to the legislative
branch,24° to maintain the appearance of fidelity to, the revolutionary
manifesto, to avoid judicial creativity and derailments in the interpretation of
statutory law, and to ensure the correct application of the law.24' This
organism, accordingly, "often only makes allusions to the facts" of a case.242
Cassation procedures eventually arrived in Latin America during the
twentieth century.243
Consonant with the revolutionary spirit of a shackled judiciary,2" and to
placate any potential activist aims of the Cour,24 5 the Constitution of 1791
237 Id. at 209.
238 See Pilar Domingo, Judicial Independence: The Politics of the Supreme Court in Mexico,
32 J. LATIN AM. STUD. 705, 718 (2000) (analyzing the lack of independence of the Mexican
judiciary).239 John Henry Merryman, The French Deviation, 44 AM J. COMP. L. 109 (1996).
240 BASDEVANT-GAUDEMET & GAUDEMET, supra note 51, at 345 ("[L]a loi plagait the
Tribunal de cassation aupr~s du Corps legislative.") ("The legislation placed the Court of
Cassation close to the Legislature." (author's translation)).
241 See 1791 CONST. tit. III, ch. V, paras. 19-23 (Fr.) (regulating the relationship of
subordination of the Court of Cassation to the National Assembly).
242 Baudenbacher, supra note 98, at 352.
243 ANGEL OQUENDO, LATIN AMERICAN LAW 272 (commenting that the Mexican cassation
procedure had arrived from France via Spain).
244 See T. Leigh Anenson, Note, For Whom the Bell Tolls... Judicial Selection by Election
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also created the institution of the refgr Mgislatf.246 This mechanism was
established for cases where judicial activity would lead to statutory
interpretation.247
In addition to the Cour de Cassation, a new tribunal called the
"Constitutional Council" was created in 1958.248 This body was charged
with control of the constitutionality of legislative activity.2 49 Allegedly, and
to maintain consistency with the stated ideals of the Revolution,
constitutional review was then called "political" rather than "judicial. 250
The legality of administrative action, in turn, was entrusted to the Council
of State.251 The Law of the Constituent Assembly of August 16-24, 1790,
provided in article 13 that "[tihe judicial function is distinct and shall always
be separate from the administrative function. Judges shall not ... interfere in
any way in the actions of administrative agencies or exercise jurisdiction
over administrators. 252 To maintain the little regularity that was left in the
original revolutionary model of strict separation, the French envisaged the
Council of State also as a non-judicial organism. 253
Under the influence of the Revolution, twentieth-century France again
created another tribunal, the Conflicts Tribunal, to resolve conflicts of
jurisdiction between ordinary courts and the Council of State. 4
Additionally, during the mid-twentieth century, France created special
judicial bodies in an attempt to guarantee independence and impartiality in
the appointment of judges.255
in Latin America, 4 Sw. J.L. & TRADE AM. 261, 277 (1997) (discussing the politization of
judicial appointment processes in Latin America).
245 BASDEVANT-GAUDEMET & GAUDEMET, supra note 51, at 345 (commenting that the ref&
is a mechanism whereby the judiciary refers a matter to the legislature whenever there is a
need to interpret the existing law, or pass a new one).
246 MERRYMAN ET AL., supra note 92, at 709.
247 Id. at 706; see also Keith Rosenn, Judicial Review in Latin America, 35 OHIO ST. L.J.
785, 787 (1974) (stating that "[d]eclaring legislation unconstitutional [by the judiciary in Latin
America] is perceived as a political function and therefore unsuitable for the ordinary
judiciary").
248 MERRYMAN ET AL., supra note 92, at 758.
249 Id.
250 Id.
251 Id. at 706.
252 Id. at 705.
253 Id. at 729.
254 Id.
255 John 0. Haley, Judicial Reform: Conflicting Aims and Imperfect Models, 5 WASH. U.
GLOBAL STUD. L. Rcv. 81, 86 (2006) ("The French were the first to create a judicial council,
the Conseil superior de la magistrature, for selection of judges and administration of the
judiciary in the 1946 Constitution for the Fourth Republic.").
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As expected, these creationist trends affecting the judiciary have been
imitated by Latin American nations, starting in the second half of the
twentieth century.256 These nations created mixed systems of constitutional
review, whether at the hands of supreme courts or by specially-created
constitutional tribunals.257 Latin American courts, in turn, also followed suit
and started releasing themselves from the doctrinal straightjacket imposed by
the imported French revolutionary ideas. The main judicially-created
procedural innovations include the design of constitutional writs258 to
counteract the abuses brought about by executive absolutism. These
novelties, however, have met strong and decisive counter-reactions from the
other two branches, oftentimes creating constitutional instability and chaos.
The dangers of self-assertion and supremacy still lay hidden in the
relationships between the branches of government in Latin America. This
situation has been caused, to a great extent, by the constitutional legacy of
the French Revolution, and its unbalanced constitutional principles.
XII. LEGISLATIVE PROCESS CONCEIVED AS A RATIONAL AND SCIENTIFIC
ENDEAVOR DETACHED FROM PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS
Within the context of the Enlightenment, the French revolutionaries
envisioned the legislative process as a rational and scientific endeavor
disconnected from reality. 259 At the core of the new movement was the
belief that a few illuminati--enlightened men-may produce legislation
based on pure reason that would last for many years with hardly any
amendments. 260 Andrds Bello, the great Latin American codifier, repeated
this idea in the design of the Chilean Civil Code of 1855,261 which is
256 See generally MERRYMAN & PEREZ-PERDOMO, supra note 69, at 25 ("[T]hey insert a new
element [after World War II] into the hierarchy of sources of law, which now must read
'constitution, legislation, regulations, and custom.' ").
257 MERRYMAN ET AL., supra note 92, at 810 (commenting that Chile, in its 1980
authoritarian constitution, created two systems of constitutional review, one before the
constitutional tribunal without the need of "cases or controversies" and prior to the
promulgation of statutory laws; and the other "incidental" to judicial adjudication at the hands
of the supreme court, which requires a "case or controversy"); see also F. Soibelman, Sfimula
vinculante na Emenda Constitucional no 45/2004. (Teresina, a. 9, n. 618, 18 Mar. 2005)
(discussing "sftmulas vinculantes" in Brazil).
258 See OQUENDO, supra note 243, at 290-303 (analyzing "the Judicially Created Protection
Suit in Argentina").
259 ERNEST A. BENIANS, 8 THE CAMBRIDGE MODERN HISTORY: THE FRENCH REVOLUTION, at
v (Sir Adolphus William Ward ed., 1904) (referring to the revolutionary legislators' attempt
"to break loose from the bonds of custom, convention, and tradition, and to build up a new
scheme of human relations from a purely rational basis").
260 Id.
261 JAKSIt, supra note 6, at 154.
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"perhaps the most influential code in the development of Latin American
private law. 262 It is apparent from the principles of the Civil Code that its
drafters thought that the solution for every legal problem could be derived
with near mathematical certainty through a process of logical deduction.263
While it is true that Napoleon enacted the Civil Code and not the
revolutionaries, the Civil Code, that magnum instrument of legal uniformity
and domination, served as a formidable tool for the consolidation of the
political victories in light of the totalizing revolutionary ideology. Hence lies
the intimate connection between the Civil Code and the Revolution.264
The inner authoritarianism of the Civil Code is also reflected in its stated
goal of comprehensiveness. Napol6on himself abhorred the prospect of
having his Code become the object of expert commentary.265 The pretension
to universalit/ 66 inherent in the idea of the Code Civil crashed upon
inception. In fact, the first law promulgated jointly with the Code Civil is
entitled, "Law on the Gathering of Civil Laws in One Body, Under the Title
'Code Civil des Franqais.' " The inconsistency in the legislative aspiration
of the Code is evident. If the Code Civil was going to encompass all
possible situations where statutory law was necessary, what consistency
exists if the same aforementioned law listed thirty-six laws that were
"understood" to be a part of the Code Civil? Either the legislative technique
was flawed, or the principle on which it was founded was unachievable. All
elements of judgment and subsequent history lead to the latter conclusion. In
fact, the original Code Civil of 1804 has gone through countless corrections,
262 Mirow, supra note 11, at 183.
263 JAKSIt, supra note 6, at 154 ("In Article 20 of the C6digo, Bello stated that 'the wording
of the law is to be understood in the natural, obvious, and generalized meaning and usage of
the words themselves.' The point of this emphasis was that citizens could not understand the
law unless it was written in precise and grammatically sound language. Only then would they
be able to read it and understand it, just as they understood the basics of day-to-day
communication. Ultimately, if the law was to become common currency among citizens, it
had to be easily accessible and recalled, perhaps not that much differently from how a poem
could be recited thanks to meter and rhyme.").
264 BASDEVANT-GAUDEMET & GAUDEMET, supra note 51, at 372 (stating that "the
bourgeoisie and the nobility that sustain the political power of Bonaparte wish[ed] to
consolidate the legal conquests of the Revolution" (author's translation)).
265 Id. at 410 n.7 (citing Napoleon's words upon learning about the publication of a legal
analysis of the Code by Maleville in 1805, "Un commentaire, mon Code est perdu") ("One
comment, and my Code is lost" (author's translation)).
266 Genaro Carri6, Judge Made Law Under a Civil Code, 41 LA. L. REv. 993, 993 (1980)
("The sought-after ideal is that a solution to all problems and conflicts arising in such given
area be found within a set of rules arranged in a rational way, free of gaps, overlappings,
contradictions, obscurity and ambiguity."). The author, Carri6, goes on to call this ideal the
"myth of codification." Id.
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additions, and amendments during the centuries.267 The enormous legislative
mess present in Latin America is a direct consequence of the adoption of the
Code Civil and its pretensions of totality.
Another ideal of the revolutionaries was to create legislation written and
implemented in a manner that would make it accessible to the common
man.268 The Enlightenment was the first fruit of philosophers and lawyers
who thought highly of themselves and took every stride to differentiate
themselves from commoners. As it turned out, due to the extensive
borrowing of the Code Civil from Roman Law,269 the pretension of
simplicity, accessibility, and easiness of reading, comprehension, and
implementation went largely unfulfilled, thanks, in great part, to the French
Revolution.
XIII. CODIFICATION As AN INSTRUMENT FOR BROAD GOVERNMENTAL
CONTROL OF SOCIETY
The idea of codification is an ancient concept, dating back at least to the
promulgation of the Justinian Code in 534 A.D.27 ° Codification experiments
also took place throughout Europe before the French Revolution, but only
the French Civil Code achieved the stardom desired by other efforts. 271 After
its passage, the Civil Code triggered an almost universal codification
272movement. 2 The Civil Code came to garner the main legal provisions
applicable to a determined area of life, and in this way, provide legal
certainty, stability, 273 and facility of consultation through legislative
267 XAVIER BLANC-JOUVAN, WORLDWIDE INFLUENCE OF THE FRENCH CIVIL CODE OF 1804, ON
THE OCCASION OF ITS BICENTENNIAL CELEBRATION 2 (2007), available at http://scholarship.law.c
omell.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1003&context=bisspapers (alluding to "two centuries of
legislative additions and amendments" to the French Civil Code of 1804).
268 Lobingier, supra note 101, at 114 (mentioning the simplicity of access to the law by
every citizen as a revolutionary goal).
269 JAKSIt, supra note 6, at 170-74 (reviewing "the Roman Law Foundations of the
[Chilean] Civil Code"); see also Knittel, supra note 141, at 2 ("Por medio, especialmente de
los c6digos europeos, y sobre todo del francds, se han difundido estas normas, y con ellas el
Derecho Romano, en todo el mundo.") ("Especially through the European codes, and above
all the French Code, these provisions have been disseminated, and with them the Roman Law,
throughout the whole world." (author's translation)).
270 PAUL BERRY, OUTLINE HISTORY OF ROME: FROM THE EARLIEST RECORD (753 B.C.) TO
THE CODE OF JUSTINIAN (A.D. 534) 358 (2006) ("The Code of Justinian was enacted in 534.").
271 Id. at 398.
272 Id. at 367, 419-23.
273 Id. at 419 ("[L]a promulgation des codes constitua pour beaucoup des jeunes ttats
cherchant 4 former leur unitd politique, le moyen de renforcer leur cohesi6n, et d'assurer la
stabilit6 juridique recherchre.") ("The promulgation of codes constituted, for many of the new
States seeking to form their political unity, a means to strengthen their cohesion, and to
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coherence.274 The Civil Code became the lege ferenda, the new law that
would govern the polis from that time onwards, in a centralized manner.275
It is hardly disputed that the Civil Code was designed to be a means to
greatly expand the governmental control of society.276 The Civil Code
became the primary means of implementing the principles of codification
and unification of the law proclaimed in Title I of the Revolutionary
Constitution of 1791.277 Alongside the 1791 Constitution, the "Law on the
Gathering of Civil Laws in One Body, Under the Title 'Code Civil des
Frangais," already referenced, proscribed in Article 7 that: "commencing on
the day these laws enter into effect, the Roman laws, ordinances, general or
local customs, statutes [and] regulations cease to have the force of a general
or particular law in the matters which are the subject of those laws
composing the present Code." '  With Napoleon carrying the banner, the
authors of the Civil Code believed that they were following the steps of
Justinian, and that by replacing all pre-existing laws, the Civil Code "was
suitable to govern the legal affairs of all nations at all times by dint of its
rational content. ' 279 Thus, the pretense of universality, broad government
control, and state authoritarianism were clearly stated at the very onset of the
revolutionary legal efforts.
The Civil Code of 1804 was followed by the Code of Civil Procedure of
1806, replaced in 1976; the Code of Commerce of 1807 and then the Code of
Criminal Procedure of 1808, replaced in 1958; and the Penal Code of 1810,
replaced in 1994.
In Latin America, the Chilean Civil Code represented the model of civil
legislation after the independence movement, and was utilized as an
instrument to achieve the purported goal of social cohesion. 28  Further
reforms of the new legal systems came to fully rely on the philosophy,
strength, and reach of the Civil Code. The contrast with the common law's
achieve the legal stability sought." (author's translation)).
274 BASDEVANT-GAUDEMET & GAUDEMET, supra note 51, at 359.
275 Lobingier, supra note 101, at 115 (commenting that codification required a centralized
power).
276 VAN CAENEGEM, supra note 21, at 125 ("Sovereigns regarded the promulgation of
national codes as an essential component of their policies of unification.").
277 1971 CONST. Tit. I (Fr.), available at http://sourcebook.fsc.edu/history/constitutionofl79
1.html ("A code of civil law common to the entire kingdom shall be drafted.").
278 Author's translation.
279 WATKIN, supra note 106, at 450.
280 A prominent politician wrote to Andrds Bello A propos Bello's draft civil code for Chile
"[W]e must take advantage of the wisdom of other countries, and especially the legal
doctrines of our South America. This might well represent a first step toward the desired
social unity of our continent." JAKSIt, supra note 6, at 174.
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approach to legislation is evident.2 81 Thus, in the case of Chile, the Civil
Code of 1855 crowned itself as the true "pillar of the centralized state and
established the basis from which more radical innovations would be
introduced in the future, especially the anticlerical legislation of the
1 880s.
' 282
The revolutionary French Constitution of 1791 clearly conceived the
Civil Code as a tool for tight government control of society. Latin America,
in accordance with that stated goal, followed the Revolution in due course,
and for two hundred years has lived under the canopy of the French Civil
Code of 1804.283
XIV. PROMOTION OF A DYSFUNCTIONAL SYSTEM OF CRIMINAL LAW AND
PROCEDURE
The dysfunctionality of Latin American criminal law and procedure
systems has been largely attributed to their inquisitorial character. Three
hundred or more years of Iberian inquisitorial law and procedures in the
Latin American colonies are said to have paved the way for a profoundly
inhuman criminal system. To prove the influence of inquisitorial law and
procedure on Latin American legal systems, frequent mention is made, for
instance, to the Santo Oficio (Holy Inquisition), which was not abolished
formally in Colombia until the Constitution of 1821.284
Oddly enough, colonial inquisitorial procedures were not different qua
processus from criminal procedures instituted against persons charged with
non-religious crimes. In fact, inquisitorial procedures signified a great
advance in the temporal human quest for humane criminal justice.28 6 In fact,
the Roman system, which was exclusively accusatorial, required the accuser
281 See E. Allan Farnsworth, A Common Lawyer's View of His Civilian Colleagues, 57 LA.
L. REV. 227, 232 (1996) (referring to the "common lawyer's mistrust of legislation").
282 JAKSICt, supra note 6, at 181.283 BLANC-JOUVAN, supra note 267, at 3 (referring to the "solid positions that our Code [the
French Civil Code of 1804] retains in many countries, even those which want to take some
distance from it. Among many examples... in Latin America").
284 Nagle, supra note 166, at 352.
285 HENRY A. KELLY, INQUISITION AND OTHER TRIAL PROCEDURES IN THE MEDIEVAL WEST
443 (2001) ("There was not a single provision of the original ordojuris or rules of procedure
for inquisition that privileged heresy cases over all other kinds of cases or limited due process
for persons charged with heresy in ways that were not permitted for persons charged with
other crimes.").
286 Id. at 480 ("In conclusion, inquisition was a brilliant and much-needed innovation in trial
procedure, instituted by the greatest lawyer-pope of the Middle Ages [Pope Innocent III]. It
served the generality of church courts very well and formed the basis of modem Continental
criminal procedure.").
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to bear the penalties carried by the crime denounced, in case he failed to
prove his accusation. 287 Canonical law added two other kinds of criminal
procedures: the denunciation, and the inquisition, which were meant to act as
"substitutes for accusation. 288 The traditional criminal and civil procedures
in the West were, in fact, accusatorial up to the time of the French
Revolution. 289 Trials consisted "of a contest between a plaintiff or accuser
and a defendant, with the judge acting as moderator., 290
The inquisitorial procedure represented a true humanization of the ancient
Roman criminal procedure from the system of private vengeance. 291 These
developments included the fact that the accuser would summon the accused
and explain the charges brought against him; that the accused enjoyed a right
to remain silent; that his guilt or innocence was to be determined in a
decision based on evidence legally proffered before the court; and that he
had a broad right to appeal unfavorable decisions at any stage of the
proceedings.292 Such developments embodied a progress without precedent
in human history.
Many of today's criminal procedural guarantees were created by
canonical law and drawn expressly and directly from biblical sources. 293 For
instance, the Miranda right to remain silent when facing an arrest tracks its
origin to the medieval inquisitorial right to silence, specifically "deduced
from the canonical rules of due process. 294  The same occurs with the
defendant's right to receive a detailed explanation of the charges brought
against him by a judge in a legally-ordained procedure.295 Human abuses in
the form of blatant departures from established inquisitorial procedures
undeniably took place, but even in those cases, prominent inquisitors did
their best to correct such abuses.296
The Revolution seems to have looked at the available procedures under
the ancient regime (accusatio-accusation; denunciatio--denunciation; and
inquisitio-inquisition), and concluded that the latter fit squarely with the
287 Id. at 407.
288 Id. at 995.
289 MERRYMAN & PEREZ-PERDOMO, supra note 69, at 128 (commenting that the Spanish
Siete Partidas describes the criminal system as accusatorial).
290 KELLY, supra note 285, at 409.
291 MERRYMAN & PtREZ-PERDOMO, supra note 69, at 128.
292 KELLY, supra note 285, at 2 (elaborating further in the chapter titled "Trial Procedures
against Wyclif and Wycliffites in England and at the Council of Constance").
3 ld. at 995.
294 Id. at 992.
295 Id. at 995.
296 See id. at 999 (commenting on the correctional efforts of the great Spanish Inquisitor,
Tombs de Torquemada).
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revolutionary concept of an omnipotent State, which recognized no other
authority or sovereign superior to itself.
297
A series of connections exist, therefore, between French revolutionary
ideas and the "sorry state of criminal law" in Latin America starting in the
early nineteenth century. 298 A broad review of the criminal law reforms that
took place after 1789 is necessary to track the monumental influence of the
revolutionary agenda upon the nascent Latin American criminal systems. 99
One of the priorities of the revolutionary program was the overall
restructuring of the criminal system.300  This program comprehended the
main aspects reviewed below.
First, revolutionary criminal law and procedure drew extensively from
Cesare Beccaria,3 °' to date, the most influential author on criminal law in the
West. 30 2  In his blueprint work, On Crimes and Punishments, of 1764,
Beccaria states: "[J]udges in criminal cases have no right to interpret the
penal laws, because they are not legislators. Once the codes of laws are
fixed, they should be observed in the literal sense and nothing more is left to
the judge than to determine whether an action be or be not conformable to
the written law., 30 3 The revolutionaries sided with Beccaria's enlightened
approach to the judicial function and, accordingly, institutionalized the
judges' handicapped status as minor servants of the revolutionary justice
machinery.30 4 However, since it was not possible for the French Revolution
to get rid of criminal judges altogether, it maintained them at the lowest level
of the government, subject to the will of the majority as represented by the
legislature.3 °5
297 Rogoff, supra note 65, at 23 (alluding to the "Code of private law in France [which is
based on] the principles of legislative supremacy").
298 KENNETH L. KARST ET AL., LAW AND DEVELOPMENT IN LATIN AMERICA: A CASE BOOK 55
(1975) ("[M]uch of this penal law was barbaric and outdated.").
299 MERRYMAN & PtREZ-PERDOMO, supra note 69, at 125 (referring to the "sorry state of
criminal law and procedure").
300 BASDEVANT-GAUDEMET & GAUDEMET, supra note 51, at 331.
301 MERRYMAN ET AL., supra note 92, at 1060-63 (commenting on the influence of Beccaria
on the criminal reforms implemented in the aftermath of the Revolution, particularly the
principle of nullum crimen sine lege and nulla poena sine lege [crimes and punishment can
only be determined by statutory law]).
30 MERRYMAN & PtREZ-PERDOMO, supra note 69, at 125 (commenting on the strong
influence of Beccaria's works throughout Europe during the eighteenth and nineteenth
centuries).
303 CESARE BECCARIA, ON CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS 12 (1764). Also cited in MERRYMAN
ET AL., supra note 92, at 1061.304 Farer, supra note 34 (describing judges as "only a certain species of bureaucrat").
305 Haley, supra note 255, at 85 (analyzing the lingering risks of having "an absolutely
independent judiciary").
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Abundant information and scholarly work throughout generations show
that the handcuffing of criminal judges in Latin America has cooperated
extensively to the ruin of criminal procedures in the region, and perpetuated
the sorry state of things. °6 In contrast to the revolutionary ideal, minimal
legal and logical thinking are sufficient to surmise that judges do, in reality,
interpret criminal laws. To deny judges this essential attribute is tantamount
to cripple the lame man twice. And this is what has happened in Latin
America, thanks to the French Revolution.
Second, the French Revolution obliterated the presumption of innocence.
The Revolution's initial overall goal of ridding society from-what they
considered to be-the shackles of religion 30 7 included an active contempt
toward all things emanating from the Judeo-Christian concept of justice and
guilt.30 8 In particular, the Enlightenment rejected those concepts of justice
and guilt embodied in canonical law. The rebuff of religious law by the
Revolution included the presumption of innocence, which was a notion
omnipresent in and greatly familiar to the pre-revolutionary ius commune of
Europe.0 9
Third, the imposition of harsh criminal laws discouraging crime fit
perfectly with the Robespierrean attachment to "guillotine justice" and the
Beccarian exhortation to apply severe punishment to criminals. 3'0  The
aristocratic revolutionaries sought to protect themselves from the
undesirables, and harsh criminal punishment was thought to be conducive to
that effect. 31' As a matter of criminal policy, the Revolution was more
concerned with the preservation of the public order than with the
rehabilitation of criminals.3 12 Crowded Latin American jails, in effect, bear
witness to the harsh punishments inflicted on poverty-arisen crime.3 13
306 KARST ET AL., supra note 298, at 91 (describing the Latin American judge as "a kind of
expert clerk").
307 NEUHAUS, supra note 53, at 86 (discussing the dogma of the secular Enlightenment
proposing that "as people become more enlightened (educated), religion will wither away").
30 See Sirach 11:7 ("Before investigating find no fault. Examine first then criticize.").
309 KELLY, supra note 285, at 444 ("I dismiss without further ado the modem notion that
defendants in any canonical process, inquisitorial or not, were presumed guilty until proven
innocent. No one could be legally convicted of a crime without adequate proof.").
310 See BECCARIA, supra note 303, at 40 (commenting than the sentence of slavery is more
severe and a greater deterrent than death).
311 Id.
312 BASDEVANT-GAUDEMET & GAUDEMET, supra note 51, at 397 ("Il faut punir pour assurer
la tranquillitd publique.") ("It is necessary to punish to ensure public tranquility." (author's
translation)).
313 CHARLES DE SECONDAT, supra note 73, at 187 (describing the use of the death penalty as
"the remedy, as it were, of a sick society").
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Fourth, the Revolution eliminated the criminal defendant's obligation to
314testify under oath on behalf of his own persona. This is certainly a
controversial matter where religion and law, in their raw expressions, either
collide or collaborate. In other words, the very origin of the concept of an
oath is religious, and goes back to the Ten Commandments. Legal systems
in the West built the procedural notion of oath based on the sacredness of the
Judeo-Christian concept of oath.3 15 Therefore, the exigibility of an oath in a
civil or criminal procedure, and the attached consequences for its violations
do trace their origins to religion. An oath is the invocation of the sacred to
back-up-or bring as a witness to-one's own testimony and may only be
understood in the realm of the spiritual.316 The Commandment to not invoke
the Lord's name in vain carries the implicit consequence of punishment in
the afterlife in case of perjury.317 Since almost all Europeans were believers
when the legal systems of the West were formed, either in the Christianized
Roman law, or the subsequent ius commune,318 it was a natural step for those
legal systems to incorporate a mandatory oath in their civil and criminal
procedures. If the deponent was willing to take an oath in Church, he was
even more prepared to take such oath in secular procedures, where available
punishments affected the body, not the soul.
As stated, the French Revolution, keen to its secular spirit, eliminated the
sacredness of the oath.319 It "laicized" the oath in the sense that it still
compelled the criminal defendant to testify, but it eliminated the requirement
314 KARL LUDWIG VON BAR ET AL., A HISTORY OF CONTINENTAL CRIMINAL LAW 319 (1999)
(referring to the constitutional reforms undertaken by the French Constitutional Assembly of
1789, which included, "6th, abolition of the accused's compulsory oath").
315 Exodus 20:7 ("You shall not take the name of the LORD your God in vain.").
316 Id.
317 Id. ("[F]or the LORD will not hold him guiltless who takes his name in vain.").
318 JAKSIt, supra note 6, at 172 ("[E]specially in [Spanish American] countries whose civil
legislation is but a manifestation, indeed a copy, of Roman legislation."); id. at 174 ("With the
exception of short-lived experiments in adopting the French civil code in Oaxaca (1827),
Bolivia (1831), and Costa Rica (1841), most Spanish American countries continued to make
do with the existing legislation. They were caught in the same dilemma of how to retain
embedded legal traditions while adapting them to new republican political arrangements.
Bello's careful balance between the two, combined with a consistent reference to Roman law,
immediately captured the attention of other countries. From Colombia, Manuel Ancizar wrote
to Bello on July 10, 1856, . . . 'This might well represent a first step toward the desired social
unity of our continent.' "). Concerning the influence of Bello's Civil Code on other Latin
American countries, see id. at 175-76 ("There is no doubt that Bello followed Roman law in
the preparation of the Civil Code.").
319 1791 CONST. tit. II, paras. 2, 4 (Fr.) (regulating the "civic oath" taken by private citizens
in the context of naturalization procedures); id para. 5 (describing the civic oath as follows: "I
swear to be faithful to the nation, to the law, and to the King, and to maintain with all my
power the Constitution of the kingdom .... "). Numerous other provisions refer to the civic
oath taken by public officials. Id
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that he do so under oath. A simple promise to tell the truth was not required
anymore, and the violation thereof did not constitute grounds for further
prosecution for perjury in the case of the accused.
Common law went a step beyond this evolution and eliminated the
defendant's obligation to testify under oath altogether, with the addition that
no inferences be drawn from the defendant's reluctance to testify.32° This
election has deprived the trier of fact in common law of an important
evidentiary means to establish the truth. This "negative" guarantee opens the
possibilities for the guilty defendant to walk away unpunished, and thus
paves the way for the mockery of the judicial criminal system. In that sense,
the civil law system requiring all criminal defendants to testify under
promise, without the threat of perjury, curbs the extreme risks of the
common law. Such compulsion is slightly more in accordance with human
reason and the ontological goal of all criminal procedures, the establishment
of the truth.
Returning to the revolutionary influence in Latin American criminal
procedures, these jurisdictions followed suit and eliminated the defendant's
obligation to provide compulsory testimony under oath.3 2 1 However, the
revolutionary approximation overlooked the core rational aspects of the
compulsory oath. If the defendant is innocent, his testimony will help to
establish the truth.322 No exposition to perjury occurs and justice is served.
And justice being, allegedly, the ultimate goal of the whole legal apparatus, it
may be fairly said that "malum quidem nullum esse sine aliquo bono.,3 23 If
the accused is guilty, bearing in mind that he has already committed a crime
(the underlying wrongdoing for which he is being prosecuted), the rationale
was that he would have no obstacle in committing another crime (perjury) to
get away from secular punishment. This rationale is insufficient in the sense
that when the guilty defendant is compelled to testify under oath and
commits perjury, it is not the end of the story. His confession must be
320 For a discussion of the general differences between common law and civil law, see
MERRYMAN ET AL., supra note 92, at 27-50.
321 See, e.g., CODIGO DE PROCEDIMIENTO PENAL [COD. CRIM. PROCED.] art. 320 (Chile) ("La
declaraci6n del inculpado no podrdi recibirse bajo juramento.") ("The testimony of the accused
may not be received under oath." (author's translation)).
32' Elisabetta Grande, Dances of Justice: Tango and Rumba in Comparative Criminal
Procedure, 9 GLOBAL JURIST 4, 8 (2009), available at http://www.bepress.com/gj/vol9/iss4/
art6/ (observing the Protestant influence in the common law adversarial criminal procedure,
according to which no objective truth exists that needs to be discovered by the trier of fact, but
whatever notion of truth the parties reach).
323 "There is, to be sure, no evil without something good." Pliny the Elder, Latin Quotes and
Latin Phrases - M&N, YuNI, http://www.yuni.com/library/latin_4.html (last visited Nov. 20,
2010).
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contrasted with other evidence for the threshold, at least in common law, of
guilt beyond reasonable doubt, to be fulfilled.324
In summary, the criminal defendant's testimony is, by itself, just another
means of evidence that is not self-sufficient for purposes of the procedural
determination of guilt or innocence. Additional evidence is necessary to
effectuate a determination. The defendant's testimony is relevant to
determine the facts of a case and thus the truth of the underlying events,325 in
order to achieve justice, whether criminal or civil. This system was never
meant to serve, and never a means to cause, a self-incriminatory oath.326 The
revolutionary elimination of the compulsory oath in criminal procedures did
not help to further the search for justice in such procedures. Contrary to
these arguments, there is no reason not to have (even if by force) the
defendant testify without requiring him to take an oath.
What the revolutionary ideologues apparently sought was lenience,
especially for criminal defendants, by not exposing them to perjury by
testifying under oath. The implicit caveat was that the defendant might do so
voluntarily at any moment. Furthermore, revolutionary criminal law ideas
never distinguished between the concealment of the truth from the outright
making of false statements. 327 The new concept of procedural justice failed
to make this distinction, which was instrumental in the shaping of criminal
procedure codes in Latin America as well.
328
Still, the argument lingers that, by not requiring criminal defendants to
testify under oath, the revolutionary lenience showed more humanity toward
the natural tendency of the human soul to lie in self-defense. Even if,
arguendo, the benefit of the doubt was given to these revolutionary "ideals,"
multiple evils are brought about by revolutionary "laicization" of the
compulsory oath. Therefore, because the French Revolution eliminated the
millenary mandatory oath in criminal procedures in the Western legal
systems, many of the guilty have walked away unpunished, many of the
innocent have been wrongly punished, and many victims have been deprived
of their day in court.
324 See generally JAMES Q. WHITMAN, THE ORIGINS OF REASONABLE DOUBT: THEOLOGICAL
ROOTS OF THE CRIMINAL TRIAL 4 (2008) (referring to the Christian law principle extant since
the Middle Ages stated as "A judge who is in doubt must refuse to judge.").
325 Grande, supra note 322, at 2 (referring to the role of the criminal procedure in the
determination of an ontological truth).
326 KELLY, supra note 285, at 1005.
327 KARST ET AL., supra note 298, at 55 ("Here, too, the liberalizing, rationalizing, and
modernizing influence of the French Revolution and the Napoleonic Penal Code of 1810 was
plainly reflected in Latin American codification.").
328 Id.
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Lastly, through the Chapelier Law of 1791, the Revolution eliminated the
right to self-defense; that is, the right of the accused to be defended by legal
counsel.3 29  The belief was that the modem man was self-sufficient and
capable of defending himself without the need to resort to the assistance of a
discredited profession: the advocates.330 In this way, the Revolution did
away with a quintessential Romano-Canonical institution, i.e., the right to
counsel, that even inquisitorial procedures respected and promoted.33' In
sum, the denegation of the accused's right to counsel so often included in the
indictments of Latin criminal procedures by common law commentators,
332
is actually a legacy of the French Revolution to Latin America, and not a
progeny of the Spanish legal legacy.333
XV. A CIVIL PROCEDURE MESHED WITH RIGIDITIES AND INCONSISTENCIES
The revolutionary authoritarianism also made its influence felt in the
realm of civil procedure. Emphasis was placed on governmental control of
the different phases of the procedure: pleadings, gathering and production of
evidence, weighing of the proof by the trier of fact, and multiple other
processual junctures.3 34 Stiff statutory standards were imposed on judges for
the review of evidence. Judicial discretion was greatly curtailed; in effect,
contempt powers, equitable powers, and other related measures were visibly
denied to the judiciary.335
329 See infra note 447.
330 Levasseur, supra note 108, at 771 (mentioning the French Revolution's view that
"citizens [are able] to defend themselves").
331 KELLY, supra note 285, at 445 ("Persons accused of heresy had a right to be defended by
legal counsel, just like persons accused of other crimes .... If one wants to find a legal
system in which persons who were only charged with a felony were denied a trial lawyer, one
can look to the English common law. This infringement of the defendant's rights was
eliminated only in 1836.").
332 MERRYMAN ET AL., supra note 92, at 1063 (commenting that in inquisitorial criminal
trials in civil law countries "the accused had no right to counsel").
333 Carlos Rodrigo de la Barra Cousino, Adversarial vs. Inquisitorial Systems: The Rule of
Law and Prospects for Criminal Procedure Reform in Chile, 5 Sw. J.L. & TRADE AM. 323,
324-25 (1998) (describing the pains through which Chile has gone through to overcome the
imperfections of its traditional criminal law procedure system). In the same vein, see
generally Rafael Blanco et al., Reform to the Criminal Justice System in Chile: Evaluation
and Challenges, 2 LoY. U. CHI. INT'L L. REV. 253 (2005) (describing the process of judicial
reform in Chile). Alternatively: RECOPILACION DE LEYES DE LOS REYNOS DE LAS INDIAS
[COMPILATION OF THE LAWS OF THE KINGDOMS OF THE INDIES] 255-58 (1774) (regulating the
multiple aspects related to the right of defense of parties, and the duties of lawyers toward
their clients in Spanish America).
334 See MERRYMAN & PEREZ-PERDOMO, supra note 69.
335 For a more detailed comparison of civil procedure in civil and common law systems, see
APPLE & DEYLING, supra note 3, at 26-31.
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A comparison is often drawn between the active role of the parties in
common law procedures and their passive role in civil law systems.336 While
there is some truth to this observation, the caveat is that the active role of the
judge in Latin American civil procedures, in general, is a subordinated one.
The latitude granted to the judge to intervene in the civil procedure has been
already pre-determined in the law. Therefore, control of the civil procedure
rests with the legislature and not the judges. If at first glance it appears that
the judicial control of civil is conducive to the establishment of truth, the real
mediate control is in the hands of the legislator.
Certain specific aspects of the revolutionary legal legacy on Latin
American civil procedures deserve a more detailed review. First, as
discussed above, the French Revolution rejected the use of mandatory sworn
testimony in civil and criminal procedures, instituting the decisory oath
instead. The typical decisory oath in Latin American civil procedures occurs
when one party is summonsed to a special hearing where a sealed envelope
containing a series of interrogative or affirmative questions prepared by the
other party is opened, to which the summoned party must respond under
oath. If the summoned party attends and readily admits the facts presented in
the pre-set questions, the facts are taken as conclusively proven against that
party. The same occurs if the summoned party refuses to attend the hearing
with respect to the questions stated in the affirmative.337 Thus, the harshness
attached to the refusal to appear to respond to these questions is a
consequence of the removal of the mandatory oath in civil procedure by the
Revolution.
Second, the disqualification of certain persons from providing testimony
has deprived civil procedures from an important tool in determining the facts
336 For a comparison of civil and common law systems, see Jean Louis Bergel, Principal
Features and Methods of Codification, 48 LA. L. REv. 1073 (1988); Joseph Dainow, The Civil
Law and the Common Law: Some Points of Comparison, 15 AM. J. COMP. LAW 419 (1966);
RENE DAVID & JOHN E.C. BRIERLY, MAJOR LEGAL SYSTEMS IN THE WORLD TODAY (1985);
JOHN P. DAWSON, ORACLES OF THE LAW (1968); JOHN D. M. DERRETT, AN INTRODUCTION TO
LEGAL SYSTEMS (William M. Gordon & Olivia F. Robinson trans., 1988); Konstantinos D.
Kerameus, A Civilian Lawyer Looks at Common-Law Procedure, 47 LA. L. REV. 493 (1987);
Hein Kotz, Taking Civil Codes Less Seriously, 50 MOD. L. REV. 1 (1987); MERRYMAN &
PtREZ-PERDOMO, supra note 69; JOHN H. MERRYMAN & DAVID S. CLARK, COMPARATIVE
LAW: WESTERN EUROPEAN AND LATIN AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEMS (1976); OLIVIA F.
ROBINSON ET AL., AN INTRODUCTION TO EUROPEAN LEGAL HISTORY (2d ed. 1987); MARTIN M.
SHAPIRO, COURTS: A COMPARATIVE AND POLITICAL ANALYSIS (1981); ARTHUR T. VON
MEHREN, LAW IN THE UNITED STATES: A GENERAL AND COMPARATIVE VIEW (1988); ARTHUR
T. VON MEHREN & JAMES R. GORDLEY, THE CIVIL LAW SYSTEM (2d ed. 1977).
337 See generally MERRYMAN & PEREZ-PERDOMO, supra note 69, at 119 (describing weight
given to different types of testimony); see also GOLBERT & NUN, supra note 155, at 24
(mentioning that "[b]esides stating the pleadings or defenses and exceptions with which the
defendant intends to oppose the action, the answer may include affirmative defenses").
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during the evidence-gathering stages. These disqualifications existed prior to
1789, but the French Revolution did nothing to overhaul them.
338
Third, the evaluation of the evidence by the trier of fact is subject to stiff
established statutory rules. 339 These guidelines provide scarce latitude to the
judicial appreciation of the evidence. The so-called system of "legal proof'
consists of a set of mechanical rules that pre-determine the value that the
judge is forced to assign to the evidence at hand.340 This arrangement greatly
reduces the judicial discretion required for adjudication.
Fourth, the open-ended right of the parties to file direct appeals and
interlocutory appeals in all of the stages of Latin American judicial process
has caused a paralysis of adjudicatory activities. In fact, since the
Revolutionary model was based on a deep distrust for the judicial role, broad
rights to further hearings before higher courts were granted to litigants.341
Ensuing interminable lawsuits have been the general rule in civil
adjudication in the region.
Fifth, lack of stare decisis has caused great docket congestions in Latin
American courts. Consider, for example, that thousands of cases are filed
every year at the supreme tribunal of Brazil,342 on topics already decided by
that court. Contrast these figures with the number of cases accepted by the
U.S. Supreme Court via certiorari in a given period.3 43 These huge court
338 See FRENCH CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE OF 1806, art. 283 (Chez J.P. Giegler ed., 1806)
(detailing the disqualification of certain persons to serve as witnesses).
339 MERRYMAN & PtREZ-PERDOMO, supra note 69, at 118 (discussing the Medieval system
of "legal proof," whereby all of the evidentiary means and their procedural weight are
determined by the law).
340 Id. at 120.
341 C.H. van Rhee, The Influence of the French Code de Procedure Civile (1806) in 19th
Century Europe," in DE LA COMMEMORATION D'UN CODE A L'AUTRE: 200 ANS DE PROCEDURE
CIVILE EN FRANCE 129-65 (L. Cadiet & G. Canivet eds., 2006), available at http://amo.unima
as.nl/show.cgi?fid=7053 (referring the broad availability of appellate review in the French
Code of Civil Procedure of 1806).
342 Richard J. Wilson, Reflections on Judicial Review in Latin America, 7 Sw. J.L. & TRADE
AM. 435, 443 (2000) ("The Brazilian Supreme Court decided the same issue over 10,000
times in a single year because of the lack of stare decisis and the mandatory nature of
Supreme Court jurisdiction for certain matters."); see also Keith S. Rosenn, Judicial Review in
Brazil: Developments Under the 1988 Constitution, 7 Sw. J. L. & TRADE AM. 291, 291 (2000)
(noting the lack of binding precedent in the Brazilian judicial system).
343 Rosenn, supra note 342, at 311-12 (highlighting that the U.S. Supreme Court, during the
1999-2000 term, had only 2,413 cases on its docket and decided 115 cases. Between the 1988
Constitution and 1996, cases filed in Brazilian courts increased from three hundred and fifty
thousand, in 1988, to 3.7 million, in 1996. The number of cases for Brazil's highest courts,
the Supreme Federal Tribunal and the Superior Tribunal of Justice, had an average of 3,622.5
cases per judge, and 7,830 cases per judge, respectively during the 1988 through 1996 period).
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backlogs have generated a great degree of distrust on the part of common
citizens toward civil adjudication procedures in Latin America. 344
Sixth, the litigants' lack of control over the procedures, and the resulting
authoritarianism attached to them, has promoted a culture of secrecy in Latin
American civil proceedings. The elimination of the pre-1789 civil courtroom
and its substitution by closed chambers are responsible, to a great extent, for
this development.345
Seventh, the judges' lack of contempt powers to compel the parties to
comply with their decisions has, in many cases, generated a mockery of the
justice system, 346 and a protracted low esteem toward the judiciary in Latin
America.347 Unlike common law, the Latin American civil law judge does
not have contempt powers allowing him to impose penalties on the spot to
those intervening in the proceedings.348 The imposition thereof is subject to
a different adjudicatory process. 349  This way, the threat of direct
imprisonment or fines does not exist in Latin America. Therefore, the
immediacy obtained by the use of broad contempt powers in the dispatching
of cases is largely lost due to the prolonged capitis diminutio to which judges
have been subjected to in Latin America.
This Article presents but a sample of the patent and latent defects
germane to Latin American civil procedures shaped by French Revolution
ideas. The new French Code of Civil Procedure of 1986 does away with
many of the entrenched flaws,350 but the pillars of the French revolutionary
civil procedural system still persist in Latin America.
344 See generally Nagle, supra note 166, at 346 (noting the dissatisfaction of Latin American
people with the judicial system).
Robert M. Kossick, Jr., Litigation in the United States and Mexico: A Comparative
Overview, 31 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 23, 24 (2000) (commenting on the configuration of
court chambers in civil law jurisdictions in the context of the exparte problem).
346 See M.C. MIROW, LATIN AMERICAN LAW: A HISTORY OF PRIVATE LAW AND INSTITUTIONS
IN SPANISH AMERICA 235-38 (2004) (pointing out disregard of the law as a significant
problem in Latin America).
347 MERRYMAN & PtREZ-PERDOMO, supra note 69, at 122.
348 MERRYMAN ET AL., supra note 92, at 1021 ("The power to compel the production of
documents, business records, and other evidence... is much weaker [in civil law
jurisdictions] that it is in common law jurisdictions .... In the civil law, a person who
disobeys a lawful order of the court in a civil action may thus be liable to a party for
damages..., but he cannot be punished by the judge .... By contrast, the common law judge
in a civil proceeding can punish for contempt.").
349 MERRYMAN & PtREZ-PERDOMO, supra note 69, at 123 ("[T]he power to compel the
production of documents, business records, and other evidence, power to subject a party's
property to inspection are much weaker" in Latin American civil procedures.").
MERRYMAN ET AL., supra note 92, at 1041.
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XVI. A CIVIL CODE MARRED WITH INCONSISTENCIES AND INSTRUMENTAL
TO A NOTION OF SOCIETY THAT BENEFITS THE FEW TO THE DETRIMENT OF
THE MANY
The Civil Code is, in many ways, the brainchild of the Enlightenment
and, at the same time, the padlock imposed on the people by the Revolution.
The Code is also the product of a philosophical movement that put reason at
the center of every societal institution. Conversely, the Code's liberal ideas
were unable to totally do away with the traditional values, the embedded
culture, and the organization of the society that it came to rule. In that sense,
the Code is a blend of positivism and natural law, the former being
represented by Roman law and the latter by customary law. In fact, the Code
borrowed extensively from Roman law in many areas, including contract
law,35' property law, testaments, and certain patrimonial aspects of family
law.352 But it clearly follows customary law, especially the Custom of Paris,
in family law, the law of inheritance (with a strong emphasis on the unity of
the family and the domestic power of husband and parents), the forced
heirship of relatives, the recognition of children born out of wedlock, the
administration of wills, and the acquisitive prescription in good faith.353
The revolutionary assumption was that if sovereignty resides in the
people and that elected representatives exercise sovereignty through
legislation, then the works of the legislature are the supreme expression of
the sovereign. This proclamation is at the root of the revolutionary homily.
Therefore, the Code, with its implicit pretenses of being Table XI of the
Mosaic Law, became a crucial tool of the political power for the total
domination of society. Conversely, the Code came to recognize that same
political power as its supreme lord. From the beginning of the independence
movement, the Latin American founding fathers understood that the Civil
Code was the most usable and resourceful tool for the political domination of
the nascent nations.354 Moreover, there were serious efforts in Chile in 1822
351 Tunc, supra note 17, at 450 ("The law of contract is clearly designed for a period of
liberalism.").
352 CODE CIVIL [C. civ.] arts. 1540-1548 (Fr.).
353 See generally Zweigert & Krtz, supra note 56, at 89 (mentioning Article 2279 of the
Code Civil des Franqais).
354 JAKSIt, supra note 6, at 156 ("On July 23, 1822, Supreme Director Bernardo O'Higgins
delivered an enthusiastic call for the Chilean Congress to consider the adoption of the French
civil code, also known as the Code Napoleon, for the Republic of Chile: 'You know how
necessary it is to reform our laws,' he declared, 'let me hope that you will adopt the five
celebrated codes [the grands codes], including the civil code, that are so worthy of the wisdom
of the times, and that have exposed the barbarism of all previous legislation! Let us forever
erase the institutions built under colonialism and eradicate ignorance! Let us proceed with
determination and we will triumph over the obstacles.' "). Id. at 180 ("Roman law was the
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to adopt the French Civil Code wholesale, an initiative that eventually
failed.355
In this context, it is worth examining some of the substantive
inconsistencies of the French Civil Code, which later passed on to most of
Latin America via the Chilean Civil Code.
First, under the Montesquieuan aura, the Civil Code provided that judges
were but the "mouthpiece" of the law and were absolutely banned from
interpreting it. 35 6 In the so-called "French Deviation," the Cour de Cassation
was created in 1791 to empower its judges with the authority to annul
judicial decisions.357 The function of cassation unavoidably implies the
power to interpret statutory laws, and to deem judicial decisions contrary to
the literal sense, purpose, intent, or scope of a given statutory material, as a
ground to nullify those decisions. The contrivance of the Cour de Cassation
as a non-judicial body is but a machination to conceal the undeniable, that is,
that judges do interpret laws. This defect is very seriously affects the legal
interpretation scheme conceived by the Civil Code.
Second, the denial of equitable powers to judges by forcing them to abide
completely by acts of the legislature is also blemished with contradictions.
Judges were supposed to adjudicate based on the law. If that law did not
exist, they were forbidden from creating it. 358 In that case, they had to resort
to the institution of the legislative referral. 359 An insuperable inconsistency
exists here: Article 4 of the Code,36 ° which forces judges to decide cases
under severe penalties even if no law exists, is incompatible with the whole
etiology of the revolutionary judicial philosophy.36'
most powerful intellectual weapon available for [the absolutist states'] typical programme of
territorial integration and administrative centralism .....
311 Id. at 156.
356 PtREZ-PERDOMO & FRIEDMAN, supra note 181, at 12.
357 1791 CONST. tit. III, ch. V, art. 19 (Fr.) ("I1 y aura pour tout le royaume un seul tribunal
de cassation.") ("There shall exist for all the kingdom, only one court of cassation." (author's
translation)).
358 1791 CONST. tit. III, ch. V, art. 3 (Fr.) ("Les tribunaux ne peuvent ... s'immiscer dans
lexercice du pouvoir legislative.") ("The courts may not interfere with the exercise of the
leislative power." (author's translation)).
9 See supra note 223, on the legislative referral (refgr lMgislatif).
360 CODE CIVIL [C. civ.] art. 4 (Fr.) ("Le juge qui refusera de juger sous pr6texte du silence,
de l'obscuritd ou de l'insuffisance de la loi, pourra etre poursuivi comme coupable de ddni de
justice.") ("The judge that refuses to adjudicate a case under the pretext that there is no law,
or that the law is obscure or insufficient, may be prosecuted as guilty of denial of justice."
(author's translation)).
361 See Konrad Zweigert & Hans-JUrgen Puttfarken, Statutory Interpretation-Civilian Style,
44 TUL. L. REV. 704 (1970), reprinted in CIVIL LAW 259 (Ralf Rogowski ed., 1996)
(discussing the French Civil Code's "Inexcusability Rule").
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Third, the Code's goal of comprehensiveness immediately faced the
insurmountable and arch-repeated reality that "the most ingenious legislator
could not foresee and determine all the possible problems which might
arise. 362 Namely, the drafters left unregulated many important areas of law,
the main example being that of tort law, which is covered by a meager five
provisions of the Code.3 63 Despite its pretensions of universality, countless
other areas were left unregulated by the Code, including: commercial
partnerships, checks and other commercial instruments, warehouses,
maritime mortgage, a satisfactory mortgage system364 that would allow the
detachment of the underlying transaction from the derivative stocks, 365 an
adequate treatment of the law of movables (personalty), a more thorough
regulation of associative forms or legal entities, insurance, bankruptcy,
product liability,36 6 class actions, 36  a thorough regulation of vicarious
liability, the liability in case of the dependent worker or employee, and
multiple other modem types of contracts.368 Equally, key equitable theories
362 Zweigert & Krtz, supra note 56, at 92; see also MERRYMAN ET AL., supra note 92, at
201-02 (quoting an Attorney General of the U.S. who referred to the Code's aim at regulating
the whole of individual and social life as overlooking the fact that "no finite wisdom can
provide for the infinite and unknown variety and complexity of future cases").
... CODE CIVIL [C. cIv.] arts. 1382-1386 (Fr.).
364 Tunc, supra note 17, at 450.
365 For a review of recent laws concerning securitization operations and secured transactions
in Latin America, see generally Richard C. Jordan, Will The Bubble Burst? Some Subprime
Lessons for Mexico, Latin America's Leader in Asset Securitization, 42 INT'L LAW. 1181
(2008); Dante Figueroa, Civil Law Trusts in Latin America: Is the Lack of Trusts an
Impediment for Expanding Business Opportunities in Latin America?, 24 ARIZ. J. INT'L &
CoMP. L. 701 (2007); Francisco SAnchez, Synthesis and Perspectives of Securitization in
Chile: Opportunities for Players in the Chilean Securitization Arena, GLOBAL
SECURITIZATION GUIDE (2006); Georgette Chapman Poindexter et al., En Ruta Hacia el
Desarrollo: The Emerging Secondary Market in Latin America, 34 GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REV.
257 (2002); Erica W. Stump, Securitizations in Latin America, 8 U. MIAMI Bus. L. REV. 195
(2000); Robert M. Kossick, Jr. et al., Structuring Private Equity Transactions in Mexico, 6
NAFTA: L. & Bus. REV. AM. 105 (2000); Claire A. Hill, Latin American Securitization: The
Case of the Disappearing Political Risk, 38 VA. J. INT'L L. 293 (1998); Boris Kozolchyk &
Dale Beck Furnish, The OAS Model Law on Secured Transactions. A Comparative Analysis,
12 Sw. J.L. & TRADE AM. 235 (2006).
366 On this topic, see Michael Gordon, Product Liability Claims on Both Sides of the Border,
a Panel Discussion, 8 U.S.-MEx. L.J. 123 (2000); John F. Molloy, Miami Conference
Summary of Presentations, 20 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMp. L. 47 (2003); Jorge Mosset Iturraspe,
General Trends in South American Products Liability Law: An Overview, 20 ARIZ. J. INT'L &
COMp. L. 115, 116 (2003).
367 Kossick, supra note 345, at 52 ("Class action suits, as they are conceived, defined, and
carried out in the United States, are not realized in Mexico.").
368 See generally BLANC-JOUVAN, supra note 267, at 8 (discussing the multiple modem
contractual forms incorporated to the original French Civil Code of 1804 during the last two
hundred years).
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of corporate law existing in common law systems have gone largely ignored
by the Code, namely the doctrine of equitable partnership, the piercing
corporate veil doctrine, the doctrine holding corporate promoters liable for
their actions, the ultra vires theory, and the sham corporation doctrine,3 69 to
name but a few.
Fourth, the overall structure of the Code begs logical strictness and
rigurosity. For instance, matrimonial property law is regulated in Book one
(On the Persons) whereas it should be included together in the institution of
marriage.370  Tort liability is catalogued as a "mode to acquire property"
instead of as a standing alone legal institution.37' Precisely this
disorganization led the jurist, Planiol, to state that "Book Three [of the Code]
is a rag-bag of heterogeneous matters.' 372
Fifth, contrasting with the terminological exactitude of the German Civil
Code, one scholar37 3 has identified the sloppiness or lack of precision in the
language of many key provisions of the Code.374
Sixth, the progressive dismantling of the Civil Code during the last two
centuries has created a widespread sense of lack of legal certainty and a
consequential disrespect for the law in Latin America. 375 The combination of
the Code's pretension for perennial universality (remember Napol6on's
reference to the "eternity" of his Code) with its accompanying inability to
foresee the many changes that would come in society, has left the Code in an
369 For more on these topics, see Stephen Bainbridge, Abolishing Veil Piercing, 26 J. CORP.
L. 479 (2000); Madhavi Sunder, Piercing the Veil, 112 YALE L.J. 1399 (2002); and Peter B.
Oh, Veil-Piercing, 89 TEx. L. REV. 81 (2010).
370 Zweigert & K6tz, supra note 56, at 94 ("The structure of the Code civil is plainly
unsatisfactory.").
171 Id. at95.
372 Id.
373 Id. at 92.
174 Id. at 92-93 (identifying the following aspects: "(a) [a]ccording to art. 778 of the Code
civil, an inheritance may be accepted either 'dans un acte authentique ou privd' or by means of
an 'acte qui suppose necessairement son intention d'accepter': here in the same sentence the
word 'acte' is used in the sense of 'deed' and in the sense of 'action. ... ' [T]he notion of
'propi~t6' is used in the sense of 'ownership of things... [art. 544] and in the sense of wealth
of all types [Title of Third Book]; (b) according to art. 1147 Code Civil, a person has to pay
damages for breach of contract, unless he proves that a 'cause dtrang~re qui ne peut lui 6tre
imputde' was the reason for nonperformance; (c) according to art. 1148 the duty to make
compensation ceases in the event of 'force majeure' or 'cas fortuity.' The relationship
between [these terms] is never made clear. (d) "[T]he famous formula 'en fait des meubles la
possession vaut titre ....... [I]t was left to the courts of France to resolve the following
questions: Under what conditions is possession a ground of defence to a rei vindicatio? What
is meant by 'possession'? Is good faith required? If so, what constitutes good faith, and at
what moment of time must it be established?").
375 See generally Mirow, supra note 11, at 186-89 (containing a succinct relation of the
elements contributing to the "burying" of the Civil Code in Latin America).
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uncomfortable gap. The Civil Code's prestige of wisdom, stemming from its
purported ability to provide solutions to the most imperative challenges in
society, has tumbled vis-A-vis its flawed design.
The slow and painful agony of the Civil Code is witnessed in every
corner of the world where its influence extended during the past two
centuries. For instance, the patria potestas has been gradually eroded, the
business capacity of the married woman greatly changed, and her position
upon her husband's death improved,376 and the distinctions between
legitimate children and others obliterated.377 Furthermore, one of the pillars
of the Code, namely, contractual freedom, has been progressively worn
away.378 Curiously, the same Leviathan that as supreme lawgiver erected the
Code, that is the legislature, is the one that has systematically restricted such
liberty. This has been the case of, for instance, the contracts of lease, sale,
carriage, employment law, or insurance law, among the many. 379 The field
of strict liability has also been seriously expanded.380  Also, in an express
recognition of the overtly wrong gagging of the judges, many recent
amendments have granted certain limited equity powers to them.
381
The overall effect has been that the courts have come to fill in the lacunae
left by the Code. In France alone, entire areas of law have been subject to
judicial creationism. 382 Failed attempts at reforming the French Civil Code
376 Id. at 96.
377 For example, the Constitution of El Salvador of 1983, Article 36, states that children born
in or out of wedlock and adoptive children have the same rights in front of their parents. This
constitutional provision has been ratified by decisions of the Supreme Court of Justice of El
Salvador dated 27 November 1991 (Sala de lo Civil de la Corte Suprema de Justicia, San
Salvador, Nov. 27, 1991, 9:00 a.m., in XCII Revista Judicial, Corte Suprema de Justicia 832
(Jan.-Dec., 1991), 3 December 1991 (Sala de lo Civil de la Corte Suprema de Justicia, San
Salvador, Dec. 3, 1991, 9:00 a.m., in XCII Revista Judicial, Corte Suprema de Justicia 836
(Jan.-Dec., 1991), and 27 February 1992 (Sala de lo Civil de la Corte Suprema de Justicia,
San Salvador, Feb. 27, 1992, 1:00 p.m., in XCIII Revista Judicial, Corte Suprema de Justicia
934 (Jan.-Dec., 1992).
378 For an exponential increase of regulatory law in recent years in two particular Latin
American jurisdictions, Brazil and Chile, see Brendan McNallen, Fixing the Leaks in Brazil's
Water Law: Encouraging Sound Private Sector Participation Through Legal and Regulatory
Reform, 9 GONZ. J. INT'L L. 147, 193-94 (2005) (concluding that more legislation and
regulation in Brazil's public utitilies sectors is necessary for public-private cooperation in
infrastructure projects to prosper).
379 Zweigert & K6tz, supra note 56, at 96.
380 PHANOR JAMES EDER, A COMPARATIVE SURVEY OF ANGLO-AMERICAN AND LATIN-
AMERICAN LAW 51-54 (1950).
381 Murillo, supra note 138, at 15.
382 See Zweigert & Kbtz, supra note 56, at 97 (referring to the law of the accident
compensation; the social protection of workmen and employees, which go far beyond the
Civil Code; the doctrine of abuse of rights, including the issuance of injunctions; the
applicability of contracts for the benefit of third parties; insurance contracts; the innovation of
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have taken place since its first centennial.383 In 1945 a committee was also
appointed to produce draft amendments of the Code.384 Only piecemeal
reforms have gone through, causing the current Code to be nothing more
than an inorganic patchwork of un-systematized legislative activity. 385 For
example, the scant five original provisions of 1804 concerning tort liability
have been left almost intact in the current version of the Code, as if life had
not changed during the intervening two hundred years.386
In sum, the subsequent dismantling of the Civil Code in vast areas of
societal life, left unregulated by its drafters, has caused great legal
uncertainty, insecurity, 387 and distrust toward the law from Latin American
a general claim based on unjustified enrichment; the design of the tool of astreinte, a legal
device akin to the common law contempt power; the prohibition of successive heirship by
means of skillfully drafted wills; and the acceptance of paternity claims based on illegitimacy
even before statutory amendments to the Code allowed them); see also MERRYMAN ET AL.,
supra note 92, at 1021.
383 Zweigert & Kotz, supra note 56, at 98 ("In the centenary year of the Code civil, 1904, a
committee was set up to reform it ....").
384 BELL ET AL., supra note 123, at 24 (commenting reformist efforts undertaken in France
during the twentieth century).
385 Zweigert & K6tz, supra note 56, at 99 (discussing partial legislative amendments to the
Code in the areas of "matrimonial property law, the law of adoption, the legal position of
illegitimate children, and the rules of incapacity").
38 CODE CIVIL [C. civ.] arts. 1382-1386 (Fr.), available at http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affi
chCode.do?cidTexte=LEGITEXT000006070721. Only Article 1384, concerning vicarious
liability, was amended in 2002. The text of the other provisions is the original from 1804.
CODE CIVIL [C. civ.] art. 1384 (Fr.).
387 JAKSIC, supra note 6, at 158:
Posterity will find it hard to believe that, having moved from a monarchic,
despotic and semifeudal regime in order to become an almost democratic
representative republic with a division of powers, we should have conserved
for twenty one years not only the laws of [medieval] Castile, but also the
colonial laws. They currently rule over our political, fiscal and civil
administration with codes that concentrate omnipotent powers on a monarch
whose government and courts sat three thousand leagues away from our land.
Id. quoting the "Oficio del Presidente de la Reptiblica al Presidente del Senado," which was
included in Cimara de Senadores, "Sesi6n 9, en 11 de Julio de 1831. Presidencia de Don Josd
Ignacio Cienfuegos," in AGB, I, 54-55. Id. at 161 (recalling that Bello "suggested that the
old legislation was probably the best foundation for change, and presented the enterprise of
codification as incremental rather than radical"). Id. at 166 ("[T]he new written law retained
much of the Spanish colonial legislation, but adopted some provisions from other codes. For
instance, in the section on persons, a combination of Roman law, canon law, and the French
civil code was adopted to classify the status of children as legitimate, natural, and illegitimate.
Canon law was followed on the validity of matrimony .... ). Id. at 167 ("[F]or instance, the
French civil code and the code of Sardinia were followed on the matter of rights of way and
the use and distribution of water, for they were seen as the most conducive to enhancing the
cultivation of land .... The section on inheritance stayed close to Roman law and the
thirteenth-century Spanish Siete Partidas, but softened some of the edges concerning
assignments to surviving spouses, and provided various formulas for the distribution of assets
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peoples. All of this has happened, thanks to the French Revolution's legal
ideas that were assimilated in the region.
XVII. PROMOTION OF THE INDIVIDUAL AS THE MEASURE OF ALL THINGS
The enlightened man, that is, the man of property who had a right to vote,
with a high intellectual life, knowledgeable about business and about the
world, is the one who won the French Revolution. This highly
388individualistic character, and to a certain extent with racist overtones,
became the dominant actor in society. The Enlightened individualism had
dire consequences in the legal field as it impacted Latin America since the
early nineteenth century.
First and foremost, it is necessary to highlight that the Code's
reaffirmation and, to a certain degree, sacralization of individual absolute
ownership over all types of property, that is, the exultation of private
property as inviolable and sacred,389 led to the destruction of communal
property in Latin America. In fact, the Civil Code of 1804 prohibited
communal property by giving all subjects an absolute right to dissolve
undivided property.3 90 For this purpose, the Code created a legal action
establishing that any joint property may be dissolved by the action brought
by any of the undivided holders at any moment.39' The result was that, in
fact, communal property became prohibited under the Code.392 The contrast
between the anti-communal property provisions of the first Latin American
between surviving spouses and children. On contracts and obligations, the Chilean code
followed some aspects, such as the nullity and rescindment of contracts, of the French civil
code. It followed the codes of Sardinia, the Two Sicilies, and the French code again, on
contracts and obligations involving minors and natural children. On the manner of choosing
among codes in this section, the message stated that 'as a general rule, the code of the [Siete]
Partidas and the French civil code have been the guiding lights that we have kept most
constantly in view. Where they differ, we have chosen what seemed most adaptable and
convenient [to our circumstances].' ").388 CHARLES DE SECONDAT, supra note 73, at 238 ("These creatures are all over black, and
with such a flat nose that they can scarcely be pitied. It is hardly to be believed that God, who
is a wise Being, should place a soul, especially a good soul, in such a black ugly body.").
389 BASDEVANT-GAUDEMET & GAUDEMET, supra note 51, at 348.
390 MARY ANN GLENDON, COMPARATIVE LEGAL TRADITIONS IN A NUTSHELL 16-57 (1999);
Mirow, supra note 143, at 321 (referring to the elimination of limits on free alienation, the
forced division of property that is owned in common, and the suspension of the division of
property by agreements that are valid for only up to five years). On this last point, see CODE
CIVIL [C. cIv.] art. 1317 (Fr.) (reaffirming those provisions).
'9' CODE CIVIL [C. civ.] art. 815 (Fr.) ("Nul ne peut 8tre contraint A demeurer dans
l'indivision.") ("Nobody may be forced to hold property in common." (author's translation)).
392 See, e.g., CODIGO CIVIL [COD. cIv.] art. 1317 (Chile) (restating the same rule of art. 815
of the French Civil Code).
2010]
GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
civil codes, with the reality of Latin America before these codes were
enacted, is paramount.393 In the New Indies, the native inhabitants had lived
since immemorial times holding certain lands, mainly pastures, but also other
lands, in common.394 An elucidatory example is the case of ejido lands in
Mexico,395 which have struggled over centuries to survive the harshness of
the anti-communal property provisions of the Civil Code. As the Code could
not do away with centuries of customary tradition in the colonies, ways were
found to circumvent the anti-communal provisions, whether in the form of
crafty contracting, or outright corruption.396 There is abundant literature
arguing that, in Latin America, these tactics aided land accumulation instead
of land distribution, 397 and this happened, thanks in a great part to the French
Revolution.
Second, the guilds, those great institutions of the ancien rrgime, where
people gathered according to profession or craft (merchants, peasants,
artisans, etc.), 398 were utterly destroyed by the Revolution.399  These
organizations provided a safety net for their members and ensured the
welfare of every member. Cooperatives were also ruined by the
Revolution.400 The cooperative and communal spirit was thought to belong
'9' See, e.g., MARIA VAZQUEZ, LAND PRIVATIZATION IN MEXICO: URBANIZATION, FORMATION
OF REGIONS, AND GLOBALIZATION IN EJIDOS 59 (2004) (describing how the ancestral situation
of ejido lands in Mexico was negatively affected by the civil legislation enacted in the
Mexican Civil Code).
394 See MIROW, supra note 346, at 11-18, 61-69, 84-94; MERRYMAN & PtREZ-PERDOMO,
sura note 69, at 364-73.
395 M.C. Mirow, Latin American Legal History: Some Essential Spanish Terms, 12 LA RAZA
L.J. 43 (2001).
396 Ana MacLean, Rethinking Legal Education in Latin America, 12 L. & Bus. REv. AM. 503
(2006) ("Throughout Latin America, but specifically in Peru, the legal profession is in crisis.
The legal system is inefficient and corrupt, the number of lawyers is extraordinary, and the
ones that actually exercise their profession are themselves considered inefficient and
corrupt.").
397 See, e.g., CARLOS FELIPE JARAMILLO & THOMAS KELLY, DEFORESTATION AND PROPERTY
RIGHTS IN LATIN AMERICA, available at http://ibcperu.org/doc/isis/6247.pdf
398 DAWSON, supra note 44, at 203 ("The life of the medieval gild [sic] was a microcosm...
and its intense solidarity made its membership more important in the life of the individual than
that of the city itself .. "). Id. at 204 (mentioning that there were guilds of bankers, lawyers,
and also of "the less privileged workers"). Id. at 207 (stating that the functions of the guild
included "the regulation of work and wages, the giving of assistance to fellow gild-men in
sickness or misfortune, and the right to participate in the government of the city"); see also
BELLOC, supra note 80, at 159 ("But the guild could and did undertake the common work and
share out the benefits of the wealth it produced.").
399 See H.G. KOENIGSBERGER & ASA BRIGGS, EARLY MODERN EUROPE: 1500-1789, at 310
(1987) (referring to the abolition of guilds by the Enlightenment).
400 1791 CONST. pmbl. (Fr.), available at http://sourcebook.fsc.edu/history/constitutionofl7
91 .html ("[N]either jurandes nor corporations of professions, arts, and crafts any longer
exist.").
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to the lower classes of society and, as such, was a direct threat to the
individual capitalistic spirit, which was the true winner4 1 and owner of the
Revolution. In that sense, the Revolution, together with inaugurating a new
world era, destroyed a whole way of life.
402
Third, at the core of the revolutionary spirit, there is a deeply-seated sense
401 h
of distrust of the masses. In the case of the United States, for example,
Jefferson showed some degree of discomfort after his initial wholehearted
endorsement of the Revolution when he saw the slave uprisings in Haiti.
This country had been the first Latin American nation to pass its own version
of the Code Civil, in 1825.
Fourth, the triumph of individualism was erected to the detriment of the
family in the way it had been organized for about fourteen hundred years in
Europe prior to 1789.404 More on this topic will be reviewed later under
Thesis XIX.
XVIII. L'ORDRE BOURGEOIS: MUCH FOR THE FEW, LITTLE FOR THE MANY
An author has rightly pointed out that "the original Code Civil was the
law-book of the bourgeoisie.,, 40 5 The defense of the bourgeois property was
a central worry of the revolutionaries. 6  The Civil Code favored the
unrestrained dominion of capitalism in the Western civil law world.40 7  In
that sense, both the advantages and the evils of capitalism are intimately
linked to it.
408
401 BASDEVANT-GAUDEMET & GAUDEMET, supra note 51, at 331 ("triomphe de
l'individualisme") ("the triumph of individualism" (author's translation)).
402 For a review of modem alternative forms of business organizations inspired by pre-
French Revolution principles and ideas, see Michael Naughton, The Corporation as a
Community of Work: Understanding the Firm Within the Catholic Social Tradition, 4 AVE
MARIA L. REV. 330 (2006).
403 CHARLES DE SECONDAT, supra note 73, at 110 ("Democracy has, therefore, two excesses
to avoid-the spirit of inequality, which leads to aristocracy or monarchy, and the spirit of
extreme equality, which leads to despotic power, as the latter is completed by conquest.").
404 BASDEVANT-GAUDEMET & GAUDEMET, supra note 51, at 351 (quoting R. Szramkiewicz,
for whom "la famille est tout a la fois cellulle monarquique et cellulle catholique") ("the
family is at the same time a monarchical and Catholic cellule" (author's translation)).
405 Zweigert & Kttz, supra note 56, at 95.
406 BASDEVANT-GAUDEMET & GAUDEMET, supra note 51, at 396 (referring to the Code of
Civil Procedure of 1806 as "la defense de la proprirtd bourgeoise constituait la preoccupation
primordiale") ("The primary purpose was the defense of bourgeois property" (author's
translation)).
407 VAN CAENEGEM, supra note 21, at 127 ("The law of these modem codifications proved
itself to be perfectly adapted to the needs of the capitalist, middle-class economy of the
nineteenth century.").
408 See Keith S. Rosenn, The Success of Constitutionalism in the United States and Its
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In Latin America, the philosophy of liberal economy found in the Civil
Code a decisive ally and promoter.0 9 When the industrial revolution hit the
Western world, it struck Latin America even harder. The new elites threw
themselves into the arms of the Civil Code and used it as their shield to
protect accumulation and dominance. 410 For instance, the sepulchral silence
of the Code toward anti-competitive and monopolistic practices has been
well documented throughout the West.411 The civil law idea that price is
determined by the free interplay of offer and demand became a big ruse after
the French Revolution. The fact is, contractual freedom and the free
determination of prices by the interplay of offer and demand are illusory with
respect to most vital items in the market. The emergence of the regulatory
State in the twentieth century as an antonymic phenomenon to unfettered
economic freedom is largely explained by. the idea of extreme individual
economic freedom advanced by the Civil Code.412
Huge struggles took place about a hundred years ago to drill into the wall
of the Civil Code statutory provisions protecting the small entrepreneur from
those already established and exerting tight market dominance. 3 Contracts
of adhesion emerged as the legal expression of market imbalances favoring
the overwhelming power of a few to the detriment of the many. Regulatory
law emerged during the twentieth century in Latin America as a response to
the abuses of capitalism in spite of, and against, the philosophy of the Civil
Code.
Failure in Latin America: An Explanation, in THE U.S. CONSTITUTION AND THE
CONSTITUTIONS OF LATIN AMERICA 70-71 (Kenneth W. Thompson ed., 1991) (commenting on
the liberal tradition of France and its relation to the United Stated democratic experiment).
409 JAKSI(, supra note 6, at 173 (remarking that the Civil code "served as a powerful
blueprint for social and political arrangements based on both tradition and the exigencies of an
emerging liberal economy").
410 See Jorge L. Esquirol, The Failed Law of Latin America, 56 AM. J. COMP. L. 75, at 15
(2008) (stating that the protection of private property is one of the main elements of the liberal
ideology--of which the Napoleonic Civil Code is a crucial landmark-and that part of the
solution to Latin American socio-economic problems lies in broadening property
opportunities to vast sectors of the population).
1 See, e.g., The French Banking Act of January 24, 1984, which came to regulate
monopolies in the banking industry, available at http://www.banque-france.fr/gb/publications/
telechar/autrestelechar/bankact.pdf; see also, e.g., IGNACIO DE LE6N, LATIN AMERICAN
COMPETITION LAW AND POLICY 10-42 (2001) (analyzing the emergence of a competition
culture in Latin American legal systems).
412 See BELLOC, THE SERVILE STATE 47 (2008) (analyzing the connection between
capitalism, pauperism, and enlightened ideas on the economy).
4 3 A good example of this struggle is the passage of laws allowing industrial and
agricultural pledges without the transfer of possession of the pledged goods to creditors, thus
permitting small entrepreneurs and farmers to obtain loans while continuing their productive
activities.
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Only decades after the passage of the Civil Code in Latin America new
doctrines emerged aimed at moderating the harsh effects of the Code's
unrestrained capitalistic philosophy.414  These ideas originated in the
Catholic Church and took expression in the notion of the social function of
property.415 Colossal doctrinal battles ensued in Latin America, after 1893,
between Code-worshippers and the proponents of new legal concepts based
on the Catholic principle of social justice and the duty to exercise one's
rights without affecting the rights of others or the welfare of the masses.4 16
As a consequence of the revolutionary experiment, occasionally the
masses in Latin America have placed their faith in extreme experiments such
as communism, the ideology that has killed more people than any other
political system in the history of humanity.417 Again, these phenomena have
been greatly facilitated by the ideas spread by French Revolution.
XIX. UNLEASHING THE IDEA THAT THE SEXUAL CONDUCT OF THE CITIZEN
IS A PURELY PRIVATE MATTER
When the traditional family is up and running, little room is left for
government intervention. In fact, when the nuclear family stumbles and is
destroyed, the government's role is aggrandized. Many evils 418 form the
414 See generally PAVEL KALENSKV, TRENDS OF PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 58 (1971)
(analyzing the connections between the expansion of capitalism and, among other, the French
Civil Code).
415 See POPE LEO XIII, ENCYCLICAL LETTERS RERUM NOVARUM, No. 46 (1891), available at
http://www.vatican.va/holyfather/leo xiii/encyclicals/documents/hf_l-xiii enc 15051891 re rum
-novarum en.html (alluding to the need to affim private property for "as many as possible of the
people to become owners"); see also POPE PIUS XI, QUADRAGESIMO ANNo, No. 53 (1931),
available at http://www.vatican.va/holyfather/pius xi/encyclicals/documents/hf p-xi enc 19310
515 quadragesimo-anno en.html ("[U]nless a man is expending labor on his own property, the
labor of one person and the property of another must be associated, for neither can produce
anything without the other. Leo XIII certainly had this in mind when he wrote: 'Neither capital can
do without labor, nor labor without capital.' "); POPE J014N PAUL II, CENTESMUS ANNUS, No. 30
(1991), available at http://www.vatican.va/holy father/john-paul -ii/encyclicals/documents/hfjp-i
i enc 01051991_centesimus-annus-en.html ("Of its nature private property also has a social
function which is based on the law of the common purpose of goods.").
416 TOM BRASS, LATIN AMERICAN PEASANTS 342 (2003) (stating that the "mobilizing
discourse used by the Falange in Chile... was that of Roman Catholicism, and in particular
the social teachings contained in the papal encyclicals Rerum Novarum and Quadragesimo
Anno, both of which upheld the rights of private property and were against socialism and class
struggle").
417 See generally BENJAMIN A. VALENTINO, FINAL SOLUTIONS: MASS KILLING AND GENOCIDE
IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 91 (2005) ("Communist violence in these three states alone-
Soviet Union, China, and Cambodia-may account for between 21 million and 70 million
deaths.").
418 Evils, including: adultery, divorce, incest, sodomy, children born out of wedlock, sexual
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breeding ground for an increase of the government's intrusion into the
traditional family setting, which has been based, in the West, on the Judeo-
Christian concept of human sexuality. The breadth of these topics largely
exceed the purpose of this Article, but these points show the enormously
nefarious effect of the revolutionary ideas in family law throughout Latin
America. When the aforementioned blights or a combination occurs, the
government emerges as the necessary savior providing welfare services, and
a myriad of benefits for the casualties generated by the destruction of the
family.
But the government does nothing for free. It also arrogates for itself the
power to define institutions that are as natural to man as man is to nature,
which is what the revolutionaries of 1789 did. The institution of marriage,
for example, which was at the root of the pre-Revolutionary social order, was
redefined by the revolutionary ideologists. 419 Marriage evolved from being a
concept subject to many vices in pagan times,42° to becoming an indissoluble
key social institution in 324 A.D. upon the conversion of Rome421 to the
Church.422 By its broad acceptance of divorce, the Revolution transformed
marriage into a dissoluble contract, and thus eroded the very foundations of a
millenary legal order. Rightly so, marriage has been defined since
immemorial times423 as the very foundation of the family and of society.
abuse, mistreatment of children, abandonment of children, care for the orphans, for the
elderly, homelessness, alimony, pornography, and domestic violence. Tunc, supra note 17, at
447 (" '[T]he door open to divorce is the door open to abuse of divorce.' ").
419 FRANCIS RONSIN, REVOLUTIONARY FEVER AND OPPOSITION TO MARRIAGE DURING THE
"GREAT FRENCH REVOLUTION" (2007), available at http://www.iisg.nlwomhist/ronsin2007.
doc ("[T]he text of the Constitution, adopted in August 1791, recognized marriage as a non-
religious contract while remaining silent on divorce. Citizens decided to skip this step. As
soon as the Constitution was promulgated they divorced in front of a notary and remarried in
front of their municipality."); see also SUZANNE DESAN, THE FAMILY ON TRIAL IN
REVOLUTIONARY FRANCE (2006).
420 CHARLES DE SECONDAT, supra note 73, at 75 ("At Rome the husband was permitted to
lend his wife to another. Plutarch tells us this in express terms.").
421 CHRISTOPHER DAWSON, THE MAKING OF EUROPE 21 (1946) ("Christianity won the
victory-against the Roman Empire--only after a long and bitter struggle."); see also
BELLOC, supra note 80, at 25 (affirming that "the conversion of the Roman Empire was a
conversion to... the Catholic Church").
422 See generally ANDREW ALFOLDI, THE CONVERSION OF CONSTANTINE AND PAGAN ROME
128 (1948) (mentioning the innovations brought about to family law by the Catholic Church
within the Roman Empire, including "regulations for divorce, edicts against concubinage, the
legitimization of marriage, the encouragament of the will to make gifts, the edicts against the
gladiatorial shows").
423 WATKIN, supra note 106, at 86 (explaining that since the conversion of the Rome, the
Church began legislating on matters related to its doctrine, particularly marriage); see also
ALAN WATSON, THE MAKING OF THE CIVIL LAW 85 (1981) (citing the Roman Institutes as the
source of "that association of man and woman that we call marriage"); SUSAN TREGGIARI,
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Therefore, if marriage is destroyed, the family follows suit, and the logical
consequence is to expect an increase in the government's intervention to
"remedy" the evils thus befallen society.
In fact, the revolutionaries substituted the notion of consent, as the
424 thsw
essential'rule, for the natural institution of marriage. In this way, they
degraded what, before was considered a universally binding union, into a
simple civil contract,425 rescindable at will by the parties.42 6 This permissive
and relativistic rule obviously transformed the important institution of
marriage into a contract to which one can get in or out of, regardless of its
consequences. Divorce thus stood at the center of revolutionary family
law427 as it fanned out in the West with formidable strength. Marriage
dissolubility has accordingly thrown millions into the hands of the Welfare
State, or made them totally dependent on charitable institutions.
It is fair to state at this point that, since the most important objective of
the Revolution was to preserve the family property and not the institution of
marriage,428 "revolutionary law ruined the very foundations of the family.
42 9
In sum, this world, as we know it-or rather knew it-has changed
dramatically for the worse, and, in good part, thanks to the French
Revolution.
XX. ABOLITION OF INHERITANCE SCHEME FACILITATED DEEP
RESENTMENTS AT THE FAMILY AND SOCIETAL LEVELS
One of the first and foremost principles of the French Revolution was to
do away with the core elements of the system of succession of the ancien
r~gime.430  The abolition of the inheritance order was de rigueur to
consolidate the passing of bourgeois property to the next generation by
ROMAN MARRIAGE; IUSTI CONIUGES FROM THE TIME OF CICERO TO THE TIME OF ULPIAN 5
(1991) ("Matrimonium is an institution involving a mother, mater. The idea implicit in the
word is that a man takes a woman in marriage, in matrimonium ducere, so that he may have
children by her.").
424 1791 CONST. tit. II, para. 7 (Fr.) ("The law considers marriage only as a civil contract.").
425 CODE CIVIL [C. ClV.] arts. 229-230 (Fr.).
426 CHARLES DE SECONDAT, supra note 73, at 15 (stating that "the power of divorce can be
given only to those who feel the inconveniences of marriage, and who are sensible of the
moment when it is for their interest to make them cease").
427 id.
428 See generally Zweigert & K6tz, supra note 56, at 96 (mentioning the reduced rights over
marriage property attributed to the wife as a result of being "unexperienced in business
affairs").
429 BASDEVANT-GAUDEMET & GAUDEMET, supra note 51, at 353-54 (author's translation).
430 Lobingier, supra note 101, at 12.
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means of instituting testamentary freedom. 43' The revolutionary legal order
considered itself empowered to regulate every aspect of the citizens' lives.
The Revolution entrusted the government, that is, the political branch,432
with the determination of how this new system of succession would look. In
other words, as Montesquieu describes, we inherit not because our parents so
decide, but because the government allows it to happen.433
The key to the new inheritance scheme was the institution of the legitime,
which was a portion of the estate that the testator was free to devise to any of
his legitimate heirs, and was equivalent to one-fourth of the estate.434 The
legitime was aggravated by another device, which was the testator's right to
dispose of one-fourth of his estate freely, to anyone, whether or not a
legitimate heir.435 In toto, the testator was free to devise up to one-half of his
estate to any of his legitimate heirs.436 Under the Old Regime, the testator
did not have that freedom, 437 and this lack of freedom was considered vital to
secure the welfare and unity of the family.
431 CODE CIVIL [C. civ.] art. 723 (Fr.) ("[L]a loi rbgle l'ordre de succ~der entre les hritiers
lgitimes & leur d~faut, les biens passent aux enfants naturels, ensuite A l'dpoux survivant; et
s'il n'y en a pas, A la R~publique.") ("The law regulates the order of succession amongst
legitimate heirs; if they do not exist, the estate passes to natural children, then to the surviving
spouse; and in default of this, to the Republic." (author's translation)).
432 CHARLES DE SECONDAT, supra note 73, at 62 ("[T]he law of nature ordains that fathers
shall provide for their children; but it does not oblige them to make them their heirs. The
division of property, the laws of this division, and the succession after the death of the person
who has had this division can be regulated only by the community, and consequently by
political or civil laws.").
433 Id. at 63 ("A general maxim: it is an obligation of law of nature to provide for our
children; but to make them our successors is an obligation of the civil or political law.").
434 Zweigert & Kdtz, supra note 56, at 96 (called "quotit6 disponible"); see also
BASDEVANT-GAUDEMET & GAUDEMET, supra note 51, at 386 ("[Lle pare dispose librement
d'une partie de ses biens, la quotit6 disponible, pour avantager l'enfant de son choix.") ("The
father disposes freely of a part of his property, called 'available quote,' to benefit the child of
his election." (author's translation)).
435 Zweigert & Kotz, supra note 56, at 96 (called "quotit6 disponible"); see also
BASDEVANT-GAUDEMET & GAUDEMET, supra note 51, at 386 ("[L]e pare dispose librement
d'une partie de ses biens, la quotit6 disponible, pour avantager l'enfant de son choix.") ("The
father disposes freely of a part of his property, called 'available quote,' to benefit the child of
his election." (author's translation)).
436 CODE CIVIL [C. civ.] art. 731-8 (Fr.).
437 JAKSit, supra note 6, at 169 ("Clearly, the time had not yet come in Chile for the
introduction of progressive legislation on matrimony, civil registries, and cemeteries. Bello
was also not entirely satisfied with the ultimate outcome of legislation on succession, for he
was an advocate of the freedom to designate beneficiaries in wills. Instead, the Chilean code
contemplated mandatory assignments, which depended on the number of surviving relatives.
Despite these shortcomings, Bello scored major victories in recognizing the rights of children
born outside church-sanctioned marriage; removing obstacles for the circulation of property,
and abolishing the mayorazgos (entails). The elimination of the latter can be considered a
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The Montesquieuan idea of succession based on an almost absolute
freedom of testation strongly impacted Latin America. The extent of this
impact is complex and debatable. The institution of the legitime is to blame,
in a significant proportion, for widespread quarrels within families. That is,
those excluded from the last dispositions of the testator oftentimes have
raised suspicions against those benefited. Since the testator is no longer
around to clarify things, familial acrimonies have persisted among those left
behind by virtue of la main mort, that is, the testator's will. Moreover, had it
not been for the constraints that Andrrs Bello encountered in Chile at the
time of the passage of the Civil Code in 1855, little or nothing of the old
system of inheritance stemming from Roman, and later Castilian law,438
would have been left.
43 9
While it is true that the Civil Code kept the institution of the forced
shares, 440 as already mentioned, it limited them to one-half of the estate.441
That, in effect, did away with the old order of the families, under which the
Western world had lived for about fifteen hundred years, under Pagan, and
later Christianized Rome.
XXI. IMPOSITION OF A STATE DOCTRINE BASED ON THE PRINCIPLE OF
UNIVERSALLY-MANDATED GOVERNMENT EDUCATION
After the Revolution, the absolute State sought to perpetuate itself by
means of the most effective of all means of control of society: the education
of the minds."2 The Constitution of 1791 mandated that "public instruction
major accomplishment because two previous attempts in 1818 and 1828 had caused major
unrest among landowners given this royal privilege during the colonial period. By converting
the mayorazgos into rent-producing liquid assets, Bello was able to assure them that their
property would not be lost. Clearly, Bello's interest in this matter was the elimination of
privilege for the few while ensuring the sovereign character of private ownership. The
principle of equality in civil (as distinct from political) terms was firmly established in such
areas as the ability to acquire and dispose of property, and enter into contracts regardless of
race, class, or national origin.").
438 For a review of the Castilian succession law applicable to the colonies prior to their
independence, see MIROW, supra note 346, at 61-69; see also CLIFFORD WALTON, THE CIVIL
LAW IN SPAIN AND SPANISH-AMERICA 519-26 (2003).
439 JAKSIt, supra note 6, at 169 ("Bello was not entirely satisfied with the ultimate outcome
of legislation on succession, for he was an advocate of the freedom to designate beneficiaries
in wills.").
440 Zweigert & Krtz, supra note 56, at 96 (explaining that the forced shares that compose the
estate is called reserve).
441 See, e.g., CODIGO CIVIL [COD. civ.] arts. 1167, 1181, 1184 (Chile) (allowing the testator
to devise in his last will and testament up to one-half of his estate).
442 See HILAIRE BELLOC, SURVIVALS AND NEW ARRIVALS 139 (speaking about the unwanted
consequences befalling onto society in the name of a "universal compulsory educational
2010)
GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
for all citizens, free of charge in those branches of education which are
indispensable to all men, shall be constituted and organized. 443 The masses
needed to be controlled, and education was the best antidote to avoid
potential challenges to the new bourgeois order.
As lofty as the goals of universal education, or rather "instruction ' 4 of
the people were, the truth is that the mandate was and is intimately
intertwined with content. The government mandates instruction, but only
and exclusively in the substantive and topical programs determined by the
government itself. As already stated elsewhere, whether a monarchy,
aristocracy, autocracy, or democracy, the government does nothing for free.
At the end of the day, the government ends up taxing parents and inculcating
the content that it thinks is proper for children to learn, know, live by, and
pass on to the next generation.
Besides content, governmental education focuses on intellectual
formation and formal instruction, to the detriment of the holistic education of
children based on values, aspiration, and ideals that only the family or a
Church setting may provide. Even if well-intended, government-mandated
education has caused a broad dereliction of parental obligations, at least in
most of Latin America. By the end of the nineteenth century, leyes de
instrucci6n primaria obligatoria (laws mandating primary education) and
literacy programs swept through Latin America.4 5 Since education was
thought to benefit society, and because it was the State's duty to avoid
ignorance, the government would force children to attend school.4 6
In this sense, the Revolution claimed the totalizing power of the State in
the present tense, but sought also to perpetuate itself by controlling the minds
of future generations.
system").
443 1791 CONST. tit. I (Fr.), available at http://sourcebook.fsc.edu/history/constitutionofl 791.
html.
444 BELLOC, supra note 80, at 160 (recalling Danton saying that "after bread, the first need of
the populace was instruction"); see also BELLOC, supra note 162, at 80 (stating, prophetically,
"For instance, suppose a majority to order for all young children of the Modem State a certain
course of instruction in certain sexual matters.").
445 MICHAEL L. KAMIL ET AL., 3 HANDBOOK OF READING RESEARCH 41 (2000) (referring to
the spread of "literacy movements in Latin America").
446 GOUGH, supra note 14 (highlighting that the revolutionary agenda clearly included the
replacement of the Christian religion by another religion built upon enlightened self-interest,
called "Civic Education." For this purpose, in July 1793 the philosophical fanatics at the
National Convention approved a plan for the creation of 20,000 boarding schools to provide
compulsory education for boys from ages five to twelve. During this time they were to receive
a strictly egalitarian education, all wearing the same clothes and receiving identical lessons,
for them to become loyal citizens educated in Jacobin orthodoxy. This program eventually
failed due to lack of funding, but not for lack of conviction).
[Vol. 39:39
FRENCH LEGAL LEGACY IN LATIN AMERICA
XXII. A LEGAL PROFESSION WITH LOOSE ETHICAL STANDARDS AND LAX
ETHICS CONTROL MECHANISMS
The legal profession is, literally more than figuratively, a survivor of the
French Revolution. In fact, the Chapelier Law of 1791, in force until
1864,44 reasoned that no mediators between the law and the citizens were
needed."4  Accordingly, it abolished the profession of lawyer." 9 Napoleon
followed suit in his profound dislike for lawyers. 5° In stark contradiction
with the French Revolution's stance against lawyers and the right of
representation by counsel, the ancien r~gime had afforded every litigant the
opportunity to make use of an attorney.45'
After the reinstatement of the profession of avocats, the legal profession
survived, crippled, particularly in Latin America, under the broad influence
of the Revolution.452 In that region, lawyers have been bred under the
concept of legal positivism that teaches that the law is just and fair per se,
that is, based on the mere fact that it emanates from the sovereign.45
However, in the many instances where the predicament of strict adherence to
rigid notions of legal positivism is not fulfilled, the legal mind enters into an
unsolvable conundrum. On the one hand, it is supposed to uphold the legal
order, and on the other, it is a first-hand witness to the injustice of the law
that it is supposed to defend. Whether the law is unfair or obsolete, the legal
system and its professional oath still force judges and lawyers to apply it.
Precisely this detachment of the law from reality, and from what is fair,
certain, and predictable, has widely caused lawyers to distrust the law as
well.454 The road from distrust of the law, to disregard of the law, is a one-
way street. In this scenario, considering that the judiciary is no longer
trusted to impart justice, lawyers have habitually resorted to any means,
some of them even clouded with illegality or illegitimacy, to obtain justice
447 BASDEVANT-GAUDEMET & GAUDEMET, supra note 51, at 391.
448 Id. at 348.
49 See VAN CAENEGEM, supra note 21, at 131 (noting the expansion of the judge's role to
create a more democratic access to justice for all).
450 Lobingier, supra note 101, at 124.
451 WATKIN, supra note 106, at 439 (highlighting that the right to counsel was instituted by
the Ordonnance on civil procedure of 1667).
452 Id. (commenting that post-Revolutionary France has supplied the structure and functions
of the legal profession in much of the civil law world).
453 See CODIGO CIVIL [COD. civ.] art. I (Chile), available at http://www.leychile.clUNavegar
?idNorma=1 72986 (defining law as "a manifestation of the sovereign will").
454 Maria Dakolias, A Strategy for Judicial Reform: The Experience in Latin America, 36
VA. J. INT'L L. 167, 168 (1995) ("A climate of distrust and frustration permeates the system
and has been acknowledged by virtually every sector of society including private individuals,
the business community and system insiders like judges and lawyers.").
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for their cases.455 The double allegiance of lawyers toward the law and their
clients ended up generating great cynicism toward the legal system, or
outright contempt for the law, in light of its unfairness or illegitimacy.
Furthermore, the legal profession well understands that its existence
depends on the actions, reactions, and inactions of the political power.456 Its
relations with the sovereign fluctuate, but the status and well-being of
lawyers is ultimately reliant on the government.457 More than living,
according to the rule of law,458 the legal profession has dwelled in post-
revolutionary times in Latin America under the rule of the lawgiver. Thus, a
legal profession with a very low self-esteem has been bred in Latin America,
and this has happened thanks, in great measure, to the French Revolution.
XXIII. CONCLUSION
Many theories attempt to explain away the flaws present in Latin
American legal systems. Whatever the soundness of those explanations, the
truth is that all the perceived weaknesses that linger in a society for whatever
reason (wars, weather, wealth, or race) need a philosophical shape around
which to consolidate themselves. These ideological underpinnings make it
possible to write a Constitution and to draft laws that reflect the ethos of a
people. The values that a society holds dear render it feasible to present a
political project to the world based on philosophical foundations and not just
on the dictatorial wimps of a ruler. In that sense, the French Revolution
provided the catalyst for the new Latin American nations' failings upon their
independence.
Experience and reason demonstrate that not every philosophical idea is
correct or fair. The Revolutionary ideology is not the exception and it must
be held accountable for the results it has provoked.45 9 That task has been
455 MARIA DAKOLIAS, THE JUDICIAL SECTOR IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN:
ELEMENTS OF REFORM 62 (1996) ("[T]he punishments [of lawyers in Latin America] may be
so minimal that enforcement does not deter unethical behavior by the lawyers.").
456 See generally ROGELIO PEREZ-PERDOMO, LATIN AMERICAN LAWYERS: A HISTORICAL
INTRODUCTION 42-48 (discussing the vicissitudes that Latin American lawyers have endured
vis-A-vis the political power since the times of independence).
457 MERRYMAN & PtREZ-PERDOMO, supra note 69, at 1-19 (commenting on the challenges
that the legal profession endures in post-Revolution Latin America); see also LUCAS SIERRA,
LAW, SOCIAL CHANGE AND LAWYERS IN CHILE: FROM THE SHRILLNESS OF THE 60S TO THE
SILENCE OF TODAY (2002), available at http://law.yale.edu/documents/pdf/LawSocial Chan
geand lawyers.pdf (discussing the relations between lawyers and the military regime during
the military dictatorship of 1973-1990).
458 JAKSIc , supra note 6, at 6-17 ("Therefore that rule is our true homeland, and that rule is
the law, without which everything disappears.").
459 For a discussion of the negative consequences brought throughout Europe by the French
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largely obscured, or is still pending with respect to Latin America. In this
region, an implicit consensus across the board seems to exist in that only
good fruits have emerged from the revolutionary seed. This paradigm needs
to face history and reality and, consequently, change.
Certainly, ill "leanings" existed under Spanish colonial rule. For
example, the most often overlooked legal obligation of encomenderos, to
convert and educate the Indians, respect their customs, pay them their due,
and protect and treat them as human beings.46° In fact, the Spanish Crown
established the institution of the Protector of the Indians, to ensure their good
treatment.461  Even if abolished,462 by the time of the independence
movement, the old flavor of the enslavement of the Indians, which was
illegal in the colonies, and sometimes carried out through the encomienda,
still pervaded Latin American societies.
At any rate, all of these societal evils needed a philosophical shape, a
substratum, to persist after independence, and they found it in the legal ideas
spearheaded by the French Revolution.
The American constitutional experience shows that a strong system of
check-and-balances counteracts abuses of power.463 As this Article posits,
the French Revolution not only did not advance such a system, but it
opposed it as a matter of principle.
Furthermore, there is an inherently discriminatory approach to equality in
the French revolutionary ideas. Equality was not for everybody.
Revolution, see generally EDMUND BURKE, REFLECTIONS ON THE REVOLUTION IN FRANCE
(1910).
460 In the West, Catholic preachers were the first and foremost to cry foul on this old
institution. See generally PAUL S. VICKERY, 13 BARTOLOME DE LAS CASAS: GREAT PROPHET
OF THE AMERICAS (2006); see also THE BULL SUBLIMUS DEI (ON THE ENSLAVEMENT AND
EVANGELIZATION OF INDIANS IN THE NEW WORLD), OF POPE PAUL III (1537) (putting the issue
to rest when referring to the American Indians as "truly men ... [not to be] deprived of their
liberty or the possession of their property ... [to] freely and legitimately, enjoy their liberty
[and not to be] in any way enslaved"). Protestant England, instead, never gave up slavery in
the American colonies and neither did the Protestant Dutch in the Caribbean. The Catholic
Medieval Age saw a gradual ascent from the slave to the serf and then to the free peasant.
The Reformation undid all of this by first creating fertile ground for undeterred capitalism (the
exploitation of the weak by the strong, in massive numbers), which in turn, generated the
Communist response, which killed more human beings than any other doctrine in the past of
humankind). Id.
461 RECOPILACI6N DE LEYES DE LOS REYNOS DE LAS INDIAS (Andr~s Ortega ed., 3d ed. 1774)
(featuring Book VI, Title VI "De los Protectores de Indios") ("On the Protectors of the
Indians" (author's translation)).
462 A royal c~dula (decree) of 1721 by King Philip V, abolished definitively the encomienda
system. MIROW, supra note 346, at 61-69.
463 BARBARA A. BARDES ET AL., AMERICAN GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS TODAY: THE
ESSENTIALS 89 (2008) (referring to the American model of vertical and horizontal check and
balances system).
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Authoritarianism ran in tandem with the despising of the lower people.
Rousseau, for example, the great inspirer of revolutionary legal ideas,
admonished that private property was at the origin of all evils. In effect,
Rousseau sustained that social evils began when the first man fenced a lot of
land and claimed it for himself.464 Rousseau himself is supposed to have said
"[y]ou forget that the fruits belong to all and that the land belongs to no
one. ' 465 However, taking a closer look at things, Rousseau not only twisted
history, but neglected to notice that private property was not at the root of the
social evils he described, but quite the opposite; the desire for accumulation
of a few to the detriment of the right to private property by all is the true
kernel of the phenomenon of accumulation. Ultimately, it was pride, the
coveting of others' lands, that was at the source of all societal evils, and not
the necessary and fundamental institution of private property.
Despite these contradictions, the Western world still lives under the aegis
of the French Revolution, and many of its illnesses are patent today. Even
the United States is not free from the influence of that movement. Thomas
Jefferson, a friend, supporter, and promoter of the French revolutionaries,
exalted the means and the ends of the Revolution early on when he said "that
the revolution's glorious ends justified apocalyptic means." 66 Jefferson, an
unrepentant slave-owner, quickly accepted the revolutionary contempt
toward the judiciary, and the fact that Marbury v. Madison occurred in the
United States is despite or rather, against, his desires.467
464 JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, DISCOURSE ON THE ORIGIN AND BASIS OF INEQUALITY AMONG
MEN (Marc Michel Rey ed., 1754), cited in PETER GAY, THE BASIC POLITICAL WRITINGS OF
JEAN JACQUES ROUSSEAU 25 (1987) ("The first man who, having fenced in a piece of land,
said 'This is mine,' and found people naive enough to believe him, that man was the true
founder of civil society.").
465 M.A. THIERS, THE HISTORY OF THE FRENCH REVOLUTION 359 (Frederick Shoberl trans.,
1877).
466 MERRILL PETERSON, JEFFERSON WRITINGS 1004 (14th ed. 1984). He also added, "[M]y
own affections have been deeply wounded by some of the martyrs to the cause, but rather than
it should have failed, I would have seen half the earth desolated." Id.
467 John Adams, a federalist in permanent political quarrel with and in opposition to Thomas
Jefferson, wanted the judiciary to control the legislature, so he appointed his Secretary of
State, John Marshall, as the Supreme Court Chief Marshall, a federalist himself, used the
first opportunity he had to assert the Supreme Court's power to control the constitutionality of
the legislature, and issued the constitutional supremacy doctrine in Marbury v. Madison as an
obiter dictum. In sum, the United States has enjoyed a democratic system based on the check-
and-balances of the branches of government for two hundred years, and this, despite the
Francophile Jefferson. His strong aversion toward the judiciary, his belief in a strong central
government, the lack of check-and-balances, and the embracing of a revolutionary philosophy
that profoundly distrusts the people, are still lingering threats to the American democratic
experiment. See, e.g., Thomas Jefferson, Letter to Thomas Richie, 25 Dec. 1820, in WRITINGS
OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 171 (Paul L. Ford ed. 1899) ("A judiciary independent of a king or
executive along, is a good thing; but independent of the will of the nation is a solecism, at
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It is oftentimes pointed out that things in France followed a course of
action different from that of Latin America, which has witnessed
dictatorships and massive human rights violations. But a closer look at
things bespeak otherwise. It would suffice to recall the casualties inflicted
during the Napoleonic wars throughout Europe and elsewhere. Napoleon's
Grande Arme alone lost more than three hundred thousand men during the
invasion of Moscow in 1812.468 Napoleon's rise to power from Consul to
dictator occurred in the spirit of, and thanks to, the Revolution's principle of
strong separation of powers. Had the principle launched by the Revolution
been otherwise, another fate would have befallen France, and Latin America
in this case. In addition, many were massacred under the Vichy Regime
during World War II. In summary, in just about two hundred years, millions
lost their lives under the aegis of the French Revolution in Europe alone.
These events probably motivated France after World War II to revisit
some of the liberal political principles it had lived by previously. But France
was reluctant to recognize explicitly that those principles were wrong.
Consequently, France started undoing some things that it had previously
considered as carved in stone upon the Revolution. Significantly, it created a
new court, the Constitutional Court, and refurbished the old royal State
Council. However, it denied these tribunals the status of courts because, to
do so, would have required denying the principle that judges do not have the
power to strike down legislation, which is central to the whole idea of the
separation of powers principle. In this evolution, the French also created a
partial presidential veto power to control majorities. As the French were
doing all of this after World War II, Latin Americans started looking at
France anew to draw from the French legal wisdom. Consequently, Latin
least in a republican government."); Thomas Jefferson, Autobiography, 1821, in WRITINGS OF
THOMAS JEFFERSON 113 (Paul L. Ford ed. 1899) ("They [the judges] are in fact the corps of
sappers and miners, steadily working to undermine the independent rights of the States, and to
consolidate all power in the hands of that government in which they have so important a
freehold estate."); Thomas Jefferson, Letter to Charles Hammond, 18 Aug. 1821, in WRITINGS
OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 331-32 (Andrew A. Lipscomb ed. 1904) ("The germ of dissolution of
our federal government is in the constitution of the federal judiciary; an irresponsible
body... working like gravity by night and by day ... and advancing its noiseless step like a
thief ... until all shall be usurped from the States and the government of all be consolidated
into one."); Thomas Jefferson, Letter to A. Coray, 31 Oct. 1823, in WRITINGS OF THOMAS
JEFFERSON 486-87 (Andrew A. Lipscomb ed. 1904) (calling the judiciary bodies "the most
dangerous" members of "our government"). All citations are taken from THE OXFORD
DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN LEGAL QUOTATIONS 215 (Fred R. Shapiro ed., 1993).
468 For a discussion of Napoldon's conquests, see FREDERICK WHISHAW, Moscow: A STORY
OF THE FRENCH INVASION OF 1812 (1905); THEODORE AYRAULT DODGE, NAPOLEON'S
INVASION OF RUSSIA (2008); H.B. GEORGE, NAPOLEON'S INVASION OF RUSSIA (1899); R.G.
BURTON, NAPOLEON'S INVASION OF RUSSIA (1914).
20101
120 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. [Vol. 39:39
American governments began implementing other French experiments
without pondering the advisability of the very intellectual bases of their own
constitutional and legal systems.
The question that begs now is: quo vadis (what happens now)? As it was
advanced in the introduction, the purpose of this essay has been destructive,
that is, aimed at exposing and demolishing the legal legacy of a philosophical
and political movement that, at least in the context of Latin America, has
largely exceeded its lifespan. The next chapter of this saga would be to
propose an alternative model or framework, a different intellectual and
philosophical foundation, which would provide sounder legal bases for Latin
American societies. That task must be left for another, maybe better, day.
Hopefully, not more than another two hundred years shall elapse until that
happens.
